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This Thesis is an analytical investigation of the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa. It focuses on the violent conflicts and instability that marked 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly the eastern DRC region since 1996-
2006. The DRC hosted about 1.25 million Rwandan Hutu refugees (including the ex-Forces 
Armeés Rwandaises and Hutu militiamen) following the hundred atrocious days of the 1994 
genocide under Hutu-led government in Rwanda. This study assesses rigorously the role of 
the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC conflicts. 
 
The theoretical framework of this research is the Ervin Staub’s Basic Needs perspective. This 
theoretical model provides an analytical tool to examine a myriad of factors underlying mass 
violence and genocide. Factors such as difficult life conditions, group cultural history, social 
psychological factors and context create an enhanced potential for movement along a path of 
violent conflicts with hallmarks including moral exclusion, stigmatization, dehumanization 
and impunity. The tool of qualitative textual analysis of relevant scholarly and non-scholarly 
documents in the subject area is used. A whole range of issues comprising the conflicts in 
Rwanda, Burundi and DRC before and after the 1994 Rwanda genocide is assessed: ethnicity, 
ideologies, refugees, rebel groups in DRC conflicts, socio-economical contexts. In analyzing 
the data I have employed content analysis. 
 
The results of this study point out that, factors such as difficult life conditions, ideologies of 
hatred, economical and political crises that marked the Great Lakes Region of Africa have 
created a climate conducive to conflicts. Furthermore, the research shows that the 1994 
Rwandan Hutu refugees, particularly the ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen, contributed in the 
escalation of violent conflicts in eastern DRC. This corroborates the scholars finding that 
refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict and the by-product of war; they are 
also important political actors who can play an active role in conflict dynamics and instability 
(Salehyan 2007: 127; Collier in Furley 2006:2). The study ends with recommendations for 
peace and sustainable stability and development in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: 
comprehending and addressing thoroughly the roots causes of conflicts, promoting and 
implementing policies and mechanisms for good governance, economic development, respect 
of human rights and justice, addressing effectively the issue of refugees and reconciliation. 
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genocide, The Hutu-Tutsi antagonism, The Anti-Tutsi ideology, The 1994 Rwandan Hutu 
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“Genocide is part of history, it follows humanity like a dark shadow 
from early antiquity to the present time.” 
 
Lemkin R (Malvern 2000:250) 
 
 
1. OVERVIEW AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The history of antagonistic relationships between two significant ethnic groups in Rwanda 
and Burundi – the Hutu and Tutsi – is linked to a large extent to the instability that marked 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa, especially in the 1990s. Although the Great Lakes Region 
of Africa comprises nine countries, geographically – Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
1
 and Mozambique – the 
most affected states were Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC. In 1994, the apex 
of this Hutu–Tutsi antagonism was the genocide in Rwanda; and as Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005: 
18) observes, all the countries of the Great Lakes Region felt the impact of the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda at least in terms of refugee flows.  
 
The present study intends to look at the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide
2
 in the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa. Moses and Knutsen (2007:132) suggest that studying a single case 
can yield reasonable hypotheses and/or theoretical outcome. This study focuses on the case of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Appendix 1), especially the eastern DRC region, which 
experienced the most dreadful repercussions of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The latter, 
harboured a remarkable number of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (Adedeji 1999, Muggah & 
Mogire 2006). In this connection, my research hypothesis argues that “the mass migration of 
Rwandan Hutu population following the genocide of 1994 contributed to the escalation of 
ethnic violence in the eastern DRC between 1996 and 2006.” 
                                                
1 The Democratic Republic of Congo is the former Zaire (until 1997). The map of DRC: Appendix 1. 





In order to assess the above hypothesis, this study seeks to address the following specific 
objectives:  
(i) To establish how the presence of Rwandan Hutu refugee population affected 
ethnic attitudes in eastern DRC;  
(ii) To investigate the role of migrations of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the 
formation of ethnic based rebel groups in eastern DRC; 
(iii) To explore the overall contribution of Rwandan Hutu refugee movements to 
the instability of the Great Lakes Region.   
Drawing from those objectives, three main questions are used to guide this research:  
(i)  To what extent did the 1994 migration of Rwandan Hutu refugees shape 
attitudes toward Tutsis in the eastern DRC region? 
(ii) To what extent did Rwandan Hutu migrations contribute to the formation of 
rebel groups based on ethnicity? 
(iii)To what extent did Rwandan Hutu refugee movements contribute to instability 
in the Great Lakes Region? 
 
Thus, this introductory chapter will give a brief background to the topic, and will point out 
the principal theories upon which this research is constructed and the methodology adopted 
for the study. This research seeks to investigate and analyse the security problems in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa, particularly in the eastern DRC from 1996 to 2006. It 
examines the role played by the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (after 1994 Rwandan 
genocide) in the instability that marked the eastern DRC region (mainly the Kivu provinces: 
South and North Kivu), it explores the exacerbation of ethnic problems and the spreading of 
the ideology of hatred. Therefore, this study hopes to make a contribution to political science, 
peace and conflict studies by investigating a possible link between the 1994 Rwandan refugee 
movements and the growth of ethnic intolerance in the eastern DRC. It is hoped that this will 
shed more light on the understanding of ethnic conflicts and on the refugees’ potential 








2. BACKGROUND TO THE TOPIC 
 
 
From April to July of 1994, hundred horrendous days of genocide took place in Rwanda 
under a Hutu-led government. It claimed the lives of about a million Rwandans made up 
mostly of Tutsis and reputedly ‘moderate’ Hutus. Generated at the state level (as confessed 
by Jean Kambanda
3
, the Prime Minister of Rwandan government in 1994)
4
 the genocide was 
mostly carried out by the Interahamwe militias (of the then ruling party, namely the 
Mouvement Républicain National pour la démocratie et le développement, National 
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development, MRND) and the Impuzamugambi 
(of the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic party, CDR, an extremist ally of the 
MRND) working together with the Presidential Guard, certain elements in the army, various 
gendarmes, and civilian administrative authorities (Newbury 1995:12). By July 1994 the 
Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which had invaded Rwanda in 1990, 
overthrew the then Rwandan government and militarily controlled the whole country. The 
victory of RPF not only ended the genocide but also triggered the massive outflow of 1.72 to 
2.1 million Hutu refugees to neighbouring countries: Burundi, DRC, Tanzania and Uganda
5
. 
Of this outflow, DRC hosted 1.1 to 1.25 million; among these were some ex-Forces Armeés 
                                                
3 Appendix 10 
4
  In the guilty plea at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) court, Jean Kambanda, Prime 
Minister and Head of Government of the Rwanda Interim Government in 1994, admits that the planning and 
execution of the genocide were acts of State (www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs).  The 1994 government officials and 
state officials, particularly the extremist Hutus, put in place structural mechanisms to mobilize Hutu mass 
population against Tutsis. The anti-Tutsi propaganda was structurally launched from the top government 
officials. Within a few hours after the plane carrying Juvenal Habyarimana (then President of Rwanda: 
Appendix 10) was shot down, Presidential Guards set roadblocks in different parts of Kigali city, the then Prime 
Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (a moderate Hutu) was killed.  Officials such as Col. Theoneste Bagosora (the 
then Rwandan Ministry of Defence Cabinet Director: Appendix 10), the new Prime Minister Kambanda and 
others of the interim government of “Abatabazi” oversaw  the killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Chretien 
2000:281-5; Hintjens 1999: 246-7; US Defense Intelligence Report of 9
th
 May 1994 on www.gwu.edu; US 
Department of State outgoing telegram to Col. Bagosora, April 1994 on www.gwu.edu;  Madsen 1999). 
5
 A number of factors explain the reason why such large number of Hutus left the country as the RPF militarily 
advanced and took over the control of Rwanda: firstly, through the genocidal propaganda, the RPF and Tutsis 
were portrayed as the enemy of Rwanda (Umwanzi w’u Rwanda) whose plan was to kill, dominate and enslave 
Hutus. Secondly, a large number of Rwandan Hutu populations (including even the ordinary people) had 
participated in genocide activities in one way or the other, such as confiscating properties owned by Tutsis. 
Thus, the military victory of RPF triggered immense fear among millions of Rwandan Hutus. Furthermore, the 
“Abatabazi” government (the interim government that oversaw the genocide) played on this general fear  to flee 
the country with a massively large number of populations as a protection (US Defense Intelligence Report of 9
th
 
May 1994 on www.gwu.edu; Hintjens 1999: 242-5; Prunier 1995: 78-80). 
4 
 
Rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Hutu militiamen (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi) (Kisangani 
2000:165).  
 
Like all genocides, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was a complex phenomenon that emerged 
gradually out of a long-term multifaceted combination of factors such as poverty, 
exclusionary policies, effects of the history of colonial rule, and Hutu-Tutsi antagonism. In 
this spectrum of events, the Hutu-Tutsi bipolar ethnic set-up, the instrumentalization of which 
has claimed so many lives both in Rwanda and Burundi (Lemarchand 1997:3) stands out as 
the major force. Indeed, to analyze meaningfully the 1994 Rwanda genocide all the 
interconnected factors and circumstances – such as the introduction of multiparty politics, the 
start of 1990 war, and anti-Tutsi ideology, which made the context in which decisions were 
made – are to be taken into account (Human Right Watch 2006:2). 
 
The presentation of a detailed study or analysis of the 1994 Rwanda genocide is beyond the 
scope of this research. It suffices to mention that there have been many detailed accounts of 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide and various attempts to explain some ideological and historical 
causes of the genocide. Among these are works by Prunier (1995), Reyntjens (1995), 
Newbury (1995), Chrétien (1995), Hintjens (1999) and Lemarchand (1998). And certainly, 
each type of explanation may have some basis in reality as well as some blind spots. 
However, all accounts do take due notice of the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic bipolarity that not only 
underscore the history of Rwanda and Burundi but also have generated hatred and deep-
seated animosity. It is this ethnic hatred that has infected and destabilized the Great Lakes 
Region, particularly DRC (Lemarchand 1997).   
 
• Hutu–Tutsi hatred in Rwanda 
The detailed account of the history of Hutu-Tutsi confrontation in Rwanda is beyond the 
scope of this work, but it suffices to briefly look at some scholarly attempts at explaining the 
historical root of Hutu-Tutsi antagonism in Rwanda. Contradictions and disagreements exist 
in these theories, but all highlight the bipolarization of the two main ethnic groups that 





Catharine Newbury, in her work The Cohesion of oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in 
Rwanda (1860-1960) reassessed Maquet’s theory. In his study ‘Le système des relations 
sociales dans le Rwanda ancien’, Maquet argues that the social relations between the three 
groups: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were ‘rigid’ in character (in Newbury 1988:3). He says that 
Tutsi minority pastoralists held all political power, controlled most wealth, and exploited the 
agriculturalist Hutu, and despite the imbalance in numbers and the evident inequality in the society the 
social and political cohesion was assured through the three mechanisms: value consensus, cattle 
clientship and a complex system of administrative arrangement (in Newbury1988:3).  
 
Newbury (1988:6) argues that Maquet’s theory is partially correct in the sense that “cattle 
clientship could serve an integrative role but the ahistorical character of the model led to 
distortions”. She goes on thus to observe that  
political relations were more complex and identities less rigid. The structures of Tutsi domination were 
more recent and less extensive…and they were transformed in important ways during the European 
colonial period (Newbury 1988: 6). 
  
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) takes a different view from the one expounded above in that the 
Hutu–Tutsi rivalry, hatred, and hostilities are “neither natural nor a product of ancient 
enmities inherited from the pre-colonial past”. He argues that Belgian colonial authorities, the 
Roman Catholic Church and colonially embedded anthropologists supported and promoted 
the ethnic identity construction into two separate and antagonistic groups in Rwanda, Burundi 
and DRC (the then colonial entity known as ‘Congo Belge et Rwanda –Urundi’) (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2005:18). Chrétien also remarks: 
the prejudices and disputes linked to Hutu-Tutsi cleavages took roots among the first modern Rwandan 
elites in the 1950s…notably those who graduated from Astrida (A secondary school founded and 
financed by Brothers of Charity) or from seminary (Chretien 2003: 300). 
 
In Rwanda in 1950s (colonial era) schools were under Catholic Church missionaries ‘who 
played a key role in moulding the elites’ as Schlang states (in Scherrer 2002:27). Public 
service and education were reserved for the Tutsis while the majority of the Hutus were 
agriculturalists and menial task laborers. Chalk and Johassohn (1990: 385-6) wrote: 
“centuries of tradition made the Tutsi feel like a privileged, superior people….and scorned 
Hutus as no more than hard-working and dumb people. The Hutus tended to agree”.
6
 
                                                
6 Although pre-colonial Rwandans were consciously aware of their respective Hutu/Tutsi/Twa identities, the 
generalization about these identities should (like all generalizations) be tempered by the complexities of 
empirical reality. Alexis Kagame (1959:21) and Eller (1999: 202-3) observe that in pre-colonial Rwandan 
society Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities were achieved statuses almost as much  as they were ascribed ones. The 
social system (in pre-colonial Rwandan society) allowed for change in ‘birth’ status of an individual, and this 
‘social mobility’ contributed in a way to strengthen the Rwandan Kingdom (Vuningoma 2009: 5). Scholars such 
6 
 
Under the colonial rule, the Rwandan social system was gradually transformed. The Hutu, 
Tutsi, and Twa identities were firmly structured and used politically or socially (Castells 
2003: 109).
7
 Belgian colonialists introduced the identity cards, which they wanted to use to 
facilitate census surveys that would shed more definitive light on the actual statistical 
distribution of Hutu and Tutsis. Until 1950, Tutsis were still a privileged class compared to 
the Hutus. However, when the anti-colonial movements started echoing around Africa and 
because of the colonial segregation imposed by Belgian colonialists, Tutsi intellectuals 
started anti-colonial activities both in Rwanda and Burundi. This angered the colonialists. 
Consequently in order to preserve and secure their rule, Belgian colonialists started 
promoting Hutus (Chrétien 2003:299-306, Scherrer 2002:28).  
 
Chretien (2003:301) further observes that at this particular time the Tutsis and Hutus had 
divergent nationalist ideas. While Tutsis wanted independence from the Belgian colonial 
government, the Hutus pursued ‘social justice’ which they “emphasized, as a prerequisite [to] 
ending ‘Tutsi feudalism’, even if that meant delaying independence”. Obviously the tension 
was mounting. The Tutsis, who in the first place were privileged by Belgian colonial 
administrators, were threatened by the impending loss of their political power. For their part, 
the Hutus were frustrated: “intellectuals among them (Hutu) aided by the White Fathers 
circulated a note they called “Manifesto of the Bahutu”….it denounced the ‘Tutsi monopoly’ 
and ethnicity on identity cards was demanded” Chrétien (2003:301). The few Hutu elites 
coalesced around political parties: “...they were able to gain the attention of European 
                                                                                                                                                    
as Kagame (1959:23), Akiba (2004:84), Nabudere (2000: 227), Castells (2003: 108), Ochwada (2004: 57) and 
Mamdani (1996: 10) report that in pre-German and pre-Belgium controlled Rwandan society,  Tutsi was more 
an identity of wealth and of power than a ‘birth’ status. And if a Hutu acquired enough wealth to own a herd of 
cattle, rising through the socio-economic hierarchy, he could then go through a social ritual called Kwihutura. 
The latter was a social ritual by which a Hutu shed his ‘Hutuness’ and became a Tutsi. Similarly, poor Tutsi 
(who lost his wealth and power) socially deteriorating became a Hutu through a ritual called Gucupira. Kagame 
(1959:23) adds also that the social mobility, particularly the social promotion to a ‘noble Tutsi’ status, could be 
the result of fundamental acts such as the King’s decision, the marriage with an ‘important Tutsi’ and the 
adoption by a noble Tutsi. This can be illustrated, for instance, by the case of a Twa named Busyete (who saved 
the King’s life) who was promoted to noble Tutsi status by the King Cyirima Rujugira, married Rujugira’s sister 
(Murangamirwa wa Yuhi Mazimpaka) and became chief of a province. Busyete’s descendants became Tutsis 
known under the name of Basyete (Shyaka on www.grandslacs.net/doc, Scherrer 2002: 24).  Furthermore, Eller 
(1999: 203-4) and Akiba (2004: 84-5) mention that the Kwihutura and Gucupira institutions prevented the 
hardening of differences that had the potential of giving rise to disaffection against the ruling of noble Tutsis. 
 
7 Under Belgian rule the social mobility in pre-colonial Rwandan society (mentioned above) was abolished 
(Akiba 2004: 84, Castells 2003: 109). 
7 
 
colonial government to the extent that they could claim to represent the rural masses” 
(Newbury 1988:181). 
 
In 1959 ethnic based political parties were formed. The first was PARMEHUTU (Party of the 
movement of the Emancipation of the Bahutu) which according to Newbury (1988:193) 
“stressed liberation of Hutu and took a strongly anti-Tutsi stance” and UNAR (Rwandan 
National Union) of the Batutsi. Thus “ethnicization and polarization fostered by 
colonialist….led to demonization and dehumanization of the respective opposing groups” 
Scherrer (2002:28). In the same year, (1959) as Destexhe (1995:42) describes, “a series of 
riots directed against the authority of the Tutsi chiefs were allowed by Belgians to escalate 
into a revolution accompanied by massacres which killed more than 200.000 Tutsi…and led 
more to the exile.” They left the country to settle in the neighbouring countries: Uganda, 
Burundi, Tanzania and DRC.  
 
In the host countries Tutsi refugee conditions were quite harsh (Newbury 1995:13, 
Lemarchand 2002:500-1, Luyt 2003:98-9). A number of violent attempts to return home were 
organized by Tutsis in 1963 and 1964 without success. These attacks put Tutsis who had 
remained in the country under risks of being killed and caused others to flee. The Tutsi 
refugees reorganized and supported by Uganda, launched attacks on Rwanda in October 1990 
as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Tutsis in Rwanda were subsequently portrayed as RPF 







                                                
8 As discussed in the above paragraph, the Hutu-Tutsi bipolarization grew gradually stronger in the Rwandan 
society. The Juvenal Habyarimana’s regime (1973-1994) implemented polices of exclusion: Tutsis were 
excluded in different sectors (schools, public services, military services, etc.). At different occasions, Tutsi were 
killed: in Kibilira, Bugogwe and Bugesera (Hintjens 1999: 255-7).  Lemarchand (2002: 510) and Verwimp 
(2000: 3-4) observe that under Habyarimana’s regime, plans and decisions were made to physically eliminate 
the Tutsi. In March 1992 a document (Report of Rwanda Commission of Inquiry) transmitted to the then 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Belgian Ambassador in Rwanda reads (in on of its paragraphs) : “a secret 
military staff charged with the extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda in order to solve forever, in their way, the 
ethnic problem in Rwanda and to destroy the domestic Hutu opposition” (in Verwimp 2000: 3). The invasion of 
RPF (in 1990) offered the context and the occasion to execute the plans of eliminating the Tutsi. In the period of 
1990-1992 thousands of Rwandan Tutsi civilians in the north and west of the country were massacred by youth 
groups acting under the supervision of communal authorities (Lemarchand 2002: 510). 
8 
 
Newbury (1995:14) accounts that: 
Following the October invasion Habyarimana pursued a two-track policy. On the one hand, responding 
to pressure from western donors, he permitted a gradual process of political liberalization and made 
concessions to an active internal pro-democracy movement. Simultaneously Habyarimana permitted 
(or pursued) a policy of internal repression as part of the war strategy, and he allowed (or encouraged) 
a proliferation of human rights abuses. The main targets were Tutsi – from 1990 to 1993 an estimated 
2,000 Tutsi were killed in massacres and murders in several different regions. But outspoken critics of 
the regime and advocates of human rights were also targeted, regardless of ethnic categories. (…) these 
attacks were directed from the security services in the office of the President. The RPF invasion did not 
cause these to happen; the regime in power did that. 
 
 
The climax of this Hutu-Tutsi confrontation in Rwanda was the 1994 genocide. As mentioned 
above, the genocide took place under a Hutu-led government, generated at the state level. 
This had tragic impacts on the Great Lakes Region of Africa in general and on DRC in 
particular: the refugee flow, instability, increased criminality, violent conflicts, ecological 
damage and infectious diseases. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) observes that although all the 
countries of the Great Lakes Region felt the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, at least in 
terms of refugee flow, the DRC has witnessed its most tragic repercussions, and these include 
the wars that ravaged DRC since 1996. Thus, in studying the impact of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide in the Great Lakes Region, I will focus on DRC conflicts. 
The two Kivu provinces in eastern DRC share borders with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. 
The ethnic conflict and civil wars in these neighbouring countries (Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi) generated refugees who moved into eastern DRC region. The presence of these 
refugees together with the pre-existing local and national fragility of the social and political 
climate heightened tensions between groups, inhabitants of Kivu provinces. The presence of 
the 1994 Hutu refugees in the Kivu provinces that followed the Rwandan genocide became 
not ‘an add-on’ to the conflict scene, but a catalyst which reconfigured and exacerbated the 
scene (Pottier 2002:51).  
The fact that the majority of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (i) had participated in the 
genocide against Tutsis (Hintjens 1999: 246-7, Lemarchand 1997), (ii) were still under the 
guidance and control of authorities responsible for organizing and coordinating the genocide 
against Tutsis (McNulty 1999:70-2, Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18) and (iii) fled together with 
armed soldiers and Interahamwe militias (Kisangani 2000:165-6) affected interethnic 
relations in Kivu as well as political and economic life: firstly by changing attitude toward 
Tutsi Congolese by other local groups; and secondly, it increased ethnic armed rebel groups’ 
formation which subsequently augmented instability in the region in general and in the Kivu 
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provinces in particular (Reyntjens 1999: 244; Clark 2003: 67; ICG 2007: 11-2; Vlassenroot 
2002:508-9).   
Different studies on DRC conflicts have shown that these conflicts have been 
multidimensional in character. Specifically, different local, national and regional factors 
rendered the conflicts more complex (Autesserre 2006:8-12). When looking at the impact of 
the 1994 Rwanda genocide in the Great Lakes Region, and particularly analyzing the DRC 
conflicts, most of these studies focus more on a range of casual factors such as the plunder of 
mineral resources, land scarcity, ethnicity, and regional security (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:16; 
Autesserre 2006:6; Reyntjens 1999: 243; Pottier 2002:9-15; Rutazibwa 1999:9). In Chapter 
Two, I will come back to these various scholarly analyses of the DRC conflicts. However, in 
these analyses, less attention is paid to the role of the 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees in the 
DRC conflicts and in the instability of the Great Lakes region. Yet, some scholars observe 
that refugees can become a source of insecurity (Havinga & Bocker in Muggah 2006:5; 
Collier in Furley 2006:2; Lemarchand 1997). It is especially in this last area that this 
dissertation makes a contribution by assessing the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in 
the DRC conflicts and in the instability of the Great Lakes Region. 
 
 
3. PRINCIPAL THEORIES UPON WHICH THE RESEARCH IS CONSTRUCTED
  
The theoretical foundation of my study is based on available literature on violent conflict in 
general and ethnic conflict in particular. However, from an anthropological view-point, 
human conflict is intrinsically complex. In Clinton Fink’s view (1968:413), no social science 
discipline, by itself, can claim to have sufficient intellectual resources to provide an adequate 
theory on human conflict. But attempts to understand why groups and ethnic groups turn 
against each other have led over the years to a wave of theoretical and empirical researches 
which have contributed towards the better understanding of the causal determinants of ethnic 
conflict.  
 
Three theories, the Primordial Theory, the Instrumental Theory, and the Conception 
presented in Ervin Staub’s book The Psychology of Good and Evil, have captured my 
attention for this study. Geertz (in Kieh 2002:10) suggests descriptively that “[b]y a 
primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ … of social existence, 
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immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly…”. In this primordial perspective, identity 
is viewed as a fixed category and ethnic conflicts are subsequently understood as mere “tribal 
clashes” that occur solely by virtue of mutual dislike or even hatred rooted in old sources of 
ethnicity and memories of past atrocities that groups have experienced (Cone 2005:56; 
Sambanis 2001: 262-3). In the case of DRC, the Primordial Theory might assist in explaining 
interethnic ties that motivated members of different ethnic groups in the eastern region to 
fight each other. The theory allows one to understand that different ethnic groups necessarily 
fight because of hatred. But looking at the complexities involved in the eastern DRC’s 
conflict, the primordial perspective becomes inapplicable. It tends to overlook other factors 
that produced a synergy to give the conflict the character it manifested, while assuming that 
the conflict in eastern DRC was exclusively based on ethnic differences and traditional 
mutual hatred among ethnic groups. 
 
Instrumental Theory basically assumes that group members rally around ethnic groups in 
order to achieve alternative goals. Cone (2005: 53-54) argues that conflict between different 
ethnic groups does not stem from a mutual dislike as the Primordial Theory suggests, but 
rather from competition for resources, power, wealth or other goals. In this regard, ethnicity 
is only an instrument of mobilization in the contest for control of power and resources. In the 
wave of democratization process in the DRC (then Zaire) in the 1990s for example, political 
parties used ethnicity to mobilize support, often through the establishment of local ethnic 
militias (Crisis Group Africa Report 2007: 23).  
 
While the Instrumentalist Theory may have been able to explain to some extent the 
complexities surrounding the DRC conflict by showing how the manipulation of ethnicity in 
the DRC conflict was a factor, it fails to “explain how groups come to define certain interests 
as critical in the first place, and why ethnic conflicts attain an intensity and intransigence 
which many suggest are often not commensurate with the substantive interests the parties 
contend are at stake” (Ross 1995: 524). Moreover, it oversimplifies components like 
“security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation” 
which are also eligible to engender conflict in a society (Azar in Starr 1999:24). Agreeing 
totally with the Instrumentalist Theory is to assume that people are at all times manipulable 
by anyone and are “unidimensional creatures… [but] that human behaviour is characterized 
by mixed motives, of which economic advantage is one of several” (Esman 2004: 79). 
Furthermore, Esman (2004:33-4) indicates that the manipulation of ethnic group members is 
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possible “but only if such a manipulation appeals to and draws on a priori sentiments of 
collective identity and group solidarity.” Therefore, Instrumental Theory seems not to 
account for issues, such as culturally rooted social and psychological processes, dormant 
frustrations, external constraints, desires, deep-seated, threats to identity, security fears, 
which produce pre-dispositions for violent conflicts (Ross 1995:525). 
 
An analytical tool therefore which addresses the psychological dispositions of the people 
involved in the DRC conflict and other social processes that played out in the conflict, 
becomes most useful. In his work, Staub (1989) identifies characteristics of a group and that 
of a society, which create an enhanced potential for a group(s) turning against another 
group(s). He states that difficult life conditions as well as group conflict in a society can 
frustrate basic material and psychological needs and can lead people not only to blame and 
stigmatise others as the cause of their problems but also to the creation of destructive 
ideologies and scapegoats as a means to satisfying those basic needs. Staub emphasizes that 
the intensification of the impact of life problems in a society and the way people try to deal 
with them are greatly affected by the predisposing cultural characteristics in a society (Staub 
1989:14; 2003:293-99), which include cultural devaluation, strong respect for authority, and 
past victimization.  
Mass violence and implicit threat of violence in DRC, as Vlassenroot (in Huggins 2005: 116) 
writes has become a continuous feature of Congolese life since 1995 (following the 1994 
Rwandan genocide). There are different groups involved in the conflict in eastern parts of the 
country, mainly Banyamulenge, Hutu, Tutsi, Shi, Nande, Hema and Lendu. But as noted 
previously, the conflict was a result of a number of factors including the decay of the 
Congolese state in general, the deterioration of economy mixed with persistent conflicts 
among groups over land and resources, the brutal arrival of Rwandan Hutu refugees that 
submerged the east, as well as the intrusion of regional countries (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:11-
21; Oyatambwe & Smis 2002: 413-4; McNulty 1999: 66-8; Reyntjens 1999: 241-2; Clark 
2001: 261-2). All of these determinants combined and worsened the existing difficult life 
conditions thereby generating and intensifying mutual negative feelings among ethnic groups 
in the Kivus. This created a fertile ground to reinforce the discourse of and clamour for 
exclusion and divisions of Congolese along the lines of ‘foreigners’ and ‘natives.’  
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Each major ethnic group in eastern DRC mobilized its members and even created its own 
armed militia to protect itself from any threats to its survival, identity, dignity, security, 
connection, etc. For instance, General Laurent Nunda’s rebels claim to protect Tutsis (Thakur 
2007:59), the Mayi-Mayi, a militia said to represent ‘indigenous’ Congolese against Tutsi and 
foreign aggression (Morvan 2006:23). The pull towards own ethnic groupings was 
occasioned by the need to address the existing fears of ones’ physical, political and economic 
security. Ethnic group leaders who emerged at this level tended to provide a ready solution 
(mostly in a destructive way) to satisfy those basic psychological and material needs. This 
was often associated with identifying a scapegoat designated as an enemy to get rid of and 
creating ideologies supportive to the elimination of the enemy. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS  
 
The methodology used in this study comprises of secondary data sources of information; and 
the qualitative research methods will be the key components of my methodology. As Moses 
and Knutsen (2007:132) suggest, studying a single case can yield reasonable hypotheses 
and/or theoretical outcome. Yin (1994: 123) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident, and in which the multiple 
source of evidence are used.” Case study is an ideal methodology when an in-depth analysis 
and a holistic investigation are needed.  The case study approach has proven to be suitable for 
studying complex social phenomena, measuring the impact of specific interventions on a 
certain group or a situation. Furthermore, case studies are designed to bring out the in-depth 
details from the viewpoint of the participants by using multiple sources of data (Tellis 1997:1 
& 12 on www.nova.edu). 
 
From a research strategy point of view, the advantages of case study approach include 
helping to establish relationships between interventions and their outcomes or impacts, 
incorporating various research techniques (qualitative or quantitative or both) which 
strengthens the credibility of results, providing strong evidence to support causal relations 
between specific interventions and specific outcomes or impacts. And the case study research 
can be single or multiple case studies. Case studies have been used in varied analysis and 
investigations, particularly in sociological studies. The limitation of the case study approach 
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is that the very fact that the latter focuses generally on only one causal relationship implies 
that other potential relationships may be left out (Lubbe 2009: 12 -13 on www.acm.org). 
Furthermore, one of the typical criticisms towards the case studies is that there is no basis for 
scientific generalization. Yin (in Tellis 1997:2-3 on www.nova.edu) argues that the purpose 
in case study approach is to generalize to theoretical propositions not to population as in 
statistical research. 
 
Yin (in Tellis 1997:4 on www.nova.edu) identifies specific types of case studies: exploratory 
cases (considered as a prelude to social research), explanatory case studies (used for doing 
causal investigations) and descriptive cases (which require a descriptive theory to be 
developed before starting the project). And each of these three approaches can either be 
single or multiple-case studies, where the latter are replicatory, not sampled cases. Stake (in  
Denzin & Lincoln 2000: 437-8) also divides the case studies in three specific types: intrinsic 
– when the researcher has an interest in the case, instrumental – when the case is used to 
understand more than what is obvious to the observer, and collective – when a group of cases 
is studied. Yin, Stake and other scholars with wide insights in the case study methodological 
approach have developed rigorous procedures for case study research strategy.  
 
Thus, in order to look at the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in the Great Lakes Region 
of Africa, I opted for a case study approach which allows for in-depth analysis and 
understanding, expanding the research findings to theoretical propositions. This study will 
focus on the case of the eastern DRC region to assess rigorously the role of the mass 
migration of Rwandan Hutu population, following the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in the 
conflicts that occurred in that region. Specifically, I will examine critically all possible 
factors linked to the 1996-2006 eastern DRC conflicts.  
 
The main task of my research is to investigate the partial contribution of the 1994 Rwandan 
Hutu refugees to eastern DRC conflicts in particular and to the Great Lakes Region’s 
instability in general. In order to measure this, I will explore the inter-ethnic relationships in 
eastern DRC region before and after the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the 
region, examining the role they played in the attitudinal change towards the Tutsi Congolese, 




To assess the attitudinal change, two variables will be analyzed.  As Rokeach (1967:529) 
opines, attitude change occurs when attitude is activated. And for measuring whether attitude 
toward someone or something has changed Eagly and Chaiken (1993:63) note that indexes of 
behaviour aggregated over multiple acts are potential indicators of attitude change if the 
various actions have in common some degree of favourableness or unfavourableness toward 
the subject in question. Therefore, in order to elucidate the change of attitude by the 
“indigenous” groups (mainly Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo, Bembe, Congolese Hutu, and Shi) 
toward the Congolese Tutsis, the most salient variables among others will be examined.  
Specifically, the study will attempt to assess rigorously: (a) The nature and extent of violent 
attacks against Congolese Tutsis; (b) The nature and extent of political exclusion and 
discrimination against Congolese Tutsi. Clearly, a range of other issues such as the 
mobilization of hostile groups and the use of hate speeches and propaganda by authorities 
against the Congolese Tutsis may provide useful insights about attitudinal shifts towards 
them.  However, the paucity of relevant hard (non-anecdotal) data renders the use of such 
measures virtually untenable for this kind of academic exercise.  As such, the thesis will look 
to focus on the narrower range of variables (as already outlined) to assess the extent and 
nature of the attitudinal changes towards the Congolese Tutsis. 
 
In order to answer to the research question on rebel groups involved in conflicts and establish 
the link between the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the regional instability that ensued, I 
will examine closely the constituents of the rebel groups in terms of their ethnicity, their 
allies, and the motives behind the fighting that occurred in eastern DRC between 1996 and 
2006, and the implication of regional intervention in the DRC conflicts. 
 
The tool of qualitative textual analysis of relevant scholarly and non-scholarly documents in 
the subject area is used. These documents include books, pertinent journal articles, reports, 
records, magazines, published papers, electronic documents, political documents, and 
memoirs that deal with issues of politics, conflict, ethnicity, refugees, (migration), Great 
Lakes Region of Africa, security and peace. Furthermore, a whole range of issues comprising 
the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC before and after the 1994 Rwanda genocide is 
assessed. They include: ethnicity and its impact on political, social and economical layers in 
the three countries mentioned; an assessment of the roles and impact of refugees; rebel 
groups involved in DRC conflicts, their political and social raison d’être, their allies; and the 
ideologies that marked peace and security issues in the region, will be assessed. In analyzing 
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the data I have employed content analysis, which provides the tool to present synthesized 
studies of subject matters. And the classification of the documentary sources into primary, 
secondary and tertiary categories (Burnham, 2004:165-175) is taken into consideration. All 
data were ordered and reduced to relate to the objectives of the research in order to confirm 
(or not) the hypothesis of my study.  
 
5. CHAPTER LAYOUT 
 
This study comprises six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter is a 
brief review of different scholarly works that dealt with the impact of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide in the Great Lakes Region, in general, and in DRC in particular. In the third chapter 
I investigate the role of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the change of attitudes towards Tutsi 
Congolese in the eastern DRC, by exploring the inter-ethnic relationships in the DRC before 
and after the 1994 Rwandan refugees arrived. This chapter examines also the role that 
ideology of Hutu-Tutsi hatred in Rwanda played in eastern DRC conflict. The fourth chapter 
comprises a critical analysis of the composition of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugee 
population and how this might have contributed to the formation of ethnic-based rebel groups 
in DRC. It also assesses different rebel armed groups involved in the conflict in the eastern 
DRC and the motivation behind their fight. And in order to assess the role of the 1994 Hutu 
refugee movements to the instability in the Great Lakes Region, I examine in the fifth chapter 
the responsibility of these Hutu refugees in the instability that occurred in each country of the 
Region particularly countries that not only share borders with Rwanda but also which serve 
as hosts to a considerable number of refugees. Furthermore, this chapter looks at the regional 
responses to the refugee crisis. A recapitulation of the findings of this research and some 














A Review of Related Literature 
 
“Evil is no faceless stranger, living in a distant neighbourhood. 
Evil has a wholesome, hometown face, with merry eyes and an open smile. 
Evil walks among us wearing a mask which looks like all our faces.” 
 
--Dean Koontz, The Book of Counted Sorrows. 
 
 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide was one of the greatest cataclysms that marked the world’s 
history. Indeed, in the last two centuries the world has experienced violent conflicts such as 
the Great Wars, Holocaust, genocides (in Cambodia, Burundi, Bosnia, and recently in 
Rwanda), and terrorism. Throughout the world a total of 226 armed conflicts have been 
recorded for the period between 1946 and 2002 (Eriksson et al, 2003:593).  Indeed, as 
Amadou (in Adedeji 1999:22) observes the post-Cold War era has been rendered unstable by 
crises and regional conflicts all over the world and the post-colonial Africa in particular, has 
been torn apart by intense and internal conflicts. 
 
Looking therefore at Africa in particular the number of armed conflict increased in the period 
from the 1950s to the 1980s. And at the beginning of the 21
st
 century armed conflicts 
afflicted 16 of the 54 African countries (Huggins and Clover 2005:1). The four decades 
between 1960s-1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa was marked by interstate and intrastate conflicts 
and/or wars, internal strife. The cases of internal conflicts in Congo Brazzaville, DRC, 
Guinea Bissau, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, the Ethiopia-Eritrea interstate war, 
illustrate the point (Adedeji 1999:3).  
 
Scholars from different disciplines have attempted to comprehend the post-colonial Africa’s 
conflicts pointing out what could be their root causes. These include scarcity of land and 
resources, political upheavals, ethnicity and cultural diversities found in Africa among others. 
Huggins and Clover (2005:2) link conflicts to land scarcity in Africa. They observe that land 
is at the core of social, economic and political life in most Africa and the lack of clarity 
regarding property rights and land tenure is a potential cause of conflicts. Uzodike (2000:291) 
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argues on the other hand that “Africa’s cultural diversity –particularly its ethnic, racial, class 
(...) regional differences – has been the continent’s most abiding source of conflict in the 
post-colonial period.” Colonialism is seen to have strongly contributed to the ethnic 
polarization that marked conflicts in Africa (Pottier 2002:15; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18).  
 
However, Adedeji (1999:7) remarks that “it [would be] ... simplistic to regard conflict, civil 
strife and political turmoil [in Africa] as merely post-colonial teething problems of 
independent states and to resort to stereotypic and facile analysis of dumping everything at 
the door of ethnicism and tribalism.” He goes further to note that Africa’s persistent 
economic crisis is a consequence of its political crisis and civil wars and strife are violent 
reactions to the lack of democracy, the denial of human rights, and bad governance. The 
complexities of the historical, social, economic, and political realities in each particular 
conflict case are to be critically and analytically considered as far as the African conflict 
studies are concerned. As Gentili (2005: 38-39) observes, 
[w]hen investigating root causes one needs to be aware that each [conflict] case is unique and 
characterised by a different [or even complex] combination of causes. (...) Cultural differences alone 
[or ethnicity as such], are not sufficient to bring about violent group mobilization, neither is economic 
inequality, (...). [And] (...) in order to expose root causes one should start with an adequate 
understanding of the historical and structural antecedents that have shaped and polarized political 
identities in the process of state formation. 
 
To achieve lasting peace, conflicts are certainly to be imperatively mastered. The latter 
requires axiomatically fully comprehending and addressing the root causes and complex 
factors and forces of conflicts (Adedeji 1999:7). Looking then at the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa (the focus of this study) various researches have shown that the region faced a 
dramatic change or even multi-dimensional crisis in post-colonial era: political, social, and 
economic (Hoyweghen & Smis 2002:575). Furthermore, the ethnicity has been one of the 
root causes in the conflicts that marked the Great Lakes Region
9
. 
 Adedeji (1999:9) points out that, 
[In the Great Lakes Region] ethnicity has been exploited and manipulated by the societal elites and 
political leaders who have shown no restraint in manipulating the people through feeding them with 
prejudices against other ethnic groups…Personal interests and ambitions of those leaders are framed in 
ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic solidarity are rung to rally group support even at the risk of 
developing animosity against another ethnic group which is considered the enemy. 
 
Some scholars argue further that the instability in the region takes its major roots in the 
history of each country in the region: the decay of the state and its instruments of the rule in 
                                                
9 In the same line of Gentili’s analysis, Lunn (2006: 67-72) observes that primary causal factors of conflicts that 
marked the Great Lakes Region of Africa are: ethnicity, state failure and greed. 
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the DRC (Former Zaire) and the crystallization of ethnic tensions which have characterized 
Rwanda and Burundi and subsequently resulted in the massive displacement of the 
population of those countries (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002:214; Lemarchand 1994: 89; Mauceri 
2004:111). And as Lemarchand (1997) adds, some of the forces that conspired to produce the 
collapse of the state in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire (currently DRC) are specific to the 
countries’ history and socio-ethnic configurations and others to the complex pattern of 
interaction arising from the “kin-country” syndrome. 
 
Indeed, the escalation of conflicts in the region (particularly in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) is 
due to a large extent, the presence in each country of a large population of refugees with 
searing memories of the violence they experienced or inflicted in their homelands. “... [I]t is 
in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire that the collapse of state systems is most patently traceable to 
insurgencies born of refugee flows.” The phenomenon of transformation of refugee-
generating conflicts into conflict-generating refugees marked these three states (Lemarchand 
1997) Rwanda and Burundi’s conflicts, the currently troubled eastern DRC region which 
hosted refugees mostly from Rwanda and Burundi provide a good illustration.  Rwanda and 
Burundi have been characterized by Hutu-Tutsi confrontations, exclusionary policies, and the 
instrumentalization of Hutu-Tutsi bipolar ethnic set-up, genocides, and movements of 
refugees in neighbouring countries (Reyntjens 1999:242).  And this impacted on the Great 
Lakes Region. Kabamba (1999:102) confirms also that “the ethnic confrontation which 
characterized the North and South Kivu region from the 1960s are the consequences of the 
dramas which Rwanda and Burundi have gone through.” 
 
This chapter intends thus to highlight very briefly the impact of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in 
the Great Lakes Region in general. As mentioned above the present research is a case study 
focusing on the eastern DRC region. Hence this chapter also includes some assessments 
regarding DRC conflicts (before and after 1994 Rwandan genocide) from available literature. 
Firstly the chapter mentions very briefly the Rwandan and Burundian refugees’ movement 








  2.1. THE EASTERN DRC REGION AND ISSUE OF REFUGEES 
 
The eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo comprising both North and South 
Kivu provinces (Appendices 4 and 5) has accommodated both Hutu and Tutsi populations 
from Rwanda and Burundi since pre-colonial period. The region has been the most affected 
part by violence and insecurity that marked DRC since its independence in 1960. Morvan 
(2006:10) indicates that 
From the time of its independence, the DRC has been a focal point for violence, particularly of a 
political nature. Examples include the mutiny of the public force in 1960, the Katangese secession from 
1960 to 1963, the Muleliste insurrection in the Bas-Congo in 1964, the Simba rebellion in Kivu from 
1964 to 1968, the Lumumbistes guerrillas in the 1970s in the eastern part of the country, and the 
Katangese police offensives in 1977 and 1978, in Shaba. (...), Kivu remained a place of refuge for 
smaller armed groups. With hills and abundant vegetation located far from the centre of power, this 
area is a preferred place of settlement for militia groups. 
 
In 1993 the Kivu region was estimated to account for about 3.5 million people who included 
the Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi) migrants. The other ethnic groups in the region were 
native ethnic groups comprising Banande, Bakonja, Banduda, Bakomo, Babira, Banyanga, 
Batembo, Bahunde and Balendu (Abdulai1995:17; Lemarchand 1997). Throughout the 
history of the Great Lakes Region the Kivu provinces have been marked by different forms of 
migrations for political, economic or colonial reasons: cheap labour for tea/coffee growing or 
mining. Due to these migrations (from Rwanda and Burundi) more than 50 per cent of the 
population of the Kivu provinces has cultural linkages with Rwanda and Burundi (Abdulai 
1995:17). Mamdani (2001:235) observes that the South Kivu province is populated mostly by 
Tutsis, whereas the North Kivu is dominated by Hutu migrants, autochthones and a few 
Tutsis. 
 
A sizable number of these migrants from Rwanda and Burundi (both Hutus and Tutsis) 
migrated into Kivu region long before the advent of colonial rule. This is the case, for 
instance of the Banyamulenge a Tutsi sub-group of South Kivu. The ‘Banyamulenge’ 
labelling in its originality referred to the locality where they first settled Mulenge locality; 
hence they were called “the people of Mulenge”, Banya-mulenge. They are said to have 
migrated into Kivu regions in the 1880s (Mamdani 2001:235).  Another category of migrants 
are the so-called “transplantes”, the thousands of workers (mostly Hutus) “who were brought 
to the Kivu at the request of the colonial administration to work on tea and coffee plantations 
[and mining]” (Lemarchand 1997; Mararo 1997:509). The Kivu regions hosted also 
Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsis) who had fled persistent drought in 1928, 1929 and 1943 
20 
 
and others who came to belong to the DRC during the annexation of some parts of Western 
Rwanda to the DRC after the Berlin Conference (Pottier 2002:11). 
 
The history of Hutu-Tutsi confrontation both in Rwanda and Burundi has been accompanied 
by the movement of refugee populations also into eastern DRC region. Such historical events 
are: the 1959-1962 violent Hutu revolution in Rwanda that led thousands of Tutsis to flee 
their home; the Burundi ‘genocide’ of Hutu in 1972 accompanied by Hutu migrations into 
neighbouring countries (including Kivu regions), exodus of Burundian Hutus following the 
‘Ntega and Marangara’ incidents in 1988, and the Ndadaye’s assassination in 1993; then 
massive Rwandan Hutu refugee populations that followed the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
(Lemarchand 1997).     
 
As abovementioned among these migrants from Rwanda and Burundi a sizable number of 
them happened to be long-time residents of the region many being born in Zaire or tracing 
their families’ origins to pre-colonial migrations. However, the tendency among the native 
ethnic groups had been to label all Kinyarwanda-speaking communities as ‘Banyarwanda’, 
treating them as ‘foreign intruders’ and consequently are disqualified to claim citizenship 
rights. Disputes and violent conflicts occurred in 1990s between native tribes and the 
migrants in Kivu regions over landownership and citizenship rights (Morvan 2006:17). 
Pottier (2002) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) remark that until 1964 nationality was not an 
issue for Banyarwanda communities settled in eastern DRC. However, following the 1964 
Constitution that reformed the nationality-right, the majority of Banyarwanda found 




 used ethnicity to secure his reign. In his strategic plan for eastern 
DRC (the then Zaire) Mobutu promoted “the political ascendancy of leaders whose ethnic 
groups could not possibly threaten central government either because they were numerically 
insignificant on the national scale or because they had an ambiguous status” (Pottier 
2002:27). Banyarwanda were ‘suitable’ candidate in this region; and this opportunity helped 
them to regain the citizenship in 1972. Banyarwanda mainly Tutsi benefited from this 
Mobutu’s political strategy: they acquired important new lands in Masisi and Rutshuru which 
resulted in landlessness for autochthones and Banyarwanda Hutu. However, the 
                                                
10 Appendix 10 
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Banyarwanda peace did not last forever. After the fall of Mobutu’s favourite Tutsi 
Bisengimana (nominated in 1969 to direct the Bureau of presidency of the Republic) in 1981 
the 1972 citizenship linked law was annulled. The conflicts broke up: the autochthones 
against Banyarwanda (Hutus and Tutsis) (Pottier 2002:28). 
 
The governance that marked Zaire after its independence shaped the political, social and 
economic life of the country and of Kivu region in particular. Baregu (in Khadiagala 
2006:60) points out that “Mobutu’s regime ... was marked by divisiveness ... economic and 
political crises, and exclusion of ethnic groups, especially in eastern Congo.” During his early 
years in power Mobutu had made efforts to build a united country but paradoxically he failed 
to create a political consensus and a real economic development throughout the whole 
country: Mobutu developed a centralized state under which the provincial governments were 
just administrative expressions; a state in which reign lack of order maintenance, rampant 
corruption, weak judiciary, and lack of service delivery.  Furthermore, the national economy 
declined remarkably, provinces being poorer, and by the early 1980s, public funds and 
resources were to a larger extent private gain property rather than national investment (Clark 
2002: 42-3; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:13). 
 
This state dysfunction and national impoverishment, particularly in provinces rich in natural 
resources especially Kivu region wherein the population could not enjoy economically the 
riches of their region created frustrations, anger and a fragile milieu susceptible to different 
forms of conflicts. It is this state of affaires that the massive Rwandan Hutu refugees 
following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, found in Kivu regions. 
 
2.2. THE 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION 
 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide is said to have played a crucial role in the overall instability of 
countries neighbouring Rwanda. First, the tragedy left the Rwandan society shaken in almost 
all the domains of life. The social and economic infrastructure were in total collapse the 
economy was in a disaster, and bank vaults had been emptied and transported to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo by the ‘defeated’ regime authorities (Kagame 2005; 
Scherrer 2002:145).  In addition to the great loss in human lives of about 1 million Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus killed in genocide over 2 million fled in the neighbouring countries, observe 
Luyt (2003:101) and Shalom (1996:1:14). Furthermore the whole society was left profoundly 
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traumatised: genocide survivors, the perpetrators and their families (Butera et al. 1999:202; 
Whitman 2005:94). Soon after the flight of Hutu refugees’ security in Rwanda became 
another new concern. The ‘defeated’ army (ex-FAR) and the militia (Interahamwe and 
Impuzamugambi) responsible for the genocide took full control over the huge number of 
refugee camps in eastern DRC and posed a serious threat to Rwanda and to the region as a 
whole (Crisp and Tan 1998: vii; Reyntjens 1995:39).  
 
Furthermore the Rwandan Hutu refugees became an additional ‘burden’ to DRC and 
Tanzania, which were already hosting Burundian refugees. The latter had fled killings in 
Burundi. As Scherrer (2002: 153) recalls insecurity and civil war was still covering Burundi 
“in almost every part of the country and the economic decline and collapse of the state 
continued.” Part of the Rwandan Hutu refugees took refuge in the north of Burundi. A region 
mostly occupied by the Burundian Hutus. Nevertheless, these refugees could not feel at ease 
as their fellow compatriots in DRC. They feared the Tutsi- dominated Government and army 
in Burundi. And this might have been one among other reasons that led them to join and 
strengthen the Burundian Hutu rebels once they set their foot on the soil of Burundi (Scherrer 
2002:153). 
  
In the historical events that marked Burundi and which many writers liken to that of Rwanda 
were two major explosions of violence: the 1972 events when the Tutsi-dominated army 
perpetrated killings against Hutus and the October 1993 Hutu’s ‘partial’ genocide that 
followed the death of the democratically elected president Ndadaye. After the death of 
Ndadaye (a Hutu) many Tutsis in the rural area were the first victims and else where in the 
country the army carried out the killings of Hutu. Many Burundian Hutus took exile in the 
south of Rwanda. They are said to have participated in the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda 
(Lemarchand 1997). Since 1959 events in Rwanda would have most probably repercussions 
in Burundi, and vice versa. Lemarchand (1997) remarks that the fate subjected to one ethnic 
group in either country would be followed by horrible consequences against the opposite 
group. Thus, although Hutu-Tutsi antagonism has marked the Burundian society, the 
Rwandan genocide aggravated the interethnic tension.  
 
Although it hosted thousands of Rwandan refugees the impact of the genocide in Tanzania 
was not as tragic as in DRC or in Burundi. Whitaker (2003) observed that: 
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They [refugees] were settled in a dozen camps along the border. Suddenly, rural hinterlands were 
transformed into sprawling cities and sleepy towns became headquarters for hi-tech aid operations. 
Business and trade flourished, as agricultural production, employment, and capital flows all increased. 
At the same time, crime, environmental degradation, and inflation caused resentment among Tanzanian 
hosts. 
 
Certainly, Tanzania did remain quite stable despite a caseload of Hutu refugees the country 
hosted from Burundi and Rwanda. This might be thanks to its political stability and social 
harmony of its multiethnic society. Generally the country did not know any ethnic hostility, 
violence or any other kind of serious instability (Whitaker 2000:218). However a sudden 
massive migration that produces a society within a society cannot leave the hosting society 
without any extra burden. Maina (1997:81) states that life in Ngara
11
, Muleba and Karagwe 
(in Tanzania) was affected by the massive influx of 1994 Hutu refugees: such as an increase 
in crime and banditry especially in the hosting areas. And the government of the Republic of 
Tanzania which had to shoulder all the responsibility of dealing with the unexpected guests 
had to create and implement new refugee policies. In addition due to their proximity to 
Rwandan borders the refugee camps threatened the new regime in Rwanda and thus risked 
putting into jeopardy the diplomatic relations between both countries (Whitaker 2000:217). 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, as already discussed, has witnessed the most tragic 
repercussions of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Kisangani (2000:165) observed that of the 
outflow of 2.1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the genocide “Congo hosted 1.1 to 
1.25 million, (...) among these were some 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers (ex-FAR) and 30,000 to 
40,000 Hutu militiamen (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi) who had been responsible for 
the genocide in Rwanda.” This massive influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees particularly into 
eastern DRC impacted remarkably on the region: loss of human lives, ecological damage, 
infectious diseases, increased criminality, and long-lasting and destructive wars. McNulty 
(1999:56), Reyntjens (1999:242) and Kisangani (2000: 165) point out that the ex-FAR and 
Rwandan Hutu militiamen were involved in the killings of Tutsi in North Kivu. Soon after 
crossing the borders aiming at making Rwanda ungovernable the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu 
militiamen also started launching attacks into Rwanda from bases in refugee camps (Prunier 
2001: 152; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18; Reyntjens 1999: 242). Rwanda responded to these 
attacks by invading DRC in 1996, and destroying the refugee camps in eastern DRC 
(Kisangani 2000: 168). It also militarily backed Kabila’s movement that overthrew Mobutu’s 
                                                
11 Appendix 8 
24 
 
regime in 1997 (Mararo 2002:52; Reyntjens 1999: 242). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) adds 
that “nearly 4 million Congolese have died as a result of the consequences of the war waged 
by Rwanda in the Congo since 1998 (...).” 
 
Following the 1994 Rwanda genocide the DRC has fallen into brutal wars in which armed 
groups from the DRC and neighbouring countries committed horrible atrocities to civilians, 
observe Longombe et al (2008:132). As testified by the available literature, these post-
genocide DRC conflicts have appeared to be multidimensional and complex in character. 
 
The following section will briefly present some of the analyses of conflicts that ravaged DRC 
following the 1994 Rwanda genocide. 
 
2.3. EASTERN DRC CONFLICTS 
 
Various scholarly studies have been carried out to decode the complexities of eastern DRC 
conflicts. Different analytical views have emerged. Some studies classify the conflicts in 
eastern DRC as mainly “war economy” (Jackson 2002:520; Chabal and Gentili 2005:132; 
Scherrer 2002:256; Autesserre 2006:6-7). Others argue that conflicts rooted in Kivu regions 
were “wars of liberation” and regional security (Reyntjens 1999:243; McNulty 1999:54-56; 
Solomon 1997:3). Some other scholars also affirm that ethnicity is the major driving force 
behind these conflicts (Rutazibwa 1999:17; Pottier 2002:40-41; Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2004:397; International Crisis Group 2007:22-28). Some studies add that the 
military presence of Rwanda and Uganda on DRC soil since 1996 fuelled animosities and 
fear among ethnic groups and led to the escalation of conflicts. Rwanda and Uganda were 
seen as dominant powers with much control over the country natural resources and with 
intention to extend their regional ‘Tutsi-dominated’ hegemony (Reyntjens 1999:243-4, 
McNulty 1999:53-4 and the International Crisis Group (ICG) 2007:11).  
 
Jackson (2002:520) argues that “[t]he long, slow rotting from within of Mobutu’s Zaire 
permitted the Kivus to build a degree of political and economic autonomy during the 1980s 
and 1990s.” The ethnic polarisation with the interethnic war in 1993 and the knock-on effects 
of the 1994 Rwanda genocide marked the region. Two national ‘wars of liberation’ emerged 
(in 1996 and 1998), both rooted in the Kivu region’s convoluted mixture of political 
machination, communal violence, borders sensitivity, and mainly the exploitation of mineral 
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and agricultural wealth of the region (Jackson 2002:520). Jackson observes further that 
before Kabila
12
 (who led the Rwanda-backed AFDL that overthrew Mobutu in 1996/7) 
reached Kinshasa, “foreign mineral concerns concluded lucrative mining concessions with 
him, financing his climb to power and consolidating their position to profit from it ....” 
(Jackson 2002:520).   
 
Trefon (in Chabal and Gentili, 2005: 132) opines that Western companies fuelled the 
conflicts with business and trade transactions involving minerals originating from the DRC 
particularly in the eastern region. Rwanda and Uganda
13
 as well as their Congolese allies 
fought for Kisangani because of its gold and diamonds, affirms Trefon (in Chabal and Gentili 
2005: 137). As the DRC conflicts went on, the DRC was portioned. The Kivu region was 
ruled by the Rwanda-backed RCD (Rassemblement Congolais Démocratique)
14
. The latter 
became “the vehicle through which elite networks reap the harvest of Kivutien mineral 
wealth ...” maintains Jackson (2002:520).  
 
Scherrer mentions also that “[for] Rwanda and Uganda [in DRC] their first war aim (to clear 
their border of domestic rebel groups) was followed (...) by far more ambitious aims that was 
(in 1996) to chase away dictator Mobutu and in 1998 to chase away the new dictator (Kabila) 
and to control large parts of the huge Congo including some of its mineral deposits” (Scherrer 
2002:256). Autesserre (2006:6-7) remarks that the claim of Rwanda to secure its border by 
pursuing the Interahamwe and the Forces Démocratique de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) 
was just a pretext to have a hand on Kivu region so to protect the Rwandaphones and to 
exploit the Congo’s resources. He argues that  
[O]nly a small number of those responsible for the 1994 genocide [and Interahamwe] were in the 
Congo. Most of the FDLR were people who had arrived in the Congo when they were young, had 
grown up there as refugees, and used violence because they had no other means of subsistence. ... 
[And] Kagame
15
 knew that the FDLR was not a real threat to Rwanda, but he had several reasons to 
prefer either its extermination or continued roaming in the Congo (Autesserre, 2006:6-7). 
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14 As it will be discussed in the following chapters, the 1996-2006 DRC conflicts that followed the 1994 
Rwandan genocide can be divided into three phases: the first phase is the 1996-7 war that overthrew Mobutu’s 
regime, the second phase is the 1998 war that aimed at changing Laurent Kabila’s regime (RCD emerged at this 
stage), and the third phase consisted of violent conflicts that followed the death of Laurent Kabila. Throughout 
these conflicts, 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, the Rwanda were among the key players (Reyntjens 1999). 
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Reyntjens (1999:243), McNulty (1999:56) and Solomon (1997:3) argue on the other hand, 
that the main reason of the alliance which backed the Kabila’s Alliance des Forces 
Démocratiques pour la Liberation (AFDL) that overthrew Mobutu – Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Burundi – was intended to remove a major source of instability for those countries. Rebel 
movements: Uganda’s Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Rwanda’s former government army 
FAR (Forces Armeés Rwandaises) and Interahamwe militia and Burundi’s CNDD-FDD 
(Conseil National pour la Defence de la Démocratie-Force pour la Defence de la 
Démocratie) benefited from Congolese territory as bases for assault and retreat. Reyntjens 
(1999:243) states that the status of the Banyarwanda (and the Congolese Tutsi in particular) 
and the regional security were main factors in eastern DRC conflicts.  
 
The 1994 Rwandan refugees’ case – the defeated Rwandan regime (FAR, militia and 
government agents) and the panicked population – in eastern DRC served Mobutu purposes 
on both international and domestic fronts (Reed 1998:139) on the one hand, but it was also a 
cause of major alarm to the regional security. Additionally, McNulty (1999:54) observes that 
the context of the 1996 DRC conflicts was marked by a weakened Mobutu’s state that later 
on crumbled subject to trilateral strain of: (a) implosion, given the non-functioning of the 
state, (b) revolution, born of the population’s resultant alienation, anger and frustration, and 
(c) external sabotage. He maintains thus that the regional implication in the war within Zaire 
“should not be confused with the long-term goals of Congolese nationalism and its campaign 
against Mobutu which dates back to 1965” (McNulty 1999:55). McNulty (1999:7, 63, 71) 
brings up that for some political reasons the external key players (USA, but manly France) 
distanced themselves gradually from Mobutu (their figure they had created during Cold War). 
This combined with the “fertile insurrectionary ground of popular discontent” together with 
the regional affairs – security – made possible Mobutu’s overthrow leading the country into 
complex conflicts. 
 
The literature above suggests generally that the key factors in DRC conflicts (since 1996) 
were: regional security, need of regime change in DRC and economic interests. The 
weakened Mobutu’s state led to difficult life conditions in the country and frustration among 
Congolese populations (McNulty (1999:54). As mentioned in Chapter One and as observe 
Hulsizer and Woolf (2005: 104-110) difficult life conditions and crises increase the 
likelihood of violent conflicts.   However, these analyses mention little about the possible role 
refugees had in DRC conflicts and regional insecurity. 
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Some other scholarly analysis of the eastern DRC conflicts points out that the latter is part of 
the big picture of the Great Lakes Region’s ethnic conflicts.  The argument maintains that 
although the post-genocide DRC conflicts are certainly too complex and multi-dimensional to 
be exclusively labelled ethnic conflicts ethnicity has been a crucial catalytic factor. 
Rutazibwa argues that “la cause fondamentale de l’instabilité dans la région des Grands 
Lacs n’est autre que l’idéologie ethniste anti-Tutsi …” (the fundamental cause of the 
instability in the Great Lakes Region is merely the ethnic anti-Tutsi ideology …) (Rutazibwa 
1999: 9). He observes that the influx of the 1994 Rwandan refugees aggravated and changed 
the tune of the inter-ethnic conflict in the DRC Kivu region (Rutazibwa 1999:17).  
 
Pottier (2002:40-41), Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004: 397) also note that different 
Congolese groups including Hutus and Tutsis were conflicting over the land since 1992 – 3. 
And these conflicts turned into ethnic confrontation: when the Hutus fought Bahunde and 
Banyanga, Tutsis joined in on the side of Bahunde. In mid July 1994 more than a million 
refugees allowed for further manipulation of ethnic groups. In Ituri (in Kivu region) an ethnic 
extremism which involved Congolese of the region (Lendu, Hema) and their outside 
supporters (mainly Rwanda and Uganda) grew stronger after the 1994 Rwanda genocide 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004:396-7). Kabamba (1999: 103) notes that the formation 
of the rebel groups which were engaged into armed conflict in eastern DRC since 1996 
started in the context of a well-known ethnic kinship in the region between Rwandese and 
Zairians (Hutu or Tutsi origin). The International Crisis Group (2007:22-28) reports that 
“[t]he presence of Rwanda rebels in eastern Congo was a principle reason for the war against 
Mobutu and has remained an obstacle to lasting peace in the region.” It maintains that 
although political and economic factors came into play in eastern DRC conflicts ethnicity 
was the major driving force.  
 
Laurent Kabila’s government encouraged divisive ideas between groups as a way to cement 
power (www.asyl.net/Magazin/docs ). He created a state propaganda machine aimed at 
fuelling animosities against Tutsis. “[I]ncreasing numbers of the local militias, such as the 
mai-mai and the Bembe, lent [then] a helping hand to Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian 
rebel groups” (Reyntjens 1999:243). Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi responded by 
encouraging and backing the Tutsi and other anti-Kabila forces to rebel in 1998, with aim of 
eliminating rebel problem in their border areas and to protect Tutsi in DRC. Angola, 
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Zimbabwe and Namibia backed Kabila with Angola and Namibia aiming at attacking the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. 
 
Certainly a healthy scepticism is always to be maintained regarding these analyses and the 
like since there is a reasonable probability that any theoretical analysis particularly in its 
interpretation of empirical data and its speculations may be erroneous. However the very fact 
that the DRC conflicts are seen from different angles as presented above confirms the 
complexity of the conflicts in question. The three analytical approaches display different 
underlying factors that marked the DRC’s conflicts, the complexity and the multi-
dimensionality of these conflicts that ravage the country. Factors such as ethnicity, economic 
interest, regional security, Congolese’s frustration and anger rising from the state’s 
dysfunction, corruption and impoverishment and the unsolved issue of citizenship rights for 
the Congolese population of Rwandan origin have played significant catalyzing roles in 
shaping the DRC conflicts (International Crisis Group 2007:22-28).  
 
In the analyses discussed above, less attention is given to the issue of refugees in the greater 
picture of DRC’s conflicts. The question remains: can refugees become a source of 
insecurity? It seems this is the case according to Havinga and Bocker (in Muggah 2006:5), 
Collier (in Furley 2006:2) and Lemarchand (1997). As mentioned above the Great Lakes 
Region has been marked by movements of refugees, mainly conflict-generated refugees from 
one state into the other. Pottier (2002:41-42) and Lemarchand (1997) observe that refugee 
flows have been to a large extent, the vehicles through which emotions were unleashed, 
ethnic ties manipulated, and collective energies mobilized. They remark that the massive 
arrival of Hutu refugees including ex-FAR and Interahamwe from Rwanda in 1994 in the 
eastern DRC affected the interethnic relationships in the region. The Banyarwanda frame of 
reference dissolved into a rigid Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy that gradually infected the whole 
region.  However questions touching the mechanisms, pathways, dispositions that render 
refugees a contributory factor in conflicts or source of insecurity are not fully explored and 
answered. It is in this line that I see this study making a contribution, by exploring closely 








The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees  
and the change of attitudes toward Tutsi Congolese  
in the eastern DRC 
 
“There is no such thing as an inevitable war. 
 If war comes it will be from failure of human wisdom.” 
 





While all the countries of the Great Lakes Region of Africa felt the impact of the 1994 
Rwanda genocide in one way or another: particularly in terms of refugees flow, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo has witnessed the most disastrous repercussions of this 
genocide. Following the massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (including ex-
FAR and Interahamwe) into the DRC the Congolese society particularly in the eastern region 
has been torn apart by complex and multidimensional chain of violent conflicts till today. The 
Congolese society in Kivu region has become more ethnically polarized and infected by an 
increasingly sharp anti-Tutsi sentiment. This chapter intends to discuss the shift in Congolese 
interethnic relationships, following the 1994 Rwanda genocide with specific focus on the 
change of attitudes toward Congolese Tutsi in the eastern Kivu provinces.  
 
Eagly and Chaiken (1993:63) point out that indices of behaviour aggregated over multiple 
acts are potential indicators of attitude change if the various actions have in common some 
degree of favourableness or unfavourableness toward the subject in question. Hence, in order 
to elucidate the change of attitude by the other Congolese ethnic groups toward the 
Congolese Tutsis, the chapter attempts to assess rigorously two variables among others: the 
nature and extent of violent attacks against Congolese Tutsis; and the nature and extent of 
political exclusion and discriminations against Congolese Tutsis. And this assessment will be 
carried out by studying the interethnic relationships before and after 1994 in DRC society, 
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with a focus on Kivu provinces. The chapter is thus divided into three main sections. The first 
section examines some main characteristics of the interethnic relationships in eastern DRC 
region before 1994, i.e. before the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan refugees in the region. The 
second section analyses the interethnic relationships in eastern DRC region following the 
arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the region. In both sections the above outlined 
variables are the key notes of the study. The last section argues that the hatred ideology used 
in 1994 Rwanda genocide played a crucial role in the eastern DRC conflict, particularly in the 
attitudinal change.  
 
The chapter findings show that before 1994 there was no record of antagonism or any form of 
violent conflict between Hutu and Tutsi living in the eastern DRC. Although in Kivu region 
an anti-Banyarwanda sentiment prevailed (Hutu and Tutsi collectively) before 1994, there 
was no anti-Tutsi feeling or violent attacks and political exclusion targeting exclusively the 
Congolese Tutsi (Mamdani 1999: 56-7; Mararo 1997: 506-8; Prunier 2001: 147-8; 
Lemarchand 1997). However, following the arrival of 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees (including 
the ex-FAR and Interahamwe) in Kivu region interethnic schisms erupted, the Congolese 
Tutsi became a target of violent attacks and socio-political exclusion (Reyntjens 1999: 242-4; 
Prunier 2001: 149-152). Certainly various factors contributed to this attitudinal change as 
underlined by this chapter. And as mentioned in Chapter One, this study is mainly 
constructed upon the Staub’s theoretical perspective, ‘Basic Needs’. Furthermore, with an 
intellectual humility, I should confess that the complexity and multidimensionality of the 
DRC conflicts have proved most of all currently published studies on these conflicts to be 
limited in one way or the other. Thus, an attentive discernment has been objectively and 
critically employed to focus on more balanced documentary data relevant to this research. 
    
3.1. PRELIMINARY TO THE CHAPTER: WORKING DEFINITIONS OF 
ATTITUDE AND IDEOLOGY 
 
The conceptual definition of attitude that is used in this chapter is that of Eagly and Chaiken 
(1993:1) stating that ‘attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a 
particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour’.  Psychological tendency refers to a 
state that is internal to the person or group of people and evaluating refers to all classes of 
evaluative responding, affective or behavioural in our case. Thus elucidating any form of 
affective or behavioural change in interethnic relationships (focusing on Tutsi group mostly) 
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in eastern Kivu provinces of DRC linked to the arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees will 
permit the measurement of attitude change and assessment of the contribution of these 
refugees in this change of attitude. Furthermore, paraphrasing a political psychologist 
Lawrence Bobo (in Jost & Sidanius 2004:341) attitudinal forms in group conflict or tension 
and violent conflict among groups are not merely an inevitable outcome of structural 
inequality. But factors such as ideology are required to motivate attitudinal change or group 
conflict. Hence in the third section this chapter looks at the hatred of ideology linked to the 
1994 Rwandan genocide.  
 
The meaning of the term ‘ideology’ has shifted throughout humankind history
16
. Definitions 
of ideology provided by a number of scholars present a common theme in what ideology is 
all about. As they suggest the latter is constructed as a response to ‘difficult life conditions’ in 
a society and aims at giving a vision of a better future.  Baradat (1997:7-8) indicates that 
some scholars like Watkins Frederick argue that “ideologies are always opposed to the status 
quo… usually militant, revolutionary and violent. For Ingersoll ideologies assess the status 
quo and predict the future and the latter is always represented as something better than the 
present or the past.” Baradat (1997:9) then offers four main points or characteristics of an 
ideology stating that  
Ideology is first and foremost a political term….Second, ideology consists of a view of the present and 
a vision of the future. The preferred future is presented as a materialistic improvement over the present. 
This desirable future condition is often attainable according to the ideology, within a single life time. 
As a result, one of the outstanding features of an ideology is its offer of hope. Third, ideology is action-
oriented. It not only describes reality and offers a better future, but most important, it gives specific 
directions about the steps that must be taken to attain this goal. Fourth, ideology is directed towards the 
masses.”  
 
The above Baradat’s characteristics of an ideology will thus constitute the framework for the 
conceptual meaning of the term ideology in this work. There are a number of societies in 
which ideologies have been used and led to the killings of part of population. Examples are in 
German under Hitler, in Italy under Mussolini, in Iraq under Saddam (Baradat 1997:255, 259 
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 The word ‘ideology’ was first coined by a French philosopher Destutt de Tracy around the end of the 18
th
 
century and was initially dealing with the study of ideas (Institute of Research and dialogue for Peace 2006:20). 
However Baradat (1997:6-7) points out that throughout history after de Tracy the meaning of ‘ideology’ shifted 
from referring to ‘science of ideas’ to a concept or system of beliefs with a political connotation. Also the 
definition of ideology varies according to authors and their respective disciplines. ‘It may be used to describe 
the shared beliefs of a group of people for example a nation, a religious sect or a group of theorists’ 
http://www.wisegeek.com. For Madeleine Grawitz (in Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace 2006:21) a 
social scientist defines ideology as a ‘coherent system of ideas and beliefs justifying people’s attitude towards 




& 301) and in Rwanda under Juvenal Habyarimana’s rule
17
. Baradat (1997:252-5) mentions 
that ideologies that destroyed societies in German, Italy and in Iraq, emerged when these 
societies were undergoing social stress, economic and political turmoil.  
 
3.2. INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS IN THE EASTERN DRC REGION BEFORE 
1994 
 
Before assessing the attitudinal change that might have been surfaced shortly after the arrival 
of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern Kivu provinces of DRC; a brief discussion 
of the most prominent societal features notably between Banyarwanda and Congolese natives 
of the region is needed to contextualize the subsequent discussion.  Thus, this section intends 
to look at the interethnic relationships that marked the region before 1994 scrutinizing, if any, 
violent attacks or political exclusion targeting exclusively Congolese Tutsis. As presented in 
chapter two the eastern DRC region has accommodated both Hutu and Tutsi populations 
from Rwanda and Burundi since pre-colonial period. Throughout the history of the Great 
Lakes Region the Kivu provinces have been marked by  
[D]ifferent forms of migrations for social, political, economic or colonial reasons for example: 
having cheap labour for tea or coffee or mining. [Subsequently] more than 50 per cent of the 
population of this region has cultural linkages with Rwanda and Burundi (Abdulai 1995:17) 
  
The region counts also a number of different native ethnic groups that include Banande, 
Bakonja, Banduda, Bakomo, Bavira, Banyanga, Batembo, Babembe, Bahunde, Balendu, and 
Bafulero (Abdulai1995:17; Lemarchand 1997). Those Kinyarwanda speaking migrants are 
categorised into five major groups: (a) the very first Rwandans migrated into eastern DRC 
since 17
th
 century. Their presence in the region is as ancient as that of native ethnic groups 
such as Nande, Kumu, Nyanga, Hunde and Tembo.
18
 (b) Thousands of people from Rwanda 
and Burundi deported into eastern DRC for labour for tea, coffee or in mining during the 
colonial period. (c) Another category of migrants are the so-called ‘transplantes’ who were 
deported into Kivu provinces by the colonial authorities under the Mission d’immigration des 
Banyarwanda (MIB) missioned to counteract demographic pressure in Rwanda. (d) The 
fourth category comprises Rwandan refugees of the 1959, exclusively Tutsis and the 1994’s, 
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18 Mugangu’s analyses point out that this category occupied eastern DRC territories such as Jomba, Gisigari, 
Mushari, Masisi, Idjwi and Rutshuru since 17
th
 century. These migrants inculturated into the local customs and 
become “native-like”  
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exclusively Hutus. (e) Lastly, the clandestine migrants who went into DRC in between 1970 
and 1990 for various reasons including jobs, business, green pasturage and academics 
(Mugangu in Guichaoua 2004:667-9). 
 
Correlating to Mugangu’s analyses Huggins and Clover (2005:128-9) observe that Kivu 
provinces hosted Banyarwanda since pre-colonial period. They further add that Banyarwanda 
who settled in North Kivu were both Hutu and Tutsi whereas the Banyarwanda in South Kivu 
were exclusively Tutsis later on known as Banyamulenge. However, Mugangu (in Guichaoua 
2004:638) remarks that the migrations that occurred in eastern DRC were not only from 
Rwanda and Burundi but also from within the DRC. Some native ethnic groups in eastern 
DRC came from other parts of Congo mainly in search of fertile lands. These include Havu, 
Hunde, Hinyi and Bembe, and so many others. The settlement of Banyarwanda (both Hutus 
and Tutsis) in eastern DRC occurred at different times in different locations with different 
causes and various circumstances. In other words, their occurrences were of different 
essential modalities: in pre-colonial period (conquest, free migrations), colonial period 
(forced and organised migrations) and post-colonial period (political violence, socio-
economic migrations). In addition to their differences in the above elucidated aspects, the 
integration of these migrants into the hosting society (eastern DRC) was also hugely shaped 
by various factors. These include mainly societal organisation of both the migrants and that 
of the hosting society and institutions and political structures of the colonial administration. 
The integration of these migrants defined subsequently their later relationships with the 
native ethnic groups. 
 
Mugangu (in Guichaoua 2004:646) indicates also that the integration of the pre-colonial 
migrants was generally smooth with no major problems to the local population. These 
migrants but mostly those of 17
th
 century either settled in unoccupied areas in the region 
establishing themselves as a kingdom with a socio-economic and political network with the 
local kingdoms or subjected themselves to customary systems of local kingdoms. 
Nevertheless, the Banyamulenge’s case has been different in this regard (Vlassenroot 
2002:499-515). 
 
An assessment of the migrations in colonial period reveals some of the various factors that 
handicapped the integration of immigrants. These include the tendency of the Banyarwanda 
to establish their own customary system of land control refusing to comply with the existing 
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local authorities. On the other hand, the native ethnic groups felt invaded by the immigrants 
(Mathieu & Tsongo 1998:392). The mechanisms of the colonial rule also did not permit a 
proper integration of these migrants creating structures that led later on to an ambiguous 
identity for the Banyarwanda in the eastern region. This is the case of the ‘transplantes’ and 
those taken to DRC for labour. Consequently, the native ethnic groups always regarded these 
new immigrants as ‘always-foreigners’. The Banyamulenge fell in this category despite their 
early settlement in the region (Vlassenroot 2002: 510-515, Prunier 2001:147-8, Lemarchand 
1997).  
 
The first Banyamulenge Rwandan migrants (Rwandan Tutsi pastoralists) arrived in South 
Kivu by the end of the 19
th
 century. They established themselves around Lemera creating the 
Mulenge village named after the neighbouring mountain. As these Tutsi pastoralists started to 
settle in the region various socio-economical mechanisms impeded peaceful coexistence 
between them and their neighbouring local ethnic groups (Mamdani 2001:235). Vlassenroot 
comments that  
Upon their arrival in Mulenge, the Tutsi settlers were confronted by local Kingdoms, which prevented 
them from establishing their own customary system of land control. Access to grazing lands was 
conditioned by their acceptance of the existing traditional order and their becoming subjects of the 
local traditional authorities. (…) the pastoral mode of life [of Tutsi pastoralists, new immigrants] 
seriously clashed with the original agrarian societies of Itombwe because of a different use of the 
available economic space … and so seriously disrupted the existing mode of exchange (Vlassenroot 
2002:499-515). 
 
Another point worth emphasizing in this discussion is that since pre-colonial and early 
colonial period cattle tenure represented wealth in the region. And this provided Tutsi and 
Tutsi Banyamulenge (pastoralists) high economic status that developed into “an ideology of 
natural superiority in relation to the rest of the local population” (Muzuri 1983:35). This 
cultural and social isolation of the Banyamulenge provoked among local native ethnic groups 
a negative sentiment towards the Tutsi settlers. However, as all Kinyarwanda-speaking 
people were considered to be ‘foreigner intruders’ by native ethnic groups, this negative 
sentiment was later on dissolved into anti-Banyarwanda feeling (Mararo 1997: 506-517; 
Vlassenroot 2002:504; Prunier 2001: 149-150; Lemarchand 1997). Furthermore, as remarks 
Mugangu (in Guichaoua 2004:647-8) the colonial rule (Belgian) drastically changed the 
territorial socio-political organisation introducing new land policies and in some cases 
replacing the local traditional authorities by the new immigrants in the region. These colonial 
administrative structures hampered the relations between immigrants and local communities 
rendering a healthy integration far from being realised. Conflicts between Banyarwanda and 
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autochthones erupted in various occasions.
19
 In 1945 and 1957 the first conflict opposed 
‘transplantes’ from Rwanda who settled in Masisi area to the customary chiefs. The former 
wanted autonomy of the area they populate. Nonetheless, the conflict did not result in 
physical violence but it did create a rift in their social interrelationship (Mararo 1997: 508-
510). 
 
The post-independence regimes in DRC failed to effectively deal with the issue of the 
ambiguous status (blamed to the colonial administration) of the immigrants; and different 
conflicts occurred between Banyarwanda and native ethnic groups over land and political 
claims. In 1962 and 1963 another conflict opposed the Banyarwanda (people from Rwanda) 
to the autochthones Hunde. Banyarwanda who had occupied political positions in the 
municipality were replaced by autochthones Hunde. During this period many Tutsi were 
fleeing from Rwanda toward the eastern Kivu provinces due to massacres against them. They 
joined in the conflict on the side of Hutu against autochthones. According to scholars such as 
Mararo (1997: 520-1), Prunier (2001:147-8) and Lemarchand (1997) this war called 
‘kanyarwanda’ was largely linked to the question of land and that of nationality which was 
raised when the Banyarwanda wanted to participate in the provincial assembly elections.  
Pottier (2002:26) observes that the problems between who is ‘native’ and who is ‘non-native’ 
polarized the eastern DRC region. Hence “the more Banyarwanda and autochthonous elites 
jostled for political power, the more strongly the theme of ‘the foreigner’ – and that of 
ethnicity – emerged in political discourse.”   
 
Mathieu & Tsongo (1998:397) maintain that following the 1962-5 ‘kanyarwanda’ conflict till 
1990 a long calm prevailed in the Kivu region; only small scale violence would surface 
occasionally in the communities at a local level. According to the same authors; serious local 
violence started between 1990 and 1993. During this period Zaire’s (now DRC) politics was 
taking another shape: multiparty democracy was introduced. Congolese Hutu and Tutsi 
whose nationality was annulled in 1981 were now hoping that the new democratic system 
will effectively deal with their problem. The CNS (Conference National Souveraine) was 
also introduced to discuss the future of the country.  Banyarwanda representatives were 
                                                
19
 This observation is also made by Vlassenroot (2002:503), reporting that at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, 
the Belgian colonial rule introduced in Kivu region the system of petites chefferies, with newly appointed chiefs. 
Banyamulenge were subsequently granted control over several of these petites chefferies. However, in 1933, the 
autonomous chefferies of Banyamulenge were abolished. 
36 
 
denied participation for the reason that they are not Congolese. The Banyarwanda, feeling 
isolated and threatened, resolved to take up arms against the autochthones. In 1993 the latter 
organized by local politicians retaliated and killed a number of Hutu and caused others to be 
displaced and to lose their land (Jackson 2002: 520, Mararo 1997: 510-20).  
 
The point stressed in the above discussion is that the integration of Rwandan immigrants in 
Kivu region since pre-colonial period
20
 did not proceed smoothly. Various factors such as 
economic, political and colonial administrative mechanisms created a climate that 
preconditioned different forms of conflicts between immigrants and native ethnic groups. 
Subsequently, the Banyarwanda both Hutus and Tutsis continued to be regarded as 
foreigners. A crucial feature for subsequent discussion is that both Hutus and Tutsis were 
collectively called by native ethnic groups Banyarwanda and foreign intruders. Lemarchand 
(1997) points out that, 
...although neither Hutu nor Tutsi are a homogeneous lot, until recently the tendency among the “native 
tribes” has been to lump them together as “Banyarwanda” and to use the label as synonym for “foreign 
intruders”. That a sizable number of them happened to be long-time residents of the area, that many 
were born in Zaire, or traced the origins of their families to pre-colonial migrations, seemingly made no 
difference. 
 
This part of this discourse suggests that before the 1994 no major antagonisms or forms of 
conflict occurred between Hutu and Tutsi living in the eastern Kivu provinces. This was 
despite tensions and violent conflicts in neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Burundi) 
between Hutu and Tutsi since colonial period. Hutu-Tutsi interrelationships in Kivu region 
were not affected. Both Hutu and Tutsi in DRC were collectively called Banyarwanda by 
autochthones, and were also seen as foreigners and non-native, which disqualified them to 
claim any citizenship rights. This solidified a collective self-awareness among the 
Banyarwanda. It follows from above that in all the conflicts that would oppose the 
Banyarwanda and the autochthones whether in North Kivu or in South Kivu, the 
autochthones would fight ‘Banyarwanda’ collectively as or ‘foreigners’ not as Hutus or Tutsi 
or even Tutsi Banyamulenge. In other words, no anti-Tutsi sentiment or violent attack 
targeting exclusively Tutsi occurred in Kivu region before 1994. 
 
 
                                                
20 The 17th century immigrants are exceptions. Their presence in the region is as ancient as that of native tribes 
such as Nande, Kumu, Nyanga, Hunde and Tembo.  
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3. 3.  THE ARRIVAL OF 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES IN EASTERN DRC 
AND ITS IMPACT 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two of the outflow of 2.1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees 
following the genocide Congo hosted about 1.5 million among these were some 20,000 to 
25,000 soldiers (ex-FAR) and 30,000 to 40,000 Hutu militiamen (Interahamwe and 
Impuzamugambi) and high political officials of the overthrown Rwandan government 
(ministers and parliamentarians) most of them were responsible for the genocide in Rwanda 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18; Kambanda ICTR case 97-23; Hintjens 1999: 254 & 264-6; 
Mamdani 1999: 57; Odora 2007: 6-7). About 850 thousands of these refugees went to 
Northern Kivu (Goma) and about 630 thousands to Southern Kivu (Kisangani 2000:165; 
Tegelen in Scherrer 2002: xiv; Scherrer 2002:145). 
 
This huge number of Rwandan Hutu refugees chose to move toward the DRC not only 
because of its border-proximity with Rwanda but also because of the longstanding good 
diplomatic relationships and ‘personal’ friendship between Habyarimana and Mobutu. With a 
background that in 1994 the collapse of Mobutu’s Zaire was taking a momentum, McNulty 
(1997:70) observes further that the relocation of the 1994 ‘defeated’ Rwandan regime 
comprising the ex-FAR, the short-lived interim government that oversaw the genocide, 
militias and ordinary people, into the DRC territory served Mobutu’s purposes on 
international and domestic fronts.  Reed (in McNulty 1997:71) remarks that, 
By hosting a movement which threatened to perpetuate regional instability, Zaire became a key player 
in any attempt to achieve an internationally backed settlement to the crisis. Within Zaire’s domestic 
political realm, the FGOR [former government of Rwanda] ... represented a strong authority which had 
a long pattern of cooperation with the central government of Zaire and which, because of its status as a 
foreign power on Zairean territory, was likely to strengthen rather than weaken the influence of 
Kinshasa. 
 
Arriving in the DRC and in eastern Kivu provinces in particular, the 1994 Rwandan Hutu 
refugees reorganised themselves politically, socially and economically establishing 
relationships with the local authorities. Royer (in Guichaoua 2004:432-5) wrote that as they 
started crossing the Rwandan borders seeking refuge into the DRC the 1994 Rwandan 
refugees were dispersed in Kivu regions forming small communities wherever they could 
find viable space for their survival. He further adds that UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organisations in order to attend to their needs had regrouped these refugees into camps in 
Kivu regions by end of 1994. The then Zairean authority failed to control and organise the 
influx of these refugees. Clapham (1998:138), Murison (in Clark 2003:226) and Nzongola-
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Ntalaja (2002:337) report that these refugees were settled in camps in Kivu regions (North 
and South) stretching along the borders of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda; some other 
refugees camps were established in lake Kivu’s islands.  
 
However with RPF’s victory the power structure changed in the region and the presence of 
these Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC became the unbearable threat to regional 
security. This factor contributed to the complete fall of the Mobutu’s regime. Two national 
‘war of liberation’ (in 1996 and 1998) erupted from Kivu region, and the latter became more 
ethnically polarized: anti-Tutsi sentiment emerged as one of the key notes in the complex 
chain of conflicts since 1996 (McNulty 1997:71). And in order to properly grasp this knock-
on effect of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in the DRC, especially the abrupt reconfiguration of 
interethnic relationships in the region, the discussion that follows assess the life conditions 
that prevailed in the region. 
 
(i) The 1994 Rwandan refugees and life conditions in the eastern DRC 
Prior to the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan refugees in eastern Kivu provinces the political 
social and economic conditions were shaken and deteriorating to a certain extent. The non 
development that has become like a ‘signal feature’ of the nation, the political chaos and 
disorder, the longstanding dysfunction of the state, national economic decline, destruction of 
public infrastructures, corruption and injustice had created alienation, anger and frustration 
among the Congolese people (McNulty 1997:54). The Kivu region in particular experienced 
significantly a progressive retreat of the state authority under Mobutu, this affected economic 
and political life of the region. The latter developed self-governance mechanisms which were 
ineffective in many aspects: security, public service delivery and economic development 
(Autesserre 2006:9).  
 
In additional, the Kivu society has been characterised by a history of conflicts between 
Banyarwanda and ‘natives’ and unsolved issue of citizenship rights of Banyarwanda who 
were consistently regarded as ‘foreigners’ (Autesserre 2006:9; Jackson 2002:520). The 
massive arrival of 1994 Rwandan refugees in eastern Kivu provinces of the DRC aggravated 
disorder in the region and in the country as whole. Bukavu and Goma became overpopulated 
and life conditions became difficult to both refugees and local communities. Increase of food 
shortage, poor sanitation, promiscuity, spread of cholera and other infectious diseases, 
39 
 
ecological damage, insecurity and economic deterioration led to a humanitarian catastrophe 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005: 18; Royer in Gichaoua 2003:453-457).  
 
The Congolese for instance were to endure a very high inflation rates and could not afford to 
purchase basic necessities needed for everyday life (Koyame in Clark 2003:208). Security in 
both Kivu provinces deteriorated due to the presence of armed groups: ex-FAR and militia 
Interahamwe, and uncontrolled groups of FAZ. In their letters to then Primer minister of the 
DRC and to Misereor’s representative; GRAPES
21
 and Archbishop of Bukavu Mgr 
Munzihirwa Christophe (in de Dorlodot 1996: 137 & 139) expressed the alarming increase of 
insecurity and panic in Bukavu due the presence of ‘uncontrolled’ and ‘undisciplined’ FAZ 
and armed ex-FAR. The issue of land tenure and Banyarwanda citizenship rights had 
hampered the peaceful coexistence among the different ethnic groups in the region. As 
detailed in chapter two and the previous section unsolved tension and violent conflicts over 
land between Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi) and autochthones had become a sensitive 
characteristic of the Kivu regions and weakened the social realm.  
 
Studies have shown that such political social and economic hardships as those outlined above 
may create an environment conducive to violent conflict. For instance, Staub (2003: 369) 
observes that difficult life conditions
22
 (which include severe economic problems, political 
disorganisation and upheaval, persistent conflict between groups in a society or their 
combination) are primary starting points of violence in a society. Indeed, as all these 
conditions hinder the country’s social, political and economic security so they affect 
individual persons and group members. In such a milieu as the political psychologists Jost 
and Banaji (in Jost & Sidanius 2004:294-5) opine people seek explanation or justification for 
the prevailing social conditions and their situation.  
When people are facing difficult life conditions not only their material needs (such as food, 
shelter, and clothing) are frustrated but also beyond that their ‘universal psychological needs’ 
(for feeling secure, for feeling effective, for a positive identity, for positive connection to 
other people, for a comprehension of reality and of one’s own place in the world) are 
                                                
21 GRAPES: Groupe de Reflexion et d’Analyse Politique, Economique et Sociale de l’Archidiocese de Bukavu. 
The group is composed of priests and ordinary Christians. The aim of the group is to reflect on and analyse the 
political, economic and social issues of the region and Zaire and that of the neighbouring countries. 
22 Appendices 6 to 9 
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affected. In a way to deal with those difficulties people will often tend to respond in 
destructive ways. For instance, economic crises, political crises or the effects of war were 
present in the immediate years prior to or concomitant with the following genocides: the 
Holocaust at the hands of the Nazis, the genocide in Bangladesh, the genocide of the 
Armenians by the Young Turks, the Cambodian genocide and the Rwandan genocide 
(Hulsizer and Woolf 2005: 104-105). Furthermore Staub (2000:370) adds that, 
To satisfy needs for identity and connection, people often turn to a group...They scapegoat another 
group for life problems, which protects their identity, strengthens connection within the group, and 
provides a psychologically useful ... understanding of events. As part of the process leading to 
violence, the group usually creates or adopts an ideology. 
 
Certainly, the above described conditions that prevailed in DRC and in eastern Kivu province 
in particular have psychologically impacted on both the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the 
host population (both natives and Banyarwanda) framing subsequently the society and 
relationships among ethnic groups in the region. Based on Staub’s theoretical perspective 
these conditions frustrated and paralyzed people’s ability to protect themselves, to control 
their lives’ circumstances, threatening deeply their identity or psychological self, values, 
beliefs and adequate views of reality.  
 
Such conditions coupled with cultural-societal characteristics (history of aggressiveness and 
unhealed wounds from past conflicts) created to a larger extent predispositions for attitude 
change and group violence in eastern DRC. In the face of persistent difficult life conditions 
the group (s) that is designated as an ‘enemy’, ‘out-group’ or as a ‘scapegoat’ is likely to face 
violent actions against it (Staub 2003:295-9). The section that follows examines the 
occurrence and development of such a phenomenon in Kivu provinces. 
 
(ii) The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and interethnic relationships in eastern DRC 
The presence of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees mainly ex-FAR and militia Interahamwe 
perpetrated to a larger extent terror, criminality and drove a permanent wedge into the 
Banyarwanda community in the eastern region (Kisangani 2000: 167-8; Pottier 2002:41; 
Scherrer 2002:145). The ex-FAR and Interahamwe soon after crossing the Rwandan border 
reorganized, rearmed and started launching attacks into Rwanda (Dunn in Clark 2003:55; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). They controlled the camps in full view of the UN agencies; and 
they altered interethnic relations in Kivu by initially mobilizing the Zairean Hutu militants 
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(mostly the displaced in 1993) and spreading anti-Tutsi propaganda. Zairean Tutsis were 
attacked and killed in many occasions. Kisangani (2000: 167) remarks that, 
The influx of refugees and the presence of the ex-FAR in refugee camps altered interethnic relations in 
Kivu. In North Kivu this broke an old alliance within the Banyarwanda, who, until July 1994, had 
fought together against local Hunde and Nyanga groups even when the Hutu and the Tutsi were 
involved in ethnic conflict in Rwanda. Second, the arrival of Hutu refugees, including ex-FAR and 
Hutu militiamen, also fuelled ethnic hatred towards the Banyamulenge in South Kivu over the land and 
nationality issues. ... local politicians used the Hutu refugees to exploit rivalry over nationality rights in 
the two provinces. 
 
With the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees new alliances were formed and 
gradually the Tutsi became a target and a common enemy. Vlassenroot (in Kaarsholm 
2006:57-8), Mwanasali (in Kieh & Mukenge 2002:59) and Kennes (in Arnson and Zartman 
2005:144-7) mention that a new coalition in North Kivu region of local Hutu-Banyarwanda, 
the newcomers (the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugee, their leadership and militias) altered local 
antagonism between Banyarwanda communities and Congolese natives. In early 1995 the ex-
FAR and Interahamwe joined by the local Hunde and local Hutu people launched attacks on 
Masisi to disperse and destroy Tutsi. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (mainly ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe) aimed at obtaining a viable space near Rwanda, land to cultivate and bases to 
launch attacks into Rwanda. Hunde on their side were to benefit from these attacks by getting 
their land back supposedly given to Tutsi by the colonial administration and local Hutu to 
retake the land they lost in 1993 at the expense of Hunde. After Masisi the next area to 
expulse Tutsi from was Rutshuru (North Kivu) as a way of consolidating their hold in eastern 
DRC. The Tutsis were thus singled out gradually as ‘out-group’ population.  And as Staub 
(2003:299) highlights in persistently difficult life conditions alliances are formed and a group 
is scapegoated so to provide an explanation to problems and hope to find solutions.  
 
Abdulai (1995:19) and Mwanasali (in Kieh & Mukenge 2002:59) report further that not later 
the Southern part of eastern DRC got infected. A handful of Zairian authorities started 
harassing Congolese Tutsi and the scene of new ethnic division began to emerge. Lwasi 
Ngabo Lwabanji the then Deputy Governor of South Kivu called upon all non-Tutsi 
Congolese to launch attacks against Banyamulenge confiscating their property and to send 
them back to Rwanda and Burundi. Other alliances were born between Rwandan Hutu 
refugees, Bashi and Barega and later on Babembe. Pottier (2002:41-3) writes that the Hutu 
refugees succeeded to mobilize these autochthones using the anti-Tutsi ideology
23
 which 
                                                




extended the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism into a much broader ideology of ‘Hamitic’ against 
‘Bantu’. A new concept of ‘Hutu-land’ in Kivu region surfaced; local and Rwandan Hutu 
militias campaigning to hunt down the local Tutsi population.  
 
These facts suggest that following the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, the Tutsi 
became gradually a target of attacks, an enemy to hunt down. The anti-Tutsi ideology (used 
in the 1994 Rwanda genocide) contributed therefore to the sudden attacks against the Tutsi 
Congolese in Kivu region (from North up to South Provinces) by the coalition of Hutu 




Indeed as Staub (2003:303-5) remarks perpetrators are likely to continuously devalue and kill 
the group of people they themselves have harmed. The perpetrators exclude their victims 
from the moral universe, so that killing their ‘enemy’ becomes the right thing to do. In this 
perspective since quite a good number of the Hutu refugees particularly ex-FAR and Hutu 
militias had played a role in killing Tutsi during the Rwandan genocide likely they would 
continue hunting down their ‘enemy’ wherever they are. By the same token, in difficult life 
conditions, after members of groups have identified their enemy they adopt an ideology that 
unites them against the perceived enemy (Staub 2003:299). Furthermore, the psychological 
state of refugees (especially in conditions as those of Kivu region in 1994) may explain also 
why massive 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees were easily drawn into the ‘genocidaires’ plan 
and campaign of hunting down the Tutsi in Kivu region. Research has shown that after arrival 
in the new environment, refugees are highly concerned with basic needs; they increasingly 
become aware of their losses and idealize the past. They (refugees) indicate a more 
pronounced anxiety, depression, anger and a severe trauma with tendencies of paranoid 
reactions, hyper-reactive and over-accepting behavioural patterns. In harsh conditions 
refugees are hence likely to become a threat to peace, reverse the morality and can be drawn 
into criminal acts (Bariagaber 1999: 604; Cohon 1981:257-8). 
 
Responding to the violent attacks, both the Congolese Tutsis and the Kigali government 
sought out alternative strategies for their own survival by supporting and contributing to the 
formation of the rising Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la liberation du Congo 
(AFDL) that toppled Mobutu in May 1997 and installed Laurent Kabila (Appendix 10) as the 
                                                
24 I will come back on this point on ideology in the following section of this chapter 
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new Chef d’Etat (Vlassenroot in Kaarsholm 2006:57; Mwanasali in Kieh & Mukenge 
2002:59) among others. Since 1996 Congolese Tutsis joined AFDL to secure their survival. 
The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) backed and helped militarily AFDL to secure its borders 
by pursuing the ex-FAR/Interahamwe incursions and destroying the refugee camps in Kivu 
regions. Many refugees were subsequently killed and others fled into jungles of Central 
Africa. One of the consequences of these attacks on refugees’ camps in Kivu region was a 
deepening of the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism that was already developing in the region. An anti-
Tutsi sentiment became strong among Congolese Hutus and other local ethnic groups 
(Kisangani 2000:163-170). 
 
Following the 1996-7 ‘war of liberation’ that toppled Mobutu’s regime and installed Laurent 
Kabila as the new Chef d’Etat several Congolese Tutsi were assigned to influential positions 
in the new regime (national and provincial) and in the army. Although they were given full 
access to the administration, the Congolese Tutsis were still waiting for their citizenship 
rights. In his visit to Bukavu in February 1998, Kabila promised Banyamulenge Congolese 
citizenship, but no official document confirmed this intention (Vlassenroot 2002:509-510). 
However, as early as end of 1997, the Congolese Tutsis became once again the target for 




Scherrer (2003:252) points out that Kabila became gradually autocratic and the new vision of 
broad-based governance representing all social groups never materialized. The presence of 
RPA soldiers in DRC and in higher positions in the army and the privileges enjoyed by 
Congolese Tutsi shortly after the 1996-7 war, led many Congolese (from other ethnic groups) 
to become discontent with an antipathy against Tutsi population. They saw the ‘liberation’ as 
an occupation and Kabila as a puppet of Rwanda. Reyntjens (1999: 244) remarks that in Kivu 
region in1997 different movements emerged campaigning the liberation of the ‘Bantu people’ 
from the ‘Tutsi-hegemony’
26
. Kabila encouraged these feelings as a way to cement his own 
                                                
25 To some extent, this was due to the active presence of RPA on Congo soil. Reyntjens (1999: 244) writes that 
“[i]n October 1997, a Mouvement National pour la Sauvegarde de la Democratie (MNSD), ... claimed that ‘the 
abuses of the Tutis military … have caused antipathy or even hatred among ethnic groups in the region (Hunde, 
Nyanga, Tembo,…) against the Tutsi populations’”. 
26 Some of those movements are CRLK (Conseil de la Resistance et de la Libération du Kivu), MNSD 
(Mouvement National pour la Sauvegarde de la Démocratie). And these movements appeared to be linked to the 
Mai-Mai and ex-FAR/Interahamwe (Reyntjens 1999:244) 
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power. Congolese Tutsis in high positions (in army or in governmental administration) were 
gradually either removed or mistreated (ICG 1998:6-7). 
 
In 1998 Kabila ordered the expulsion of the Rwandan-Ugandan troops and created a state of 
propaganda machine aimed at fuelling animosities against Tutsis. In a speech he delivered on 
the national radio and television Laurent Kabila urged listeners to use “a machete, a spear, an 
arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire...to kill the Rwandan 
Tutsi”(Clark2003:67). The result, following this speech was a witch-hunt against all eastern 
Congolese and foreigners, often judged exclusively by facial appearances. Similar speeches 
resonated from Congolese authorities against Congolese Tutsis. The International Crisis 
Group report, ICG (2007:11-2) observes that political leaders openly used anti-Tutsi rhetoric 
threatening Congolese Tutsi and mobilizing people against Tutsi. The Amnesty International 
report (1998:4) points out that, 
[Since August 1998 propaganda against Tutsi were launched and spread across the country]. 
Some DRC senior Congolese government officials and media have incited civilians to take up 
arms and attack Tutsi. For example, on 8 August [1998] an official made a statement on the 
Congolese radio from Bunia in eastern DRC calling on listeners to “... jump on the people with 
long noses, who are tall and slim [reference to Tutsi] and want to dominate us ... Wake up, be 
aware of our destiny so as to defeat the enemy.” 
 
The ex-FAR and Interahamwe (under ALiR: Rwandan Liberation Army
27
) approached by 
Laurent Kabila, contributed actively and significantly in the spread of anti-Tutsi feeling; 
cooperating with FAC (Forces Armeés Congolaises) and mobilizing many groups, especially 
Mai-Mai in hunting and killing Tutsis: in 1998, thousands of Congolese Tutsis were 
massacred in Kinshasa and Kivu region (Scherrer 2003:254-5; Clark 2003:67). 
 
In August 1998 an anti-Kabila rebellion was launched from Kivu region by the Rwanda-
Uganda backed RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy).
28
 The point to mention here is that 
under the new regime of Laurent Kabila (Appendix 10), the Congolese Tutsis were still 
denied citizenship rights. The Tutsi faced continuously political exclusion and violent attacks.  
The HRW (Human Right Watch’s report) (2007: 10) notes that the ordinary Tutsi soldiers 
were targeted and attacked in many occasions by soldiers from other Congolese ethnic 
groups; the Tutsi officers were harassed that for not being Congolese. The report mentions 
                                                
27 ALiR later on became FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda). I shall come back on this 
point in Chapter Four. 
28 I shall come back on this point in Chapter Four. 
45 
 
further that the moral and physical torture against Congolese Tutsi soldiers led to the 
dissolution of 51
st
 Battalion. Tutsi who would want to join in other battalions were also 
pushed away and others were subjects of harsh treatment (torture, imprisonment or beating 
even death).  
 
The Congolese from other ethnic groups in cooperation with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, 
continued to hunt down the Tutsi. For instance, in May 2004 the Congolese army attacked 
Banyamulenge civilians in the town of Bukavu. These attacks led thousands to flee to 
Burundi. They settled in Gatumba camp, in rural Bujumbura. In the night of 13 August of the 
same year their camp was attacked and more than a hundred Banyamulenge were killed 
mostly women and children. Those who attempted to return home were stoned by an angry 
mob of Congolese while others (Banyamulenge refugees) chose to camp in the neutral zone. 
These massacres were carried out by a well-organized force from the Congo that combined 
Congolese Mai-Mai, ALiR combatants (ex-FAR/Interahamwe) and the Burundian Hutu 
rebel, FNL (Forces pour la Liberation Nationale) (HRW report 2004:1-5). 
 
Another wave of Tutsi exclusion and anti-Tutsi campaign was intensified in the run up to 
national and provincial election, from 2002 to 2006. During the electoral campaign anti-Tutsi 
rhetoric was used by many politicians. In Goma (Capital of North Kivu province) during a 
rally the primer Minister of Joseph Kabila, Abdulai Yerodia, holding a spear in one hand 
(www.kivupeace.org)  called upon people to get rid of Tutsi from DRC 
These people we will tell them to leave our territory. You who stay here, you must go back where you 
come from. If you do not want to go back where you come from, we will put sticks into your backsides 
to make sure you go back (Human Right Watch 2007:11-12) 
 
The riots against Tutsis in many parts of the country also increased. The political balance 
shifted away from the RCD (Seen as representing Tutsi Congolese in the transitional 
government) towards the Nande, Hunde, Nyanga and Hutu communities allied to Kabila. In 
Kivu region the RCD officers were being replaced by Kabila’s officers. The appointment in 
Bukavu of the pro-Kabila, General Nabyolwa (an FAC officer) in 2004 as the military region 
commander (ICG 2007: 3) illustrates this point. In South Kivu, the government refused to 
recognize Minembwe region (populated mostly by Banyamulenge) as a territory. This 
decision was perceived by Banyamulenge as a way to limit them from participating in the 
national political life (HRW 2007: 12). In North Kivu the Congolese Tutsi almost lost 
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elections and representation at the provincial level mainly because a great number had fled to 
Rwanda and could not come back for voting (ICG 2007:5-6). 
 
Certainly the weakening of the Congolese Tutsi political positions at the local and national 
level, the growing hatred and marginalisation by other ethnic communities 
(Vlassenroot2002:508-509) and mostly the unsolved issue of their citizenship rights increased 
fears and frustrations among Tutsis in the DRC. And the failure of the Congolese government 
to recognize the Congolese Tutsis as Congolese citizens has obviously increased the feeling 
among the indigenous of seeing them as an ‘out-group’, and confirming the propagated idea 
of Tutsi “foreignness
29
” in the Great Lakes Region. Rutazibwa (1999:21) quotes one of the 
speeches of the commissaire of the Zone of Uvira (South Kivu) when he was calling people 
to ‘crush snakes which are amongst them’. When members of a group in a society are seen as 
the ‘out-group’ and, as such, devalued, dehumanized and scapegoated it becomes easier to 
harm them.  
 
The above paragraphs therefore suggest that, with the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu 
refugees particularly with the subsequent actions of ex-FAR and Interahamwe hunting down 
the Tutsis, campaigning that the latter were the only true enemy of Bantu people various, 
ethnic groups (in DRC) distanced themselves from the Congolese Tutsis. Obviously the 
conflicts that unfolded since 1996 in Kivu region worsened the situation. The interethnic 
relationships changed gradually as new shifting alliances emerged. As the above discourse 
shows the old collective Banyarwanda was gradually dissolved into two separate and 
antagonistic Hutu and Tutsi camps (Reyntjens 1999: 242-244; Lemarchand 1997; Prunier 
2001: 152-155; ICG 2007: 4-5).  
 
On many occasions the local autochthones mobilized by ex-FAR and Interahamwe joined in 
the Hutu camp perceived as the really ‘Bantu’ people to be liberated from the ‘Tutsi 
hegemony’. The Congolese Tutsis were singled out as ‘out-group’ and scapegoated. And as 
Dutton et al (2005:458) observe “to remain [a] member of in-group, individuals move away 
physically and attitudinally from the identified out-group” promoting subsequently social 
polarization and eventual hostility. The Tutsi being turned into an out-group, the other local 
                                                
29 One of the Core ideas of the genocide ideology against Tutsi in Rwanda was that they are foreign to Rwanda, 
they came from Ethiopia.  
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ethnic groups particularly Bashi, Barega and Babembe (in South Kivu) and Hunde, Nyanga 
and Nande (in North) changed their behavioural attitudes towards Tutsis by siding with ex-
FAR and Interahamwe in hunting down the local Tutsi population. The above described 
instances of violent attacks and political exclusion (nationally and provincially) targeting the 
Congolese Tutsis provide utterly tangible insights about attitudinal shifts towards the Tutsis.  
The anti-Tutsi ideology played a crucial role in conflicts that ravaged DRC, and particularly 
in attitudinal change discussed above. As argued in the above section, the ideology used in 
DRC with the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees was similar to anti-Tutsi ideology 
used in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The ‘genocidaires’ (ex-FAR and Interahamwe) 
contributed actively in the expansion and spread of this anti-Tutsi ideology in DRC and in 
Kivu region in particular. Hence, in the following last section of this chapter, I would like to 
argue that the anti-Tutsi ideology played a crucial role in attitudinal change discussed 
previously. I will look very briefly at this ideology in the context of the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide and then assess its usage and impact in the DRC and in Kivu provinces in 
particular. 
 
3. 4. THE ANTI-TUTSI IDEOLOGY OF 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND THE 
EASTERN DRC CONFLICTS 
 
The preliminary to this chapter defines the term ‘ideology’ and points out that politicians or 
social leaders use an ideology to technically present a future that is better than the one 
prevailing in a society in question
30
. However, the history of humankind societies has 
unambiguously taught us that some ideologies tend to be destructive, igniting violent 
conflicts. Instances such as in Germany under Hitler, in Italy under Mussolini, in Iraq under 
Saddam (Baradat 1997:255, 259 & 301) substantiate this argument. 
In the case of Rwanda the ideology that led to the 1994 genocide against Tutsis the Rwandan 
society was facing many problems at different levels. Between 1990 and 1991 the multiparty 
system was adopted and from then on many political parties were created. Those political 
parties initially appeared to be in opposition to ruling party MRND (Mouvement 
Révolutionnaire National pour le Development). The latter had been the unique ruling party 
                                                
30 Baradat (1997:9) notes that ‘ideology’ as a political term consists of views that present a future 
materialistically improved over the present. And this desirable future is attainable according to the ideology. 
This description of ‘ideology’ suggests that the latter often emerges when a society faces difficulties and life 
challenges in many of its aspects. Staub agrees (2003:299). 
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since 1973 to 1991 and governing the country ‘unchallenged’. The new formed political 
parties had differing political programs. They were born in a climate of deep antagonism and 
rivalry.  Many of them were afflicted with discriminatory ideas. It is during this difficult time 
that the war of liberation was launched in 1990 started by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).  
 
From 1991 there was an increasingly sharp political tension in Rwanda. Economically 
Rwanda was scarcely any better. In provinces like Butare, Gikongoro and Kibuye there was a 
famine. The national currency had experienced a sharp drop. What was called: the structural 
adjustment program was badly applied and this reinforced the economic downturn. Moreover 
the price of coffee which used to be the principal country’s main export sharply fell on the 
international market. Briefly there was a deep economic crisis (Commission Episcopale 
“Justice et Paix” 2004:142-145). All these factors combined with many other had paralyzed 
all domains of life of Rwandans by making them feel confused and hopeless. It is in such a 
social and political environment that the society became vulnerable. Rwanda of the 1990s 
sunk into deep political discords that generated political chaos coupled with conflicts between 
groups. An ideology was needed to offer a new comprehension of reality with promises of a 
better future and hope. The ‘Tutsi’ identified with RPF were gradually described as the 
‘enemy’, scapegoated for the prevailing life problems and excluded from the moral realm 
(Staub 2003:299). 
 
However the anti-Tutsi ideology was not a new phenomenon or a new social construct. As 
discussed in Chapter One scholars point out that the anti-Tutsi ideology used in 1994 Rwanda 
genocide is rooted in Hutu-Tutsi polarization that marked the post-colonial history of 
Rwanda. Human Rights watch briefing paper (2006:6) reports that some of the ideas that 
formed the core of the anti-Tutsi ideology were: 
• Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there. 
• Despite the 1959 revolution, Tutsi continued to enjoy higher status and greater wealth than Hutu 
and were in some way responsible for continuing Hutu poverty. 
• Tutsi posed a danger to Hutu, who were always the victims, whether of Tutsi military power or of 
Tutsi cunning and so Hutu had a right and a duty to defend themselves. 
This anti-Tutsi ideology, propagated gradually under Habyarimana’s regime, promoted the 
exclusion and physical elimination of the Tutsi (Hintjens 1999: 255-7, Lemarchand 2002: 
510, and Verwimp 2000: 3-4).
31
 A detailed analysis of the anti-Tutsi ideology and the 1994 
                                                
31 As discussed in Chapter One, the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism marked the Rwandan society since colonial period, 
and became gradually stronger in post-colonial era. Under Habyarimana’s regime social structures and 
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Rwanda genocide is beyond the scope of this study. Hence it may suffice here to emphasize 
that the anti-Tutsi ideology of 1994 Rwandan genocide underlined that the Tutsis were 
foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there and they posed a danger to the Hutu 
population. The disseminated propaganda dehumanized the Tutsi and equated them to bad 
animals that should be killed. This created a new morality that proclaimed the correctness of 
killing Tutsis (Melvern 2000:61-63).  
 
From the above discussion following the 1994 Rwanda genocide the Tutsi-population in 
DRC was also portrayed as ‘out-group’ and scapegoated. This anti-Tutsi sentiment took 
different forms as the DRC conflicts developed and changed its tune.
32
 Various factors 
contributed to the sharpening and remodelling of this anti-Tutsi ideology in the DRC 
conflicts. A close analysis of different documents (scholars and non scholars) on DRC 
conflicts shows that the above described anti-Tutsi ideology has been used in DRC conflicts 
in general and in Kivu region in particular. (Chretien2003:344) articulates that one of the 
major Great Lakes Region’s political failures after the 1994 Rwandan genocide is the 
continuation and expansion of the ideology that inspired the genocide: “hatred of the Tutsi 
perceived as invaders has taken over Congo.” However what might be the nuance is that this 
ideology has been used at different levels and phases of the DRC conflicts bearing thus 
different tones. With the massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in Kivu region 
the ex-FAR and Interahamwe disseminated the anti-Tutsi ideology seeking to establish 
themselves in “ an ethnically cleansed sanctuary” (Arnson and Zartman 2005:126; Kabamba 
                                                                                                                                                    
mechanisms were put in place to exclude the Tutsi. Mass Hutu population were mobilized so as to see the Tutsi 
as their enemy. In schools it was taught (from Rwandan History textbooks) that Tutsis were, dishonest, actually 
‘foreigners’ and have mistreated Hutus (Verwimp 2000: 21-6; Lemarchand 2002: 509-5110; Hintjens 1999: 
254-9). Media played a big role in portraying the Tutsi as the enemy of the Hutu even before the 1994: for 
instance the Journal Kangura (wake them up). The Journal published the ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’ (Kangura, 
No.6, December 1990). These ‘commandments’ called upon Hutus to hate Tutsis: statements such as “Hutu 
must stop taking pity on the Tutsi” (8
th
 commandment), “Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their 
common enemy: the Tutsi” (9
th
 commandment) (on: www.trumanwebdesign.com). At different occasions, Tutsi 
were killed: in Kibilira, Bugogwe and Bugesera (Hintjens 1999: 255-7).  Lemarchand (2002: 510) and Verwimp 
(2000: 3-4) observe that under Habyarimana’s regime, plans and decisions were made to physically eliminate 
the Tutsi. In March 1992 a document (Report of Rwanda Commission of Inquiry) transmitted to the then 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Belgian Ambassador in Rwanda reads (in on of its paragraphs): “a secret 
military staff charged with the extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda in order to solve forever, in their way, the 
ethnic problem in Rwanda and to destroy the domestic Hutu opposition” (in Verwimp 2000: 3). 
32
 The detailed study of the development of DCR conflicts in all its aspects is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Hence this section intends to simply focus on the extent to which the ideology of hatred among Hutu and Tutsi 
in Rwanda contributed to the exacerbation of the eastern DRC conflict. 
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1999:123). After the fall of Mobutu’s regime the Congolese authority propagated the anti-
Tutsi ideology for a massive reactionary mobilisation against the presence of Rwandan army 
on DRC soil. Furthermore, the anti-Tutsi propaganda was used by the FDLR rebel group 
following the demolition of the refugees’ camps in Kivu region by the RPA/ADFL. 
 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) also observes that as they found refuge into DRC, the 
genocidaires enjoyed freedom of movement and more to that they imported their genocide 
ideology unleashing a reign of terror and ethnic cleansing against the Congolese Tutsi in 
North Kivu. Melvern (2000: 223) reports that 
Hutu power remained a threat, its adherents determined to continue their genocidal policies (...) In the 
refugee camps, aid workers saw at first hand how local officials and militia established their authority 
and control. (...) some 4000 murders took place in Goma in the first months of the exodus. Killings, 
threats, extortions, rape (...) were common. The Hutu power ideology was as entrenched as ever with 
people openly expressing the view that it was correct to kill Tutsi.  
 
Since 1998 Laurent Kabila created a state of propaganda machine spreading an anti-Tutsi 
ideology, portraying that Uganda-Rwanda intention was to establish Tutsi hegemony in the 
Great Lakes Region
33
 (Reyntjens 1999:243-4). In Kivu region a theme of struggle between 
Bantus and Hamites evolved gradually as different propaganda were pronounced. In his 
introduction to a publication of the Zairian Ministry of Information and the Press Professor 
Kabuya-Lumuna Sando declared that “in the face of the hegemonic doctrine of the Tutsi, it 
evokes a sort of objective alliance between the people of Zaire and the Hutu” (Reyntjens 
1998:12). The propaganda against Tutsi fostered by the anti-Tutsi ideological ideas used in 
1994 Rwanda genocide divided the eastern DRC society into two camps of friends and 
enemies. “Hutu-Tutsi polarities became the basic referential frame among a large segment of 
the Congolese population for identifying friends and enemies” (Lemarchand 2002:393). And 
the actual ethnic identities needed not to correspond to these labels only certain cultural or 
physical markers were sufficient as indicators of ‘Tutsiness’ or ‘Hutuness’. The Congolese 
Tutsi were threatened with expulsion from the region for they were labelled ‘out-group’, 
‘invaders’, ‘foreigners’, ‘oppressors’ or ‘population of doubtful citizenship’.   
                                                
33  Scholars have argued differently about the thesis of Tutsi hegemony in Great Lakes region. Was this a reality 
or a mere campaign against the Tutsi? Reyntjens (1998:12) opens up a discussion on the issue, but from 
different angles, mentioning that Hutu from Rwanda and Burundi have claimed the existence of a “plan of Tutsi 
colonization in Kivu and in the central region of Africa”. Reyntjens points out different incidences that 
stimulated such claim: in October 1996 the then President of Rwanda, Pasteur Bizimungu “evoked the frontiers 
of former Rwanda, which included parts of Zaire adding that if Zaire wants to expel the Banyamulenge, it 




The hate propaganda coupled with acts of violence polarised the eastern DRC society and 
disrupted its ethnic balance. Inter-groups schisms developed gradually as the situation 
deteriorated with despair among refugees and lack of a clear political, social and economical 
direction on DRC society’s side. In such situation of social, political chaos and conflicts, 
ideology is developed to offer a new comprehension of the world and direction to life (Staub 
2002:50). A developed-ideology in such circumstances usually seeks to designate a group to 
blame for the ills of a society whether social, political, economic or even conflicts between 
groups; an enemy standing in a way of achieving a better society. For instance when asked 
about the causes of conflicts in Congo a number of local Congolese said “wherever there are 
Tutsis, there are problems” (The Economist on www.Colorado.edu/geography 2006). Such 
ideology leads to devaluation and scapegoating the group defined as ‘out-group’, the 
‘enemy’. The tendency is the reversal of morality, killing the ‘enemy’ becomes the right thing 
to do (Staub 2003:299-305). The Congolese Tutsis experienced this reality as discussed in the 
previous section. 
 
Thus, the above paragraphs argue that following the arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees 
in DRC (especially the ‘genocidaires’) an anti-Tutsi ideology infected the Kivu region and 
contributed significantly in the attitudinal shift.  The ‘Tutsi’ became the ‘enemy’. Certainly 
the group identified as the ‘enemy’ by other groups would feel threatened and seek measures 
for security and survival. Violent conflicts are most likely to erupt, with formation of armed 
groups and alliances. In DRC, the ‘Tutsi’ facing exclusion and violent attack resolved in 
taking up arms. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the DRC fell into violent conflicts. 
Interethnic hatred grew stronger and became one of the key factors in the DRC conflicts. In 
1996 a ‘war of liberation’ was launched from Kivu region opening up a complex chain of 
violent conflicts involving various actors and alliances: internal armed groups and regional 










The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees 




Chapter three highlighted that the ethnic polarization in Kivu region with the interethnic war 
in 1993 and the knock-on effects of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which significantly marked 
the region
34
. Two national ‘wars of liberation’ emerged (in 1996 and 1998), both rooted in 
the Kivu region’s convoluted mixture of political machination, communal violence, border 
sensitivity, and the exploitation of mineral and agricultural wealth of the region (Jackson, 
2002:520)
35
. The 1996-7 struggle that toppled Mobutu’s regime put in motion a complex 
chain of conflicts that have characterized the DRC since then, involving various powers and 
different alliances including internal rebel groups and regional states. 
 
This chapter will assess the contribution or link of the 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees in the 
rebel movements’ formation involved in the DRC conflicts since 1996, focusing mainly on 
the country’s eastern Kivu provinces. The chapter divides the DRC conflicts into three main 
phases, which correspond to the chapter’s main sections: (i) the October 1996 to May 1997; 
(ii) the August 1998 to late 2001; and (iii) the 2004 onwards conflicts.  Each section looks at 
the main actors in the conflicts; assessing their constituency and raison d’être; and elucidating 
any link to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees: i.e. examining the nature and extent of these 
refugees’ involvement in the DRC conflicts. Staub’s Basic Needs framework provides a 
theoretical structure for this study. As pointed out in chapter two the DRC conflicts are 
complex and multidimensional in nature. Various factors and forces (ethnicity, economics 
                                                
34 As indicated in previous chapters, of the outflow of 2.1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the 1994 
Rwanda genocide, DRC hosted 1.1 to 1.25 million and among these were thousands of ex-FAR and 30,000 to 
40,000 Hutu militiamen (Interahamwe) responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. This massive influx of 
Rwandan Hutu refugees particularly into eastern DRC impacted on the region in terms of loss of human lives, 
ecological damage, increased criminality and long-lasting destructive wars (Kisangani 2002:165). 
35
 “The long, slow rotting from within of Mobutu’s Zaire permitted the Kivus to build a degree of political and 
economic autonomy during the 1980s and 1990s” notes Jackson (2002:520). 
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and politics) have driven the conflicts from the roots. However, in this chapter, a focus is put 
on the link between the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly the ex-FAR/Interahamwe) 
and the main players in conflicts that occurred in DRC.   
 
The chapter shows that the presence of ex-FAR and Interahamwe on DRC territory has been 
one of the factors that led to the launching of the two ‘wars of liberation’ from Kivu, i.e. the 
1996 anti-Mobutu and the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellions. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe in 
Kivu region had become a threat to both the Congolese Tutsi and the Kigali government; and 
they contributed significantly in anti-Tutsi propaganda that marked the DRC conflicts. Some 
elements from previous chapters will be referred to in order to contextualize the subsequent 
chapter’s discussion. 
 
4.1. OCTOBER 1996 TO MAY 1997 DRC CONFLICTS AND MAIN ACTORS 
INVOLVED 
  
In October 1996 a ‘war of liberation’ was launched from Kivu against Mobutu’s regime 
(Appendix 10).  Through this phase of DRC conflicts, Mobutu led the government side with 
the unpaid, demoralized Zairean army (Forces Armeés Zairoises, FAZ), which collapsed 
swiftly. During this 1996-7 phase of the DRC conflict, Mobutu had no external direct military 
assistance. The West, particularly USA (United Sates of America), France and Belgium, who 
had sustained Mobutu during the Cold war period as their strong arm in the Central Africa, 
had gradually turned their back against him since the end of cold war (Lemarchand, 
2002:390-1; McNulty, 1999:69-73). Thus, in this first phase of the conflict, Mobutu with his 
army (FAZ) in the bad shape, cooperated militarily with the rebel groups that were fighting 
neighbouring countries from bases on DRC soil, i.e. Uganda rebel groups, the Rwandan Hutu 
rebel group ALiR, the Burundian CNDD-FDD rebel group and the Angolan rebel movement 
UNITA. 
 
The main rebellion that launched the war and toppled Mobutu in May 1997 was AFDL 
(Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire), an alliance of 
several anti-Mobutu forces. The foundations of the AFDL were laid in South Kivu and the 
four primary revolutionary movements made up initially the alliance: Laurent Kabila’s PRP 
(Peoples’ Revolutionary Party), the CRD (Conseil de la Resistance pour la Démocratie) led 
by Andre Kisasse Ngandu, the PDA (Peoples’ Democratic Alliance) led by Deogratias 
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Bugera, a Masisi Tutsi, and the MRLZ (Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la liberation du 
Zaire) led by Masasu Ningaba, a member of one of the main ethnic groups in South Kivu, the 
Bashi. The Banyamulenge joined the AFDL and regional states including Rwanda, Uganda, 
Angola and Burundi to a less extent played a vital role in forming and backing militarily the 
AFDL (McNulty 1999:54-5, 72-4; Reyntjens 1999:241-2; and Dunn in Clark 2003:56-7). 
 
Recalling from chapter three, the Banyarwanda collectively (both Hutu and Tutsi) in Kivu 
provinces had faced the victimization and denaturalization under Mobutu’s regime. With the 
arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, including ex-FAR and Interahamwe, an anti-
Tutsi propaganda was spread, in North Kivu, violent attacks were launched against 
Congolese Tutsi (Mwanasali in Kieh & Mukenge 2002:59; Zartman 2005:126-7), and in 
South Kivu, Banyamulenge faced the same fate (Abdulai 1995:19; Gnamo in Adelman & 
Suhrke 2000:327). Thus, for their own survival the Congolese Tutsis (both from North and 
South Kivu provinces) responded by supporting and contributing to the formation of AFDL, 
with an objective that a new regime in Kinshasa would recognize their citizenship rights and 
address effectively the security issue in Kivu region. Vlassenroot (2002:509) remarks that 
hundreds of young Banyamulenge joined in the formation of AFDL to reclaim their 
nationality rights and to save and protect their families from violent persecution. 
 
The swift military advance and success of the AFDL depended immensely on the external 
supports. Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) officers planned and directed many of AFDL 
military operations, participated in the capture of many cities including Lubumbashi, Kenge, 
Kisangani and Kinshasa (McNulty 1999: 55, Clark 2001: 268). Rwanda and Uganda trained 
and organized the AFDL’s army and the Angola provided tanks and heavy artillery. As 
previously noted, a key reason for the regional support to the 1996 AFDL’s ‘war of 
liberation’ against Mobutu’s regime was related to regional security. Rwanda assisted AFDL 
aiming to both uproot the ex-FAR and Hutu militia (Interahamwe) operating from Zairian 
soil and to topple Mobutu’s regime that supported the previous Habyarimana’s regime and 
supported the Hutu militia (Kisangani 2000:168; McNulty 1999:55, 72-7 and Dunn in Clark 
2003:57-8).  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, as soon as they crossed the border into Kivu region, 
the ex-FAR and Interahamwe reorganized and started launching incursions into Rwanda from 
Zaire’s soil to destabilize Kigali’s newly established government; and Mobutu’s generals 
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helped this rebellion militarily (Pottier 2002:41-3; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). Rafti (2006:9-
10) reports that by the end of 1996 in Kivu region, helped by Mobutu and some of the then 
FAZ’s officers, the former Governor of Kigali, Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho and ex-FAR 
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rwarakabije (Appendix 10) started a rebellion, ALiR (Rwandan 
liberation Army). The ALiR was composed of ex-FAR (both genocidaires and non-
genocidaires) and Interahamwe and young recruits from the 1994 Rwandan refugee 
population. ALiR infiltrated north-western Rwanda killing mainly Tutsi genocide survivors, 
Hutu seen as RPF collaborators, forcing young Hutus to join them in the forest, destroying 
infrastructure, and trying to interrupt foreign aid to the new Rwandan regime. This was a 
threat to Rwandan security, and the new government in Kigali had made several appeals to 
International community and to Kinshasa government to intervene, but no actions were taken. 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005:18) reports that, 
(…) The international community failed to heed the request of Rwanda, and even that of the 
Kinshasa authorities under Prime Minister Leon Kengo wa Dondo, to stop these [Rwandan 
Hutu] rebel activities. When Kengo tried to expel the refugees, he was prevented from doing 
so by President Mobutu and the international community.  
 
The then Rwandan Vice-president and chief commander of army Paul Kagame (Appendix 10) 
expressed “since 1995 his determination to sort out the security problem himself if the 
international community was unable to do so” McNulty (1999:76). Thus, the new regime in 
Kigali supporting AFDL hoped to solve once and for all the security problem on Rwanda 
western borders with the DRC. 
 
Other regional states that played a vital role in the formation of AFDL and supporting this 
rebellion that toppled Mobutu’s regime in May 1997 were Uganda, Angola and Burundi; 
and all aiming to solve the security problem they were facing from the DRC. Uganda’s 
government supported militarily the AFDL in this first phase of conflict so as to destroy the 
bases of the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces), the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) and the 
WBNF (West Bank Nile Front) who used DRC soil to destabilize Uganda. Angola on the 
other side, was actively involved in the 1996-1997 DRC conflict, militarily backing AFDL so 
as to oust Mobutu, the longtime benefactor of the Uniao Nacional para a Independecia Total 
de Angola (UNITA) rebels, hoping to drive the latter out of their Zairian rear bases. Burundi 
was involved also in the 1996-1997 DRC conflict on AFDL side, so to neutralize the 
Burundian rebels namely the Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-
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FDD), and the Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL) that used Zairian territory as their 
bases (Reyntjens 1999:241 and Clark 2001:265-7). 
 
The outlined data suggested that the formation of the coalition AFDL and its supporters 
(regional states: Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi) was paradoxically ignited by 
converging and diverging objectives. The regime of Mobutu and the rebel groups operating 
from DRC’s soil (Ugandan rebels, UNITA and CNDD-FDD but particularly the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe) were the target for the 1996-7 AFDL and its supporters: the elements and 
threats to be liberated from. The ‘defeated’ 1994 Rwandan regime (that had committed the 
genocide against the Tutsi) contemplated the possibility of regaining power in Rwanda in the 
hope of finding a way of rationalizing and justifying the crime of genocide committed 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18, Eriksen 2005: 1100, Reyntjens 1999: 241, Lemarchand 1997). 
Hence it would not be irrational to speculate that one of the ways for their survival (the 
defeated Rwandan regime, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe) was to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda in 
Kivu provinces at all cost so to gain support and a ‘friendly’ environment from which to 
launch attacks into Rwanda. As detailed in Chapter Three following the arrival of the 1994 
Rwandan Hutu refugees the Congolese Tutsi became a target of violent attacks.  
 
These attitude and behaviours of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees as they arrived in DRC 
may be analyzed and interpreted differently. However, the main argument here based on the 
outlined data and on Staub’s framework (2003:305) is that since the Hutu refugees 
particularly ex-FAR and Hutu militias had played a role in killing Tutsi during the Rwandan 
genocide likely they would continue hunting down their ‘enemy’ (the Tutsi) wherever they 
are. In the same line of discussion, Dutton et al (2005:458) observes that “a common 
perception of genocidaires is that their target is virus- or cancer-like”; thus the Tutsi 
(wherever he/she is) was an intolerable element to be eradicated. Additionally, the 
psychological state of these refugees: severe fear and anxiety of their future, uncertainty and 
unknown, depression, anger, severe trauma, aggressiveness (Cohon 1981:257-8) and shame 
to be defeated (humiliation) with no complete success in their ‘genocidaire’ plan provides a 
rationale behind such behaviours.
36
 The ex-FAR/Interahamwe became thus a threat to both 
the Congolese Tutsi and the new regime in Kigali. 
                                                
36 Certainly the analysis presented here does not undermine the complexity of the history of Hutu-Tutsi 
antagonism in Rwanda and its consequences (politically, socially and economically). However, as mentioned in 
Chapter One, a focus on the psychological dispositions of those involved in DRC conflicts may provide useful 
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An anti-Mobutu rebellion appears to have provided an opportunity for both Rwanda and 
Congolese Tutsis to end the intolerable situation. Furthermore, as described in previous 
chapters under Mobutu’s regime life conditions in DRC had practically deteriorated and 
Mobutu had become a threat to a healthier life (politically, socially and economically) for the 
majority of Congolese people. There was a need for change, and as Staub (2003:293) 
suggests difficult life conditions and persistent life problems in a society are conducive to 
conflict. In additional, Mobutu, cooperating with and supporting the above mentioned rebel 
groups operating from DRC’s territory, was to a larger extent a threat to the security of the 
directly concerned regional states (particularly Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola) as 
presented above. There were no effective domestic mechanisms to redress the situation and 
the international community was almost silent in this regard. This may thus explain the 
formation and victory of AFDL and the vital regional support it received: the threatened 
parties brought their forces together. Paraphrasing Dutton et al (2005:457), the perceived 
threat inspires the requisite initial avoidance and alliance formation to end the unbearable 
situation.   
 
However, as it progressed the AFDL was gradually marked with internal schisms that 
progressively grew stronger. And as the AFDL made contact with the Kivu population 
recruiting young people from all parts of the provinces as it advanced, the anti-Tutsi feeling 
infected gradually the movement (ICG Congo Report 1998:14-5)
37
. Despite these internal 
clashes and schisms the AFDL constituents tried to keep together for the sake of wining the 
war they had launched against Mobutu’s regime for it was in each one’s interest (McNulty 
1999: 55-7). 
 
Another type of actor also involved in the 1996-7 DRC conflict was the Mai-Mai (or Mayi-
Mayi) militias. In the beginning of the conflict the Mai-Mai groups sided with Mobutu but 
after the AFDL made an approach and appeal to the militias many of the Mai-Mai groups 
                                                                                                                                                    
insights for understanding more these complex and multidimensional conflicts that have ravaged the DRC till 
today. 
37 As from early 1997 internal clashes (some of them were violent) occurred between Tutsi (both Congolese and 
Rwandan) and Congolese “non-Tutsi”. With the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees, particularly the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe the Kivu society was more ethnically polarized and the anti-Tutsi sentiment had grown 





 The Mai-Mai movement emerged in the 1960s during the Muleliste 
rebellion. And later on in 1990s, the Mai-Mai movement emerged as the result of violent 
political and economic rivalries and frustration. The term Mai-Mai refers to all community-
based fighters who initially fought to defend the politically and economically marginalized 
local people. The Mai-Mai movement is heterogeneous and divided for it includes different 
groups that vary in their relative level of organization: group of General Padiri, group of 
General Dunia, FRDKI (Front de resistance et de defense du Kivu), FURNAC (Forces unies 
de resistance nationale contre l’agression du Congo). Initially, the Mai-Mai groups allied 
together to protect their respective regions, specifically with respect to the security of both 
their people and resources (Morvan 2006:10-15; the April 2002 United Nations Security 
Council-UNSC report).  
 
The Mai-Mai are known to shift alliances to achieve their interests. The constituents of these 
groups under the umbrella of Mai-Mai are mainly from the Hunde, Tembo, Nyanga and 
Nande ethnic groups. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe trained militarily and armed the Mai-
Mai groups which used to carry traditional weapons: arrows and alike. The 2002 UNSC 
report states further that since the rise of the 1996 DRC conflict the highest concentration of 
Mai-Mai groups are found in North Kivu (Walikale and Masisi), in South Kivu (Walungu 





To sum up the above analysis and in the theoretical perspective of this study I would like to 
emphasize that the survival (political, social and economical) of either party involved in the 
1996-7 violent conflicts in DRC and in Kivu provinces in particular  was the main driving 
forces behind these conflicts. When the group’s survival is threatened politically, socially and 
economically the need for connection becomes powerful (Staub 2002:16); hence the 
formation of alliance (AFDL and its allies, and ALiR) observed during the first phase of DRC 
conflicts. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly the defeated regime and ex-
FAR/Interahamwe) facing fear of uncertainty for their future survival became a dangerous 
                                                
38 This is reported also on the Mai-Mai website: www.congo-mai-mai.net  
39 The total number of Mai-Mai active in the Kivu region was estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 in 2002, when the 
UNSC report was compiled 
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threat to both Congolese Tutsis and Rwanda. They played a crucial role in polarizing 
ethnically the Congolese society.  
 
4.2. AUGUST 1998 TO LATE 2001 DRC CONFLICTS AND ARMED GROUPS 
INVOLVED  
 
In August 1998, about a year after Mobutu’s fall in May 1997 and installation of Laurent 
Kabila’s government in Kinshasa a new armed movement in Kivu region launched another 
“war of liberation” against the new regime. This latest new “war of liberation” launched from 
the eastern province of Kivu was essentially different from the 1996-7 AFDL’s war in three 
aspects: firstly, the anti-Kinshasa camp was made up by various forces with no common 
agenda and often competing objectives; secondly the anti-Kinshasa forces had relatively 
limited logistical capacities than in the case of the 1996 “war of liberation”; thirdly, the 
guerrilla groups in eastern DRC i.e. the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (ALiR and later became 
FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) and the Mai-Mai were more 
strengthened than before (The ICG Kivu report n
o
1 1998:1). Reyntjens (1999:242-4) and 
Afoaku (in Clark 2003:109-110) report that some of the main roots of this new “war of 
liberation” were the differences between the founder members of the AFDL the coalition that 
installed Kabila as the Head of State in May 1997. As mentioned in the previous section the 
disagreement and opposition on various issues and Tutsi antipathy had plagued the movement 
from its inception.
40
 Furthermore, contrary to the expectations of Kabila’s supporters and 
sponsors his regime proved unable and unwilling to solve effectively two of the main 
problems at the origin of the 1996-7 liberation war, i.e. the security of the eastern neighbours 
(Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda) and the status (citizenship rights) of the Congolese Tutsi. 
Reyntjens (1999:243) writes further that, 
                                                
40 The 1998 Amnesty International report on DRC conflicts mentions that, General Andre Kisasse Ngandu, a 
leader of one of the armed groups in the AFDL and the chief commander of AFDL was killed in January 1997. 
He was opposed to the dominant presence of Rwanda (RPA) and Tutsi in the AFDL’s war of liberation. After 
his death some of his supporters left the AFDL to join or reform armed groups opposed to AFDL. After the 
death of Andre Kisasse Ngandu, Laurent Kabila, who as the then spokesman of the coalition became the 
AFDL’s leader. Although initially Kabila had no troops, he was known for his long and determined opposition 
to Mobutu’s regime and he had a political programme. Another leader of the AFDL coalition Anselm Masasu 
Nindaga was arrested in November 1997, sentenced in May 1998 to 20 years’ imprisonment, accused of 
endangering the security of the state, treason and forming a private militia. At start of August 1998, unhappy 
with Kabila policies, Deogratias Bugera, a third leader of the AFDL coalition, and President Kabila’s Foreign 
Minister Bizima Karaha, joined the new emerging anti-Kabila movement, RCD (Rassemblement congolais pour 
la democratie / Congolese Rally for Democracy) in eastern Kivu.   
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Although security arrangements were signed by the Kabila regime with Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi, the Congo remained a source of insecurity and the launching ground of attacks 
against these neighbours. Frustrated by what they perceived as ‘Tutsi hegemony’ in the 
region, increasing numbers of the local militias, such as the mai-mai and the Bembe, lent a 
helping hand to Uganda, Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups; on a number of occasions, 
even elements of the new Congolese army Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC) gave support to 
insurgents, e.g. by escorting them to the Rwandan border on their commando raids. 
 
The Congolese Tutsi’s participation in the 1996-7 AFDL war of liberation did not 
significantly improve their standing within Congo. Despite the victory of AFDL and 
promises made by Kabila to the Banyamulenge community the latter was disappointed and 
the sense of insecurity grew stronger: they were still denied nationality rights, and had 
strained relations with other ethnic groups in the region.  
 
As presented in chapter three the Congolese Tutsis were gradually isolated from the high 
political positions and most of the Banyamulenge soldiers were frustrated by the fact that 
they were only allowed access to inferior positions within the new Congolese Forces (FAC). 
With the continued hostile presence of ex-FAR/Interahamwe in Kivu region the Kabila’s 
anti-Tutsi campaign worsened the Banyamulenge’s situation and they resolved to anti-Kabila 
rebellion (Vlassenroot 2002:510-1 and ICG Kivu 1998:1). Laurent Kabila created a state 
propaganda machine and launched an anti-Tutsi ideology that claimed Ugandan-Rwandan 
intention to establish Tutsi hegemony in the Great Lakes region. In Kivu region as reported 
by Reyntjens (1998:12) a theme of struggle between Bantus and Hamites evolved gradually 
as different propaganda were pronounced. The ex-FAR/Interahamwe to whom Kabila had 
made appeal proved their usefulness and contributed significantly in anti-Tutsi propaganda 
and killings of Tutsi in different parts of the country.  
 
Thus, in this climate of complex unresolved issues: Congolese Tutsi security and nationality 
rights, regional security, anti-Tutsi feeling and antipathy that grew deeper in DRC and 
people’s unhappiness for Kabila’s administration
41
, the new ‘war of liberation’ was launched 
                                                
41 Afoaku (in Clark 2003:112-50) observes that since the early stage of the 1996-7 war of liberation, Laurent 
Kabila showed an autocratic style of governance. Although the AFDL and Kabila got some credit and popularity 
due to the victory toppling Mobutu regime, Congolese people expected a symbiotic relationship between the 
armed and nonviolent oppositions against Mobutu; 86% of respondents expected co-working relationship 
between Kabila and the leaders of nonviolent opposition, such as Tshisekedi, the leader of the largest of the 
nonviolent opposition groups, the UDPS (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progres Social / Union for 
Democracy and Social Progress). Disappointingly, Kabila showed no sign and no interest in sharing power. 
After the death of his co-leader Kisasse Ngandu early in the rebellion in January 1997, Kabila promoted himself 
from spokesperson to uncontested leader of the AFDL; and at the end of the rebellion, he proclaimed himself 
transitional president of Congo without serious consultation with political leaders and organisations involved in 
the movement (Afoaku in Clark 2003: 112-50). As the self-proclaimed president of the country, Kabila spread 
terror inside the AFDL and dismissed the Sovereign National Conference, which sought to re-establish the basis 
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from the eastern Kivu provinces in August 1998 against Kinshasa government by the 
Rwanda-Uganda backed RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy). However, as mentioned 
above this new ‘war of liberation’ was more complex in its nature than the 1996-7’s war. The 
war became increasingly complicated as a large number of African countries got involved 
both at government level and in relation to the rebel groups. During this phase of conflicts the 
anti-Tutsi factor played a key role in defining the enemy. The following paragraphs intend to 
look at the main different players in this new ‘war of liberation’. 
 
4.2.1. RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie / Rally for Congolese 






 of August 1998, from Kivu provinces the military wing of RCD was officially formed 
and launched the ‘war of liberation’ against Kabila’s government. This military wing of RCD 
was initially formed by four main key actors: (i) the Congolese Tutsi who felt isolated, 
betrayed and in danger
43
; (ii), the former AFDL solders who felt pushed out by Kabila 
autocratic style; (iii) the former Mobutu generals who were unhappy with how they were 
treated by Kabila (iv) the regional states, Rwanda and Uganda, former AFDL’s vital 
supporters in the 1996-7 war whose security on their borders with DRC was still a major 
problem which Kabila failed to solve as promised. 
 
Reyntjens (1999:246-7) and Afoaku (in Clark 2003:115-6) mention that as early as on 2
nd
 of 
August 1998 following Laurent Kabila’s decision ordering Rwandan and Ugandan troops out 
of the DRC
44
 fighting had started in Kinshasa, (Congolese Tutsi solders against FAC loyal to 
                                                                                                                                                    
of national participation and citizenship.  His regime alienated its supporters at home as well as Western 
governments and NGOs. His credibility plummeted (Afoaku in Clark 2003: 112-50, Lemarchand 1997). 
42 Appendix 2 
43 The Congolese Tutsi supported the 1996-7 war that toppled Mobutu regime with the hope of gaining 
nationality rights and a protection against the anti-Tutsi campaign that was growing in Kivu region with the 
arrival of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the region. However, as scholars such as Reyntjens (1999:242-4) and 
Vlassenroot (2002:509) point out, after the 1996-7 rebellion Kabila looked away from the nationality rights 
issue of the Congolese Tutsi, and the latter were persecuted as foreigners and enemy. And Kabila to regain 
popularity and credibility he resolved to propagate an anti-Tutsi campaign. This campaign was also catalyzed by 
the attitude and behaviour of a number of Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi, civilians and military: some Tutsis 
benefited from the 1996-7 situation to accumulate wealth at the expense of others, some of the non-Tutsi local 
populations were harassed and humiliated by Congolese Tutsi soldiers; and the RPA soldiers behaved as if they 
were operating in occupied territory, exploiting the mineral resources of the region. 
44
After the military victory of AFDL, Rwanda remained shortly a favoured ally of Laurent Kabila. General 
James Kabarebe (Appendix 10), a Rwandan army officer and the current Chief of Staff of Rwandan national 
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Kabila) in the Eastern areas of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, where Rwandan troops, former 
army officers of FAC and Banyamulenge troops attempted to seize military camps of 
Tshatshi and Kokolo. Sylvain Mbuki, the commander of the 10
th
 battalion of the FAC (one of 
the best units in the new Congolese army) stationed in Goma declared on Goma-based radio, 
‘Voix du Peuple’ that ‘We, the army of the Democratic Republic of Congo have taken the 
decision to remove President Laurent-Desire Kabila from power’. He was soon joined by the 
12
th
 brigade in Bukavu; and the Rwandan and Ugandan army units supported the rebellion. 
Many of the former army officers (ex-Mobutu generals) who were reintegrated in the new 
FAC were unhappy and were mobilized by Jean-Pierre Ondekane (Appendix 10) to join the 
rebellion in 1998. Some of the three Mobutu generals who joined the anti-Kabila rebellion 
are Barimoto, Nzimbi and Mavhe.
45
 
                                                                                                                                                    
army, was appointed military commander in Kinshasa and then Chief of Staff. In May 1997 the regional leaders  
gave the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) the task to structure and organize a new Congolese national army, for 
according to Julius Nyerere, it was a regional project (Scherrer 2002: 265). 
45 The rise of the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion was part of the empirical complexities of the DRC conflicts. 
Recalling from Chapter Two of this work, various studies have been conducted on DRC conflicts presenting 
different analyses. Certainly these different accounts on DRC conflicts reflect the complexities of these 
conflicts: there have been indeed, regional, internal wars being fought simultaneously on the DRC soil. And all 
the participants seemed to have their own agendas, sometimes conflicting with alliances and agreements made 
(Oyatambwe & Smis 2002: 414, Reyntjens 1999: 231-3). The investigation of the role of regional countries in 
DRC conflicts led to different conclusions. Jackson (2002: 520-522) and Autesserre (2006: 5-6) observe that the 
Rwandan-Ugandan intention in intervening in DRC conflicts was not merely a regional security, but also an 
economic interest. Jackson (2002: 520) reports that “[e]ven before [Laurent] Kabila [who was backed militarily 
by Rwanda and Uganda in 1996/1997] reached Kinshasa, foreign mineral concerns concluded lucrative mining 
concessions with him, financing his climb to power and consolidating their position to profit from it.” He further 
adds that the RCD rebel movement (against Laurent Kabila in 1998), which was backed militarily by Rwanda, 
was “the vehicle through which elite networks reap the harvest of Kivutien mineral wealth unhindered” (Jackson 
2002: 520). Autesserre (2006: 5) argues that Kagame (Appendix 10) and his ally, the RCD-Goma “presented 
many obstacles to the U.N. program that was organizing the pacific repatriation of the [Hutu militias] FDLR.” 
Autesserre (2006: 5) adds also that “the FDLR presence in the Congo provided Kigali with a pretext for coming 
back into the Kivus and pursuing what Rwanda was truly interested in: protecting the Rwandaphones and 
exploiting the Congo’s resources.” Would this be entirely true? There are other accounts that report that actually 
the FDRL and other regional rebel groups (Ugandan and Burundian) were a real threat to the regional security 
(Reyntjens 1999: 242, Eriksen 2005: 1099, Rafti 2006: 8-12, Oyatambwe & Smis 2002: 415-6, Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2005: 18, Lemarchand 1997and ICG 2007). The regional countries (particularly Rwanda and Uganda) 
backed militarily Laurent Kabila (1996/1997) and RCD (1998) so to secure their borders (McNulty 1999: 56-7, 
Reyntjens 1999: 241-3). Furthermore, since 1998 the FDLR soldiers had become extremely and highly skilled 
in guerrilla warfare. This led the MONUC’s military leadership fearfully resistant to use force against the 
FDLR. “We don’t want to send our soldiers home in body bags”; a MONUC commander confessed to the Crisis 
Group in an interview in Goma in July 2007 (Rafti 2006:11-12; ICG 2007:28). Without underestimating the 
possible credibility of the above accounts, I would like to emphasis here that the focus of my research is to 
investigate the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in these conflicts. Hence I shall try to narrow my 
discussion (as objectively as possible) on this core point of my research.  
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 The 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion got a rising momentum as more troops joined the enterprise 
and within few days the RCD had captured a number of towns and the Inga hydroelectric 
dam where the rebellion was able to cut off electricity supplies to Kinshasa as well as 
Katanga. However, with Angola and ex-FAR/Interahamwe (ALiR) backing militarily Kabila 
the RCD advancement was slowed down in late August 1998 (ICG Kivu Report 1998:6). 
 
The political wing of RCD was formed as late as 20
th
 of August 1998 by a group of 
Congolese politicians for a wide variety of reasons; some from the Kabila’s regime and other 
from Mobutu’s regime. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (Appendix 10) was the president of RCD 
and Jean-Pierre Ondekane (Appendix 10) was the military chief commander of the rebellion 
(ICG report 1998: 6).
46
 Although the RCD initially claimed that its aim was to end Kabila 
dictatorship and lack of leadership, thus to rebuild the country and promote peace in the 
region the movement proved to be endemically factious. Early in the 1998 war a new 
dynamic of conflict emerged within the movement, RCD. A major battle that took place in 
Kisangani between the UPDF (Ugandan People’s Defense Forces) and RPA (Rwandan 
Patriotic Army) mid-1999 was a clear sign of the already existing differences between these 
long-time allies over the objectives and strategies of the war in the DRC (Afoaku in Clark 
2003:117-8). Afoaku reports that, 
While Uganda showed some interest in encouraging the Congolese people to develop an 
alternative leadership, the Rwandan government was particularly interested in overthrowing 
Kabila, who was arming the radical Hutu enemy. The Rwandans were also more sceptical 
about the capacity of the Congolese people to work out an internal political settlement. The 
Rwandans’ first priority was to establish a secure border with the DRC (Afoaku in Clark 
2003:118). 
 
These differences were reflected in conflicts and shifting alliances within the RCD. In May 
1999 the RCD was split into two rival factions: Wamba dia Wamba and his supporters 
formed one faction the RCD-ML (RCD-Movement de Liberation); and a second one, RCD-
Goma was formed by the militarist core of the coalition comprising Congolese Tutsi, FAC 
officers, and former Mobutists. The RCD-ML was backed by Uganda, and the RCD-Goma 
was supported by Rwanda. The RCD-ML emphasized the need to legitimize the rebellion, 
while the Rwandan backed RCD-Goma aimed at the physical removal of Kabila from office. 
                                                
46
 ICG Congo report N
o
2, 17 November, 1998 (pp6-7) lists some of the politicians that joined forces in the 
formation of RCD: Bizima Karaha (a Congolese Tutsi from South Kivu), who was Minister of Foreign Affaires 
under Kabila; Shambuyi Kalala (a Kasai), Emile Ilunga (a Katangan), Moise Nyarugabo (a Congolese Tutsi 
from South Kivu) formerly Kabila’s private secretary and became Vive-President of the RCD; Deogratias 
Bugera (a Congolese Tutsi from North Kivu), formerly Secretary-General of the AFDL; Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, 
the first coordinator of the RCD, Wamba Dia Wamba, professor of history, and he was elected to head the RCD.  
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Furthermore, the two RCD factions also disagreed over the political and administrative 
control and resource exploitation in the territory controlled by RCD
47
. Following this RCD 
schism, further splits have occurred within the RCD factions producing smaller factions like 
RCD-Original, RCD-Populaire, RCD-National and RCD-K-ML. (ICG 2007: 24, Clark 2001: 
271-2, Afoaku in Clark 2003: 117-9, Collins 2002: 608-9). 
 




The second Congolese rebel movement that emerged in the 1998 anti-Kabila war was the 
MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo). The MLC was created and headed by Jean-
Pierre Bemba (Appendix 10) in September 1998 and launched its rebellion in November 
1998. The MLC was fighting for regime change in Kinshasa. The Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo was based in Equateur province, and enjoyed strong popular support in 
that area. It is reported that the MLC could be linked to Mobutuism for Bemba’s father was 
an important baron of the Mobutu regime. Thus, Bemba’s political background and 
experience was different from that of Wamba dia Wamba who was an opponent to Mobutu 
regime (Afoaku in Clark 2003:118). 
 
The differences within the two MLC and RCD movements weakened the 1998 anti-Kabila 
rebellion and rendered the war more complex. These differences resulted in intra-rebel 
conflicts and divisions making difficult to legitimize the rebellion. The MLC and RCD 
groups were located in different regions and they had different political perspectives: the 
MLC stressed more broadened national goals while the RCD generally and initially aimed at 
physical removal of Kabila from office. The above pointed out differences between the 
Rwanda and Uganda that backed RCD affected the anti-Kabila rebellion as a whole: 
differences over the objectives and strategies of the war, the differences over the political and 
administrative control and resource exploitation in the territory controlled by the rebellion. 
Attempts were made to bring together the MLC and RCD but with a very slim success. 
                                                
47 As mentioned in chapter two of this work, some scholars have argued that although Rwanda and Uganda 
backed AFDL in the 1996-7 DRC war aiming at securing their borders with DRC, in the 1998, the Rwanda and 
Uganda’s involvement in DRC conflict had economic interest: both countries had ambitious aims to control 
large parts of DRC including some of its mineral deposits (Scherrer 2002:256; Autesserre 2006:6-7; Jackson 
2002:520). 
48 Appendix 2 
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Furthermore, the anti-Tutsi propaganda that was being spread in the country and particularly 
in the Kivu region affected the anti-Kabila rebellion: the RCD was being portrayed as a 
Niolitc Tutsi-Hima channel to implement the Tutsi hegemony in the region. This rendered the 
rebellion as a whole unpopular and less legitimate (Jackson 2006: 97-107; Vlassenroot & 
Raeymaekers 2004:385-410). 
 





The FDLR descended from the ALiR. As mentioned above, the latter was composed of ex-
FAR (both genocidaires and non-genocidaires) and Interahamwe and young recruits from the 
1994 Rwandan refugee population. The ALiR was created by the former Governor of Kigali 
Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho
50
 and ex-FAR Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rwarakabije (Appendix 
10). They were helped by Mobutu and some of the then FAZ’s officers. By mid-1998, the 
Rwandan army had tried to destroy the ALiR killing and capturing key ALiR commanders 
and combatants (Rafti 2006:9). 
 
With the rise of anti-Kabila rebellion since early 1998 Laurent Kabila allied with the ALiR 
and helped the later to be restructured into two separate branches: ALiR I was based in 
Masisi (North Kivu) and Shabunda (South Kivu) and ALiR II was based in Kinshasa. The 
ALiR fought along side with the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) against the 1998 anti-
Kabila rebellion. The ALiR played a key role in propagating the anti-Tutsi ideology in DRC 
and particularly in Kivu region. In 2002 ALiR I and ALiR II came together under the 
politico-military movement the FDLR with Paul Rwarakabije as commander-in-Chief of the 
military wing of the movement (Rafti 2006:9). Both Laurent Kabila and his son Joseph 
Kabila supported (financially and militarily) and collaborated closely with the FDLR which 
contributed in spreading the anti-Tutsi hatred and fighting the Rwandan backed RCD. At the 
                                                
49 Appendices 3 and 5 
50 Col. Tharcisse Renzaho was arrested in 2002 in DRC and turned over the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in Tanzania. According to the ICTR prosecutor, Col Renzaho is alleged to have contributed to 
the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda (in 1994) in numerous ways. In July 2009, ICTR sentenced Col. 
Renzaho to life in prison (www.ictr.org).  
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rise of the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion many FDLR high ranking officers
51
 and its best soldiers 
were deployed in Kinshasa to back militarily Kabila’s forces. Since late 1998 the ALiR 
(which became FDLR) had become gradually the strongest single fighting force on the DRC 
government side (Scherrer2002:255-269). 
 
As previously mentioned, arriving in DRC in 1994 the Interahamwe and ex-FAR launched 
anti-Tutsi propaganda, killing Tutsis in the Kivu region and mobilizing local populations 
(Hutu and other tribes) so to implement a “Bantu culture” that would stand “Tutsi hegemony” 
(Reyntjens 1999:244). They contributed in ethnically polarizing the Kivu population and 
militarizing various local groups especially Mai-Mai. To make its voice heard and forcing its 
cause to local population the FDLR used and still uses terror and violence particularly in 
Kivu region where it is mainly based. “Doctors throughout Kivus report that most brutal 
rapes they treat have been committed by FDLR” (ICG 2007:28). UN and other human rights 
associations have reported thousands of FDLR rapes, killings and terror spread in Kivu 
region. Throughout the DRC conflict the rough treatment of the Kivu population by FDLR 
combatants had led the latter to be considered extremely violent. It has introduced an 
excessively violent culture in Kivu provinces.
52
 In south Kivu, the FDLR has remarkably 
contributed to social and demographic change: spread of anti-Tutsi hatred, pillage, violent 
attacks against the population has caused the ethnic-polarization of the society, the internal 
displacement, destitution, the fall of food self-subsistence, death of local civilians, and a high 
state of insecurity in the province (Rafti 2006: 18, Mararo 2002: 35).  
 
The FDLR ideology hinges on revisionist history, stressing the pre-independence Tutsi rule 
as oppressive to Hutu population. FDLR downplays the 1994 Rwandan genocide and claims 
and stresses rather that the RPF committed genocide against Hutu in Rwanda in 1994 and 
against Hutu refugees in DRC between 1996 and 1997; a discourse referred to as a “double-
genocide”. Rafti (2006:10) writes further that, 
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 These high ranking FDLR officers include General Paul Rwarakabije, former FDLR commander-in-chief till 
November 2003, and the current FDLR commander-in-chief General Sylvestre Mudacumura, a known Hutu 
extremist and former commander of President Habyarimana’s guard (ICG 2007:27-8). 
52
 Rafti (2006:14-8) and Scherrer (2002262-5) among others observe that the FDLR expropriate locals’ land, 
taking also their harvest and cattle. The FDLR combatants use also sexual violence, infecting their victims with 
HIV which results in the spread of HIV/AIDS in the Kivu region. The victims of rape and their families are 
often stigmatized, humiliated and socially marginalized. In some parts of Kivu region, civilians claim that they 
are forced to find a way of cohabitating with the FDLR so to survival. 
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FDLR ideology stems form a hardening of the Hutu identity (…) due to a sense of 
victimization that was fed by myths of oppression and was cultivated through life in exile. 
Many Rwandan Hutu refugees perceive their hardships in terms of Tutsi malice and any traces 
of guilt pertaining to crimes they may have committed during the genocide are replaced by 
feelings of injustice, which in turn give way to a radical view of their ethnic “rivals”. 
 
The FDLR’s main political objective is supposedly to change the post-genocide regime in 
Rwanda and the FDLR military wing proclaims itself protector of Rwandan Hutu refugees 
and has declared the use of force to achieve the movement’s political objectives. FDLR 
emphasizes the predicament of the Hutu and defines the RPF as the “first enemy” and the 
RPF is identified as the Tutsi population. FDLR combatants confess that they have killed or 
will kill “the Tutsi enemy” (Rafti 2006:10). The ICG (2007:27) reports that the FDLR 
soldiers, especially those who were young when they left Rwanda in 1994 are indoctrinated 
to believe that their enemy are Tutsi population since pre-colonial period and that the current 
regime in Rwanda is a Tutsi led government that seeks to oppress all Hutu and as soon as 





The FDLR commanders have sustained a recruitment network recruiting their combatants 
from young Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC; and they have extended their recruitment from 
Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and local population. Following their FDLR ethnic ideology, 
expressed in what they call “Hutu culture” the FDLR commanders emphasize that the 
recruitment be confined to Hutu only. Currently the FDLR is reported to have strength of an 
estimated 7,000 – 15,000 troops of which 3,000 to 4,000 are deployed in South Kivu.
54
 The 
FDLR has received support from the Government of the DRC and although this support has 
been officially terminated since the Lusaka agreement the informal support has been reported 
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 Scholars such as Rafti (2006:9-12), Mararo (2002:35.78) and Lemarchand (2006:1-20) argue that although the 
FDLR combatants (especially young ones) were raised in adverse conditions in refugee camps and in the 
Congolese bush under the extremists who installed anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi sentiments in them, the RPF public 
denial of crimes perpetrated against refugees in eastern Congo in 1996-7 deepened the mutual antagonisms and 
catalyzed the anti-Tutsi attitude among Hutu population in DRC. 
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 According to 2002 UNSC report, these figures are just estimates. Some sources report 4,000 to 6,000 FDLR 
troops operating from DRC soil and RPA estimations are around 13,000 to 15,000 FDLR troops. The strength of 
the FDLR military wing was also weakened when FDLR commander-in-chief General Paul Rwarakabije 
(Appendix 10) and other 100 combatants, among them high-ranking FDLR officers defected to Rwanda in 
November 2003. The known Hutu extremist Colonel Sylvestre Mudacumura (who later became General) 
succeeded Rwarakabije as commander-in-chief of the FDLR. The internal organisation of the FDLR have also  
been slightly destabilized by the internal regional intensions between FDLR commanders from the south of 
Rwanda and those from the north (who were associated with Habyarimana’s clique) and two prominent deaths 
of the deputy force commander, General Kanyandekwe and the secretary general, Colonel Nubaha (Rafti 
2006:20; ICG 2007:27).  
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(Rafti 2006:13, ICG 2003: 2, ICG 2007:27-8). Furthermore, apart from the DRC’s 
government support and close cooperation with the FARDC (Forces Armeés de la 
République Démocratique du Congo), the FDLR, employing the anti-Tutsi ideology, has 
succeeded in mobilizing and cooperating militarily with the Mai-Mai, the Burundian Hutu 
rebels FDD and FNL, and the local Hutu population (The 2002 UNSC report on armed 
groups in DRC, Rafti 2006: 12).  
 
Certainly as the above paragraphs underline; for Hutu extremists to solidify the existence of 
the FDLR and subsequently the safety of their survival a motivational beliefs system was and 
is a sine qua non condition. Paraphrasing political psychologists Tajfel and Turner (in Jost 
and Sidanius 2004:279), one of the functional aims of a beliefs system is to keep and increase 
the members of the constructed ‘in-group’, Hutu movement (FDLR) in this case. The new 
recruits were gradually to make the beliefs system, the views and objectives of the FDLR 
theirs. Indoctrination process was one way to mobilize the young Hutu to adhere to a beliefs 
system. And engaging the young Hutus in violent conflicts and in the killings affected 
certainly the psychology of these young people turning them into ‘killers’: in their view of 
reality morality is reversed. In this regards, Darley (in Jost and Sidanius 2004:391-2) states 
that situations can be created in which a person is drawn in the commission of evil, and in the 
process the participant is gradually transformed into an individual capable of autonomously 
and knowledgeably committing evil actions. 
 
Furthermore, according to Staub’s line of thought (2003:293-5) the persistent difficult life 
conditions and the experience of aggressiveness or violence are also ‘activator’ for an 
individual or group of people to develop violent behaviours. Ross (1995:537) adds that 
historical traumas, suffering inflicted may lead individuals or a group to see themselves as 
having been hurt and suffered that they can attend to their own needs and pursue their 
objectives feeling little or no empathy for the hurt and harm they inflict upon others. Harsh 
living conditions and the experience of violent conflicts had certainly affected the 1994 
Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC: refugee camps destroyed violently in 1996-7, forced and 
harsh life conditions in eastern DRC jungles, etc. (Kisangani 2002: 163-202). These factors 
might have contributed psychologically in drawing many young Hutus into the FDLR and its 




The military and political headquarters of the FDLR in DRC are based in Kalonge and Kibua 
respectively in the jungle of Walikale. Thanks to the ex-FAR officers the military 
organization of the FDLR unlike that of typical rebel forces is well structured like a 
conventional army. It has an ordered bureaucratic structure and a high command with 
decentralized military departments: personnel (G1); intelligence (G2); operations (G3); 
logistics (G4) and civil affairs (G5). Furthermore, according to MONUC sources, the FDLR is 
well armed and equipped. Its troops in Kivu provinces are profuse in remote areas that are 
difficult to reach by land or aircraft. They are militarily trained on regular basis and have 
become extremely and highly skilled in guerrilla warfare. This has led the MONUC’s 
military leadership fearfully resistant to use force against the FDLR. “We don’t want to send 
our soldiers home in body bags”; a MONUC commander confessed to the Crisis Group in an 
interview in Goma in July 2007 (Rafti 2006:11-12; ICG 2007:28).
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 Apart from cash payment 
from the DRC government the FDLR’s financial survival is mainly based on land cultivation 
in Kivu provinces, extortion and selling minerals. The FDLR controls important cassiterite, 
gold and coltan mines in Kilungu (Walikale), Birala, Masisi (Fizi) and Ziralo (Kalehe), taxing 
the miners and controlling important trade routes. In south Kivu, many of the FDLR 
combatants are embedded with the civilian population, where they cultivate plots of lands. 
Many of them are mixed with the Rwandan refugees and some of them are married to local 
women. 
 
The solid highly trained and well structured military organization of the FDLR had made the 
later a very powerful armed group in DRC difficult to crash down; very active and effective 
in spreading anti-Tutsi hatred; and a source of insecurity in region. Reporting about the DRC 
conflicts, the International Crisis Group (ICG) African report (2007:27) writes, 
The presence of Rwandan rebels in eastern Congo was a [principal] reason for the war against 
Mobutu and has remained an obstacle to lasting peace in the region. (…) [The Rwandan 
rebels] prey on locals and prevent the displaced population, in particular the Tutsi community, 
from returning. They regularly ally with local militia and the national army, thus forming a 
serious obstacle to reconciliation between local communities, as well as between Kinshasa and 
Kigali. 
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 This solid and well structured and trained military organization of the FDLR has made the latter a very 
powerful armed group in DRC  
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Various agreements have been signed by the concerned parties (the initially agreement 
between Laurent Kabila (Appendix 10) and Kigali to deal with ex-FAR/Interahamwe
56
 and 
later on the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the 2002 Pretoria Accords and others alike) 
articulating that the disarmament and disbandment of “negative forces”
57
 operating within 
and from DRC soil as one of the imperatives to regional peace however effective actions up 
to now are yet to be seen in this regard. Although in 2003 Joseph Kabila (Appendix 10)
58
 
officially cut off most support to the FDLR from DRC government the FDLR has 
continuously benefited military support and collaboration from FAC based on the strong ties 
formed during the 1998 war between its military officers and the FAC officers and is still 
established in DRC forests. 
 
4.2.4. Laurent Kabila’s camp and other regional participant in DRC conflicts 
 
In this second phase of DRC conflicts, Laurent Kabila led the new established DRC 
government army. However, at the outbreak of the anti-Kinshasa rebellion in the August 
1998, the DRC government forces showed a setback and were defeated in many areas in the 
first weeks of the 1998 war (Afoaku in Clark 2003: 115-6). The inefficiency and weakness of 
the Congolese government troops were due to different factors including their number and 
organization.
59
 In 1998 Congolese government troops numbered only 40,000 men; and by the 
end of 1998 about 10,000 men most of them Banyamulenge left the national army and joined 
the RCD. The formation of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) along ethnic and regional 
lines had also interfered with its effectiveness especially in Kivu region where troops are 
highly polarized according to ethnicity; and its contact with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe has 
sharpened this ethnic polarization. Subsequently, after Mobutu’s regime the FAC instead of 
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 In the outbreak of the 1996-7 “war of liberation” that toppled Mobutu, Kabila made an agreement with his 
allies (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) to secure DRC eastern border with these neighbouring countries against 
rebel groups. 
57
 “Negative forces” is a term used in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to describe armed groups other than the 
signatories of the Agreement (government forces and RCD-MLC rebels) in DRC. And these “negative forces” 
include the FDLR, the FDD (Burundian rebel group), UNITA (Angola rebel group), the Ugandan rebel groups 
(ADF, LRA, WNBF, and FUNA) and internal militias (Scherrer 2002:290). 
58 Joseph Kabila is the son of Laurent Kabila. He became the President of DRC in 2001 when his father, Laurent 
Kabila, was assassinated. 
59
 For instance, the only official troops supposed to control the North Kivu region are the Congolese government 
troops, but because of their number and bad organization, the DRC army has in many occasions permitted the 
other armed groups such as Ugandan rebels, Mai-Mai and the FDLR to police the province, and in some cases 
conducting joint patrol activities with these armed groups (ICG Kivu Report 1998:8-9). 
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being national army in character is rather dominated by an ethnic group of Kabila’s home 
province of Shaba. Another factor that severely limited the efficiency of the FAC is the lack 
of a proper mechanism for the salary payment of its regular soldiers and junior officers. 
Hence the latter often restore to illegal means of earning a living, which leads to acts of 
indiscipline. These factors and the low morale have contributed to the inability of the FAC to 
respond effectively to the rise of RCD against Kinshasa government in August 1998 (ICG 
Kivu Report 1998: 9-8). 
 
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, as the AFDL progressed in its 1996-7 war against 
Mobutu it gradually got infected by the anti-Tutsi propaganda; and Laurent Kabila had then 
began initiating contact with various armed groups in the east Congo including the ALiR 
(which later became the FDLR), the Mai-Mai and Ugandan rebel groups. And after being 
installed in Kinshasa as the new Chef d’Etat Laurent Kabila became autocratic and gradually 
distanced himself from his former allies, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, and officially made a 
call to the population for lynching Tutsis. Thus, as the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion (Rwanda-
Uganda backed RCD-MLC) launched its attacks, the FAC got vital military support from all 
these armed groups Kabila had formed relationships with (about 40,000 men from 
ALiR/FDLR; 12,000 men from Mai-Mai; 14,000 men from FDD-FNL and ADF). These 
groups contributed also in spreading the anti-Tutsi hatred and carried out the killings and 
atrocities against Tutsi and Tutsi-like population in various parts of DRC (Scherrer 2002: 
258; ICG 1998:1, Lemarchand 2006).  
 
As the 1998 anti-Kabila rebellion rose from Kivu region, Kabila did also a lot travelling 
seeking and calling for outside support. Some countries, fellow-members of the SADC 
(Southern African Development Community) including Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola 
responded by sending their heavily armed troops (Kisangani in Bradshaw & Butts 2002:10, 
Reyntjens 1999: 247, Lemarchand 2002:389). Later Libya, Chad and Sudan followed suit by 
either sending troops or making financial contributions to support Kabila. It was thanks to 
these various support (from the militias and these other African states) that Kabila and his 
FAC were able to stop the advancement of the Rwanda-Uganda backed RCD-MLC; and 
some Congolese citizens responding to anti-Tutsi propaganda and Kabila’s call to kill the 
Tutsi, joined in the conflict to fight the enemy, the “Tutsi invaders”. In 1999 Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement were signed by the government forces and RCD-MLC (Reyntjens 
2005:5). However, the realities on the ground were that the immediate cessation of hostilities 
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by the Lusaka Agreement signatories was not materializing till early 2001. The 2000-2001 
battle of Pweto became another turn in DRC war for it was one of the factors that led to 
Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001; and he was replaced by his son Joseph Kabila, the 




These brief analytical descriptions of the rise of anti-Kabila rebellion suggest that the 1998-
2001 DRC conflicts emerged in a more complex fashion. Following the fall of Mobutu there 
was again a lack of a solid leadership in Kinshasa that would address effectively some of the 
key factors of the 1996-7 war: citizenship rights of Congolese Tutsis, regional security and 
DRC domestic life (political, social and economical). The Congolese society was once again 
susceptible to violent conflicts as shown by the above data.  
 
Without oversimplification of the 1998-2001 conflicts I would like to argue that the 
frustration of the ‘universal’ psychological needs to use Staub’s terminology (2003:293-4) 
was the rationale behind the conflicts: threat of one’s identity, inability to control or address 
life problems (in all aspects) and to satisfy material basic needs. Drawing from the above 
analysis it appears that the parties that launched the 1998 rebellion felt betrayed by Kabila. 
Congolese Tutsis (deprived of citizenship rights) were once again threatened; their survival 
was at risk as the anti-Tutsi feeling increasingly sharpened and actively expressed in DRC 
and in Kivu provinces particularly. The regional states (Rwanda and Uganda)’s security was 
still unsolved.
61
 With the experience of the refugees’ camps destruction by RPA/AFDL, the 
1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees felt a necessity to reorganize solidly and fight for their survival 
hunting down and killing the ‘Tutsi’. The anti-Tutsi campaign became a survival mechanism 
(Staub 2003:299) for both Laurent Kabila and his allies (FDLR, FDD and Mai-Mai). The ex-
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 In mid-October 2000 FAC units jointly with ex-FAR/Interahamwe, the FDD, the local Mai-Mai as well as 
Zimbabwean and Namibian troops launched a major offensive in north-eastern Katanga province aimed to 
destroy the RCD-RPA bases. They captured RCD positions including the town of Pepa. Early December, RCD-
RPA heavily counter attacked and heavy fighting occurred in the vicinity of Pweto, on Lake Mweru; and 
Kabila’s camp was humiliated and lost thousands of men in the battle. The RCD-RPA captured Pweto on 6
th
 
December 2000. Pweto was a strategic point in Katanga and was Kabila’s Katanga-based power elite. The loss 
of Pweto to RCD-RPA created great tensions within and between the government and its allies. On 16
th
 January 
2001, Laurent Kabila outraged by the humiliating defeat in Pweto had an argument with his generals and was 
shot by his own people (Scherrer 2003: 288-290, Talbot 2001). Different rumours and conspiracy theories have 
been made about the shooting of Kabila, and some of the AFDL leaders have been accused. However, following 
the Kabila’s assassination, a staggering change took place: the Lusaka agreement was revived and all parties 
respected the ceasefire, Rwanda and four other states withdrew their troops, and MONUC was deployed 
(Scherrer 2003:288-290). 
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 As mentioned above, some literatures argue that the economic ambitions were one of the main factors in DRC 
conflicts and regional states intervention. 
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FAR/Interahamwe proved their usefulness on DRC soil in this regard. In the 1998-2001 DRC 
conflicts, deep-seated threats to identity and security fears served as powerful tools for armed 
groups formation and alliances (Ross 1995:525). The created “out-group” and “in-group” 
became a frame of alliances formation. 
 
4.3. THE 2004 ONWARD CONFLICTS AND KEY ACTORS INVOLVED 
 
The third phase involved some of the actors above mentioned; mainly the FDLR, a Hutu-Mai 
Mai coalition called PARECO and certainly the FAC. However, the new and main actor in 
this phase was the CNDP (the National Congress for the Defense of the People). As troops 
from all actors in the 1998-2001 conflicts started their process of integration in the new 
Congolese national army FARDC, a former RCD commander, General Laurent Nkunda from 
Banyamulenge felt betrayed. Followed by many of his men, General Nkunda left the newly 
formed FARDC in 2004 and launched attacks in Bukavu, a Kivu city to stop an ongoing 
killing of Banyamulenge (ICG 2007:1-4, 7; Schimmel 2006: 310-313), and in August 2005 
General Nkunda officially launched the Military Counsel for the People’s Defense (CMDP) 
with the goal of establishing an “inclusive and conflict-free government, capable of restoring 
peace and security of all in our republic”. The CMDP was later renamed CNDP (Congres 
National pour la Defense du Peuple) (ICG 2007:7). 
 
4.3.1. The CNDP (the National Congress for the Defense of the People) 
 
To reinforce the 1999 Lusaka Agreement in 2003 another peace agreement was signed at Sun 
City in South Africa and a three-year transition period was agreed up and an imperative 
appeal was made to all concerned parties to implement the elements of Lusaka agreement. 
Although the three year transition period following the Sun City peace agreement managed to 
improve significantly the security situation in most parts of DRC, preparing and creating 
conditions for peaceful elections in July and October 2006, the transitional government failed 
in many aspects to accomplish various necessary tasks before holding elections: army 
integration, “brassage”
62
, in Kivu region tensions remained high, no serious progress was 
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 Army integration was the central issue for the stabilisation of Kivu region because of its implications: the 
RCD’s political and economic survival and the physical security of its core Tutsi constituency depended to its 
military leverage. The Sun City agreement failed to define clear modalities ensuring the success of this army 
integration. The 2003 Congo’s peace agreement treated army integration as a mere technical process consisting 
of shuffling of command positions between former belligerents, without taking into consideration the 
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made with disarming the “negative forces” on DRC territory, resentment between local 
communities over land security and mass human rights abuses remained deep, ethnic hatred 
continued to divide the society (ICG 2007:1).  
 
Clearly in the climate of ethnic hatred, mistrust, fear and unhealed wound from the past 
conflicts the army integration was a crucial element particularly in Kivu region. The 
appointment of new army commanders, especially the FAC commanders, all over the Kivu 
provinces exacerbated inter-communal tensions. The continued anti-Tutsi propaganda and the 
presence of FDLR in Kivu region and its continuous ties and cooperation, though unofficial, 
with FAC officers were a threat to Tutsi community in the region. And during the brassage 
process the RCD dominated by Tutsi felt betrayed.  Ordinary Tutsi soldiers have been 
attacked, mistreated and pushed away on different occasion by soldiers of other ethnic 
groups. HRW (2007:10) reports that, 




 brigade) was disbanded after its 
officers, who were Tutsi, were told by their superiors that they were not Congolese. (…) 
soldiers [Tutsi] who joined other units were beaten, imprisoned, and tortured, and four were 
killed. (…) at a training camp in Bas-Congo province in February 2006, a soldier of 
Banyamulenge origin was blamed for the death of a fellow combatant of another group, and 
he and other Banyamulenge soldiers were attacked and several injured. 
 
The new army officers from Kinshasa appointed in Kivu region looked down the RCD 
soldiers and contributed in deepening the anti-Tutsi propaganda. Many of them continued to 
collaborate with the FDLR. Furthermore, in the run-up to national and provincial elections, 
different politicians also stepped up anti-Tutsi rhetoric, and the RCD-Goma and its 
constituency (Tutsi) gradually faced the risk to loose their political and economic survival. 
The new army commander in South Kivu province, a pro-Kabila General Nabyolwa 
mistreated Tutsi soldiers, and in May 2004, the national army under his command rounded up 
and killed fifteen Tutsi and forcing about 3,000 Tutsi civilians to flee the town (ICG 2007: 3). 
Faced with such unsecure situation and conditions, many of RCD officers led by General 
Laurent Nkunda (Appendix 10)
63
 refused and withdrew from the army integration process 
                                                                                                                                                    
implications on the ground and all aspects could be involved. The army integration process (which was called 
brassage) required soldiers from all concerned belligerents to be trained for 45 days and then to be deployed in a 
region other than in which they had previously fought; and during this process, soldiers could choose to be 
demobilized (HRW 2007:10). 
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based north of Goma in Masisi. 
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stating that they had no confidence in the army due to the fate, including death, many Tutsi 
soldiers faced in army formed under brassage process (HRW 2007:10-11). 
 
General Laurent Nkunda and his men launched the CNDP to protect themselves and the Tutsi 
community. Many Tutsi businessmen supported the rise of the Nkunda rebellion for their 
protection and survival. The CNDP, based in North Kivu, insisted as precondition for the way 
forward for the integration of its troops into the national army both the eradication of the 
FDLR rebels and the return and reinstallation of 45,000 Congolese Tutsi living in refugee 
camps in Rwanda. Since 2004, the CNDP has launched different offensive and defensive 
attacks on Bukavu, Goma, Sake and other places responding to abuses against Tutsi, whom it 
claims to protect. The CNDP has been accused of human rights abuses too, although its 
officers have denied such accusation. Different attempts have been made, with MONUC 
intervention, to bring the concerned parties (especially Kinshasa government and Nkunda) to 
find solutions that would bring end to the conflicts that are still paralyzing life in Kivu region 
till nowadays. The national army, in collaboration with different armed groups in Kivu region 
(especially FDLR, Mai-Mai) has occasionally launched attacks to the CNDP bases to destroy 
it but with no success (ICG 2007: 7-16,  HWR 2007: 10-12). 
 
Without going into political machination involved in the 2004 DRC conflicts, the analysis 
elaborated above points out a lack of political will and commitment on the concerned parties 
to end violence. The previous violent conflicts (the 1996-7 and 1998-2001 wars) had 
destroyed the Congolese society socially, economically and politically. Fear, mistrust and 
uncertainties based on these past experiences had become psychological driving forces in the 
society. Lack of improved life conditions and the failure to implement political and social 
reconciliation mechanisms of the Congolese society in its totality constituted a conflict-
oriented milieu. The anti-Tutsi feelings and expression, the presence of ex-FAR/Interahamwe 
on DRC territory and their actions continued to be a threat to Congolese Tutsis and to the 
regional security. The latter points to the core of the following chapter in which I would like 
to examine the instability in Great Lakes Region in connection to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu 
refugees. 
Although this study focused on DRC conflicts till 2006, it is to be added that the instability in 
DRC and in the Great Lakes region of Africa has continually been a hot issue. The CNDP 
continued to be one of the key players in these conflicts (United Nations Joint Human Rights 
Office: UNJHRO 2009). By November 2008, the CNDP managed to militarily secure several 
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strategic positions in Kivu regions. It occupied then a large area in the Kivu provinces 
(UNJHRO 2009). However, since end of 2006 till end of 2008 there have been internal power 
struggles within CNDP and speculatively some misunderstanding with Kigali
64
 (Ntarugera 
2009; UNJHRO 2009). In January 2009 General Nkunda was arrested by the Rwandan 
Government and held incommunicado in Rwanda. General Bosco Ntaganda (Appendix 10) 
took over the command of CNDP (Appendix 3).
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64 Kigali supported militarily CNDP, ensuring thus that FDLR does not launch attacks into Rwanda (HRW 
2007, UNJHRO 2009). 
65 The reasons for Nkunda’s arrest are still unclear (Ntarugera 2009). The legal Counsel representing Laurent 
Nkunda has set forth process with the Rwandan Government to discuss the case of Nkunda’s detention. A 
meeting between the interim President of the High Military Court of Rwanda (Capt Bernard Hategekimana) and 
Counsel representing Nkunda was to take place on the 5
th
 October 2009 ( www.cndp-congo.org). Following 
Nkunda’s arrest, the Governments of Rwanda and DRC launched joint military operations (Umoja) against 






The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees 




Geographically the Great Lakes Region of Africa comprises nine countries: Uganda, 
Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. However this study 
limits itself on the countries that share borders with Rwanda i.e. DRC, Uganda, Burundi and 
Tanzania. The post-genocide Great Lakes region of Africa has been marked by instability in 
various aspects: political vacuum, human rights abuses, economical instability, refugees-
generating conflicts and conflict-generating refugees. Almost all countries of the great lakes 
region did feel the impact of the Rwandan genocide at least in terms of the refugee flows. 
Chapter two in its second section makes allusion to the linkage between the Great lakes 
region’s instability and the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees however with less details and 
analysis. Thus this chapter intends to assess more closely the role of these refugees in the 
overall instability that the Great Lakes region of Africa has witnessed following the Rwandan 
genocide.  
 
The chapter argues that to a larger extent the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees have constituted a 
security threat in the region on many different dimensions: human security of the refugees 
themselves and hosting population, societal security as well as national and regional security. 
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first section describes the responses of the 
regional countries (specifically DRC, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi) to the 1994 Rwandan 
Hutu refugees’ situation. The last section examines critically the extent and nature of the role 
of these refugees in the instability that marked the host countries and the Great lakes region 
as a whole, focusing more on the security aspect. Certainly the previous chapters may be 






5.1. THE REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES 
 
Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide which claimed life of about 1 million Rwandan Tutsis 
and moderate Hutu, over two millions Rwandan Hutus took refuge in neighbouring countries 
particularly Burundi, Tanzania, DRC and Uganda. Among these refugees were the officials 
of the defeated regime, the ex-FAR and the Hutu militiamen but also thousands of ordinary 
people who followed their leaders’ call to flee the RPF (Luyt 2003:101; Shalom 1996:1:14; 
Kisangani 2000:165). Although the international community stepped in for humanitarian 
assistance the aforementioned regional countries had to shoulder all the responsibility of 
dealing with the massive inflow of these Rwandan Hutu refugees. 
 
Certainly the implications of refugee flows are blatant both for refugees and host countries. 
Studies have shown that refugees generally compel the host country to stretch its resources so 
to accommodate them. The refugees often face traumatic experiences that affect their 
psychological state. Additionally the refugees’ situations are also compounded by difficult 
life conditions in their refugees’ camps wherein overpopulation and overcrowding carry the 
possibility of epidemics that claim lives of these refugees (Appendices 6 to 9). When no 
effective control is in place in the refugee camps all sorts of crimes develop and threaten the 
lives of refugees (Cohon 1981:257-8; Akokpari 1998: 223-5).  
 
Most likely the degeneration of the life conditions in refugee camps into intolerable levels 
may create subsequently an environment conducive to conflict as Staub (2003:293) would 
argue. These theoretical observations suggest thus that following the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
(with over two million Rwandan population fleeing the country) mechanisms and policies 
were needed in regional countries to take on the onerous task of dealing with the outbreak of 
refugee crisis. This implied to ensure the well-being of the millions of Rwandan Hutu 
refugees by providing essential services and assistance, promoting and facilitating the 
voluntary repatriation, and ensuring that the set-up refugee camps retained an exclusively 
civilian and humanitarian character accommodating only people entitled to humanitarian 
protection and assistance.  
 
However, as mentioned in chapter two, the situations were different in each hosting country 
(Tanzania, Uganda, DRC and Burundi) due to various factors. The latter included the then 
existing structures and conditions (political, economical and social) in the host country but 
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also the dynamics of refugees themselves. Certainly it wouldn’t be illogical to postulate that 
the regional countries’ responses to the 1994 Rwandan refugee crisis affected in a certain way 
the stability of the host country and that of the region as a whole.  Furthermore recent studies 
remark that refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict and the by-product of 
war, they are also important political actors who can play an active role in conflict dynamics 
and instability (Salehyan 2007:127; Collier in Furley 2006:2). Thus expanding on the chapter 
two the following paragraphs intend to describe and analyze the response of the regional 
countries to the refugees’ crisis that followed the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 
 
5.1.1. Tanzania’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees’ crisis 
 
The United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania)
66
, although not actively involved in violent 
conflict that ravaged the Great Lakes Region, has received thousands of people fleeing 
violence in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC.
67
 Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide Tanzania 
hosted thousands of Rwandan refugees. Maina (1997:81) reports that by the 3
rd
 of June 1994 
Tanzania had received already 410,900 Rwandan Hutu refugees scattered in various camps in 
west of Tanzania (districts of Ngara, Karagwe and Muleba) near Rwanda. These camps were 
Benako (330,000), Murongo (15,000), Lukole (8,500), Kagenyi (24,000), Nyakasimbi 
(1,400), Burigi (5,000), Chabilisa (22,000) and other smaller camps (5,000). In total Tanzania 
is estimated to have hosted more than 600,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees joining another huge 
number of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Tanzania since 1960 and about 538,400 Burundian 
Hutu refugees (Ogata 2005:178; Muggah 2006:137).  
 
Life conditions in the Ngara, Karagwe and Muleba districts were to be affected by the 
massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan refugees in many ways: resources distributions, 
sanitation, social and environmental impacts. Undoubtedly as Biswas and Tortajada-Quiroz 
(1996:403) observe a sudden influx of thousands refugees confined to very limited areas is 
likely to have direct and indirect impacts on the environment. This has been the case of 
deforestation due to the refugees seeking mainly fuelwood for cooking. The immediate task 
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 Geographically, the United Republic of Tanzania (called simply Tanzania) is in the east of Rwanda and shares 
borders with Burundi (in west), Kenya (in north east), Uganda (in North West), DRC (in west) and in south 
three countries: Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. 
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 By the 1
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 of January 2007, Tanzania was among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries in the world with an 
estimation of 485,000 refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Somalia (www.unhcr.org).  
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of the then Tanzania government was to address as properly as possible the sudden refugees’ 
crisis by providing controlled assistance to the refugees and the Tanzanian population in the 
region where refugee camps were set; thus to ensure more or less better life conditions and 
security for all. 
 
At the abrupt influx of the 1994 Rwandan refugees en masse, the refugee law in Tanzania 
was nearly 30 years old: the Refugees (Control) Act of 1966.  Processes to prepare and 
implement a new law had been attempted since 1991. Although this 1996 Refugees Act had 
been characterized as the most comprehensive and detailed refugee legislation in Africa, a 
critical assessment of this law shows that the legislation was not very balanced for it 
emphasized very little in the way of refugees’ rights only duties and potential penalties 
(Maina 1997:87-8).
68
 In his address to the Cabinet in 1991 the then Tanzanian Minister of 
Home Affairs, Augustine Lyatonga Mrema, outlined the deficiencies of the 1966 Refugees 
Act and recalled the international legal framework in regards to refugees. These included 
“lack of definition of who a refugee is; duties of providing the refugee with the basics of life 
from the time of arrival in the country up to the time of departure; (…) absence of a specific 
institution entrusted with the task of dealing with the refugees in the country” (Maina 
1997:89).  
 
Certainly considering these deficiencies of the Tanzanian Refugees Act 1966, the legislation 
was inadequate to deal properly with the 1994 Rwandan refugees. For instance the Benako 
camp of about 330,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees hosted local leaders who participated in the 
Rwandan genocide and were taking other refugees in hostage (Ogata 2005:179). Obviously a 
need to define and separate ‘innocent’ refugee from the alleged criminals was de facto an 
imperative. To respond immediately to the refugees’ crisis on its soil the then Tanzanian 
government put in place mechanisms and policies: structures to control refugees, the refugee 
camps and modes of administration and assistance (to the refugees) were set up.  
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 The 1966 Refugees Act of Tanzania in many of its section had a tendency to place very wide discretionary 
powers on individual authority. For instance section 9 of the Act gives the Minister or any competent authority 
appointed by the Minister the powers to depot any refugee at any time. And section 7 states that the competent 
authority may order the detention and slaughter of animals belonging to and brought into the country by any 
refugee. Section 8 mentions that refugees’ vehicles may be used by the competent authority with no 




Tanzania cooperated closely with UNHCR to assist the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in 
many aspects and ensuring the security of refugees and Tanzanian population. Tanzanian 
police was mobilized in this regards. As soon as the new Kigali (Rwanda) government was 
established, a functioning tripartite mechanism (Tanzania/Rwanda/UNHCR) was put in place 
and refugees’ repatriation program was launched. Vigorous environmental protection 
programs were encouraged and installed in and around the camps aiming at preventing 
depletion of wood, water resources and soil erosion (UNHCR 2002: 68). Undoubtedly the 
Tanzanian history of calm and its solid and orderly structured response to the 1994 Rwandan 
refugee crisis contributed to the subsequent stability that continued to mark Tanzania unlike 
other regional countries. 
 
5.1.2. Uganda’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees ‘crisis 
 
Literature reports that relatively few 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees poured in Uganda 
following the Rwandan genocide. This might be due to the fact that the RPF invaded Rwanda 
from Uganda. And few data are reported about the life of these Rwandan Hutu refugees in 
Uganda.  Thus it may suffice to outline here that by the end of August 1994 UNHCR 
estimated about 10,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees in Uganda mainly women and children. And 
UNHCR in collaboration with the Ugandan local authority provided assistance to these 
refugees (UNHCR 2000:246). 
 
5.1.3. Burundi’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees ‘crisis 
 
Burundi is said to have received about 270,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees following the 1994 
Rwandan genocide and among them were leaders and Hutu militiamen responsible for the 
genocide. These refugees were settled in the north of Burundi, a region mostly occupied by 
the Burundian Hutus (Scherrer 2002: xiv). However no clearly defined mechanisms and 
policies were immediately put in place by the then Burundian government in order to deal as 





The history of Burundi has been also marked by the Hutu-Tutsi antagonisms that generated 
refugees both outside and inside the country
69
 (Uvin 1999: 253-4; Lemarchand 2006:1-10). 
The detailed presentation of the Burundian history of violence is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, in order to situate and properly grasp the social, economical and political 
environment in Burundi in 1994 (at the massive influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees) some 
elements need to be highlighted. Going back in time to the pre-genocide situation since 1993 
Burundi was plagued into violent conflicts that claimed thousands of lives. On the 1
st
 of June 
1993 Melchior Ndadaye won the presidential elections, the first Burundian Hutu to become 
president since independence in 1962. Tutsis were not happy for the defeat and immediately 
demonstrated against Ndadaye’s victory. On 21
st
 October 1993 the army (which is Tutsi-
dominated) carried out a bloody coup in which President Ndadaye was killed. The coup 
triggered massacres in many parts of the country and by the end of the same month UNHCR 
counted about 500,000 Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries: Rwanda, Tanzania and 
DRC (the then Zaire). By mid-November 1993 the number of Burundian refugees and IDPs 
had risen to about 800,000 of whom 100 a day were dying; and by the end of December 1993 
about 1.5 million Burundians (both Hutu and Tutsis) out of a population of 5.6 million had 
fled their homes to escape violence and up to 150 a day were dying (Arnold 2005: 857). 
 
In January 1994 Cyprien Ntaryamira also a Hutu was appointed the President of Burundi by 
the National Assembly. However, the violence continued in many parts of the country (Hutus 
and Tutsis killing each other) and the number of IDPs was increasing deplorably. The 
national army, police and Burundian Hutu militiamen were implicated in the violence. The 
country had fallen into an institutionally very insecure period marked by terror, oppression 
and economic decline. During this period the process of democratization was turned upside 
down. Relief agencies tried to cope with refugees and IDPs as they could. President 
Ntaryamira was killed on the 6
th
 of April 1994 in the plane he shared with the then Rwandan 
President Juvenal Habyarimana, and he was replaced by Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, a Hutu. 
Throughout 1994 Burundi experienced a state of low-intensity internal violent conflicts. 
However the then government was facing many internal challenges: the IDPs, the economic 
decline, reconstruction of the country (infrastructures), the rise of militiamen (both Hutu and 
Tutsi) and the reconciliation of Burundians (Khadiagala in Boulden 2003: 216-7; Dagne and 
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Farrell 2003: 1-2; Arnold 2005: 857). And this is briefly the state which the 1994 Rwandan 
Hutu refugees found in Burundi.  
 
The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees already marked by a history of Hutu-Tutsi antagonism and 
genocide feared the Tutsi-dominated Burundian government and army. This might have been 
one of the reasons that led many of these refugees to join and strengthen the Burundian Hutu 
militiamen as soon as they crossed into Burundi (Scherrer 2002:153). I shall come back on 
this point in the second section of this chapter. The point to highlight here is that at the arrival 
of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees the Burundian society was already ethnically fragile and 
sensitive. The society was destroyed by the Hutu-Tutsi violent confrontations which affected 
inevitably the functioning of the state. Mechanisms to deal properly with the massive arrival 
of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees immediately were technically absent. However, since 
UNHCR and other international relief agencies were already present in Burundi (due to IDPs 
and Burundian refugees as mentioned above) they intervened: setting up refugee camps for 
1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and providing assistance to the latter. 
 
5.1.4. DRC’s response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees ‘crisis 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (the then Zaire) is the regional country that received 
many of the Rwandan Hutu refugees. As mentioned in previous chapters about 1.5 to 2.0 
million Rwandan Hutu populations took refuge in DRC. Among these were thousands of ex-
FAR (genocidaires and non-genocidaires), the officials of the ‘defeated’ Rwandan regime 
that planed and oversaw the genocide, and thousands of Hutu militiamen who carried out the 
genocide (Kisangani 2000:165; Biswas and Tortajada-Quiroz 1996: 403). The massive influx 
of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees into DRC found the country already in a very bad shape 
politically, economically and socially.  
 
Without repeating all details described in previous chapters, it may suffice to briefly recall 
that prior to the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in DRC, the latter was marked 
and characterized by a state of non development, the political chaos and disorder, the 
longstanding dysfunction of the state, national economic decline, destruction of public 
infrastructures, corruption and injustice (McNulty 1997:54). This deplorable situation and 
difficult life conditions prevailed in the whole country and had created alienation, anger and 
frustration among the Congolese people. Political opposition was in existence but weak and 
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paralyzed as far as concrete actions to change the situation were concerned. The Kivu society 
has been characterized by a history of conflicts between Banyarwanda and ‘natives’ and 
unsolved issue of citizenship rights of Banyarwanda who were consistently regarded as 
‘foreigners’ (Autesserre 2006:9; Jackson 2002:520).  
 
Certainly form the above description it would not be irrational to argue that the 1994 DRC 
state was not effectively fit to deal properly with the sudden outbreak of massive influx of the 
1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees. The literature points out that the then Zairean authority failed 
to control the influx of these refugees. UNHCR and other international relief agencies 
stepped in immediately to provide assistance to this massive population in need. The refugees 
were settled in camps in Kivu region (Clapham 1998:138; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002:337). 
However till September 1994 the Zairean authority was still absent and UNHCR on its own 
could not ensure security in and around refugee camps. This vacuum permitted the 
proliferation of criminal activities within and from the refugee camps. The hosting population 
especially those near the camps started showing discontentment and asked for refugees to be 
repatriated or to be settled in other parts of the country (Royer in Guichaoua 2004: 442,460; 
UNHCR 2000: 251). 
 
The massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees affected the life in eastern DRC, 
politically, socially and economically. Infectious diseases including cholera spread in the 
region claimed thousands of human lives (of both refugees and local population). Serious 
ecological problems emerged increasingly as rapid deforestation within and around refugee 
camps took place as well as a very poor sanitation (Biswas and Tortajada-Quiroz 1996:403-5; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). The then opposition led by Etienne Tshisekedi urged the 
Kinshasa government to deal effectively with the massive influx of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu 
refugees unfortunately in vain (Arnold 2005:885). Mobutu on his side used the situation. He 
hoped to strengthen his influence and pursue his purposes making himself indispensable on 
both international and domestic fronts, resurfacing politically as the protector of refugees in 
central Africa (McNulty 1999:70-1). 
 
An agreement was made between Mobutu and the French that the then Congolese forces were 
not to disarm ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen. UN system and international 
humanitarian NGOs gave no thought to the definition of who actually was entitled to refugee 
status and protection. Ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen controlled the refugee camps in 
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full view of the UN and humanitarian agencies; and they were supported militarily by the 
French through Operation Turquoise
70
. UN and international humanitarian NGOs ignored 
violations of international law arising from the location of refugees’ camps too close to the 
Rwandan border. These camps were soon turned into ‘military camps’ (Mamdani 2001:254; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). The international community and Mobutu regime failed and/or 
refused either to separate bone fide refugees from armed ex-FAR/Interahamwe or to disarm 
the latter. The defeated 1994 Rwandan government, ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen 
reorganized and launched attacks against Congolese population (targeting Tutsis) and into 
Rwanda. The situation became increasingly volatile and exploded into violent conflicts in 
DRC, affecting the Great Lakes region’s peace and stability. In the following section I 
intends thus to examine closely the extent and nature of the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu 
refugees in the instability that marked the post-genocide Great Lakes region of Africa. 
 
 
5.2. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES’ 
ROLE IN THE INSTABILITY OF THE POST-GENOCIDE GREAT LAKES 
REGION 
 
The above analyses although with less in-depth details suggest that the Great Lakes Region’s 
response to the 1994 Rwandan refugee crisis was multifaceted in character. Various factors 
influenced each regional country’s behaviour towards the refugees in question. This regional 
response to the 1994 Rwandan refugees mirrors theoretical considerations of certain scholars. 
Jacobsen (1996:655-8) in his study on refugee influxes argues that a set of factors influences 
refugee policy formation in host countries. These factors include among others the costs and 
benefits of accepting international assistance, relations with the country from which refugees 
flee and national security considerations. In the line of the empirically-based Staub’s 
perspective (2003:298-9,381-4), Jacobsen’s list could rationally be expanded. In other words, 
dynamic factors such as history of aggressiveness or conflicts (in a society), social cultural 
and political background conditions (of host society) and the prevailing life conditions in the 
host country play inevitably a role in shaping refugee policies in host country. 
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Certainly (and theoretically) refugees by conventional definition of the term (UNHCR 
1978)
71
 are people in need of assistance. Therefore good policies (in host countries) are 
imperatively needed to provide protection and all assistance refugees may need. However 
recent studies remark that refugees are not merely unfortunate victims of conflict. They are 
also important political actors who may play a role in conflict dynamics. Although the vast 
majority of refugees may never directly engage in violence “refugee flows facilitate the 
transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict, they alter the 
ethnic composition of the state, and they can exacerbate economic competition” (Salehyan 
2007:127; Gleditsch & Salehyan 2006:335). Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide (with 
over two million Rwandan populations pouring in regional countries) the Great Lakes Region 
became more than ever a scene of violent conflicts and human rights abuses. In this section I 
thus intend to assess critically the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the overall 
instability that marked the post-genocide Great Lakes Region. I will mainly concentrate on 
security issue that has been ubiquitous in the region.  
 
5.2.1. Violent conflicts in the post-genocide Great Lakes Region of Africa and the 1994 
Rwandan Hutu refugees 
 
As the previous chapters outlined the post-genocide Great Lakes Region has been convulsed 
by violent conflicts. One of the particular marks of this ‘paroxysm’ is the two wars (that 
erupted in DRC: one in 1996 and the other in 1998) in which regional countries were actively 
involved militarily, politically and economically. Baptized “wars of liberation” the two wars 
were multidimensional in character and emerged out of a complex context of state collapse, 
national and regional insecurity.  Although fought on DRC soil, the two wars affected to a 
large extent peace and stability in the whole Great Lakes Region of Africa. The analysis in 
chapters three and four highlights the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in these two 
wars. I intend not to repeat just what these chapters have pointed out. The paragraphs below 
examine these two wars in their regional and/or continental dimension discerning critically 
the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees’ place in the conflicts. 
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(i) The 1996 DRC war and instability in Great Lakes Region of Africa 
 
In October 1996 the AFDL, an alliance of several anti-Mobutu forces, headed by Laurent 
Kabila launched the war from Kivu region and toppled Mobutu in May 1997. Regional 
countries Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi were involved in this war. The diagnostics 
of the causal roots of the 1996 war in DRC reveal certain indisputable ingredients to the 
eruption of this ‘regional’ war. These include the non-functioning of the state under Mobutu; 
Congolese population’s alienation, anger and frustration; the porous borders (a threat to 
regional security) and an increasingly ethnic hatred in Kivu provinces following the 1994 
Rwandan genocide (McNulty 1999:54; Khadiagala 2006:2-3; Arnold 2005:885-9).  
 
Recalling from Chapter Three the 1994 Rwanda Hutu refugees (particularly ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe) perpetrated terror, criminality and drove a wedge into the Banyarwanda 
community in the Kivu provinces (Pottier 2002:41; Scherrer 2002:145). They spread the anti-
Tutsi ideology and subsequently the Congolese Tutsis became gradually a target of violent 
attacks and exclusion (Kisangani 2000: 167-8; Vlassenroot in Kaarsholm 2006:57-8; Zartman 
2005:126-7; Arnold 2005:886-7). Staub (2003:305) and Dutton et al (2005:458) observe that 
the genocidaires or perpetrators of killings in general are likely to continuously spread the 
hatred ideology and engage into killings hunting down their “enemy” (the Tutsi in this case). 
  
As soon as they crossed the border into DRC, the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly 
the ex-FAR and Interahamwe) reorganized launched attacks into Rwanda and against 
Congolese Tutsi (Barber 1997:10). They controlled the refugee camps (in eastern DRC) in 
full view of the UN and humanitarian agencies. These camps were soon turned into ‘military 
camps’ (Mamdani 2001:254; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). From DRC soil, the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe mobilized and collaborated closely with the rebel movements operating 
from DRC territory. These rebel groups included the Burundian CNDD-FDD and FNL, the 
Angolan UNITA, the Rwandan Hutu rebels ALiR and Ugandan rebel groups. The Kivu 
region was suddenly turned into a source of insecurity for both Congolese population 
(particularly Tutsis) and neighbouring countries: Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Furthermore 
with the massive arrival of 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern DRC life conditions 
worsened. Economy became worse as ever, very poor sanitation and infectious diseases 
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(including cholera) featured the region claiming thousands of lives of both refugees and local 
Congolese population (Biswas & Tortajada-Quiroz 1996: 403-5; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18). 
 
This reality reflects the observations of recent studies on refugees. Scholars Gleditsch and 
Salehyan (2006:335, 340-1) among others remark that refugees can constitute a channel of 
transnational spread of ideologies conducive to conflict and arms; and they can increase the 
risk of subsequent conflict in host countries. Refugees can also expand rebel groups’ 
networks constituting subsequently a threat to the security of the host countries and the 
neighbouring states; and most likely altering the diplomatic relationships among the 
concerned countries. Additionally refugees can have negative effects on economic conditions 
and change the demographic profile of receiving region. They can be responsible for the 
spread of infectious diseases in the host areas and create serious environmental problem 
through deforestation, causing a decline in living conditions. And as Staub (2003:293) would 
argue difficult life conditions are mostly like to lead to violent conflicts. 
 
The Congolese state was practically absent to address effectively the crucial issue of the 1994 
Rwandan refugees that was drastically worsening the living conditions of Congolese 
population and threatening both domestic and regional security. The regional countries 
(Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi to a less extent) resolved to solve the security 
problem themselves by supporting vitally the AFDL rebellion. These regional states aimed at 
destroying the bases of aforementioned rebel groups (ex-FAR/Interahamwe, Ugandan rebels, 
UNITA and Burundian rebels). In other words, the 1996 war of liberation to overthrow 
Mobutu had a regional dimension i.e. to solve the increasingly regional insecurity which was 
linked to great extent to the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees as the above argument points out.  
 
Certainly many other regional and internal factors such as state collapse, frustration of 
Congolese population, economic deterioration, and economic interests might have 
contributed directly or indirectly to the outbreak of the 1996 war as chapters two and four 
mentioned. However, the main argument here is that the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees 
contributed to the increasingly insecurity in the eastern DRC provinces and in the regional 
countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi). The 1996 war on DRC soil was therefore 
conceptually an expression of the instability that prevailed in the Great lakes region. However 
it is important to note that not only the security of both regional countries and Congolese 
population was at a stake in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The very fact that 
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the armed groups (ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen) lived in and controlled the camps 
was in situ a potential threat to the bone fide Rwandan Hutu refugees. The Rwandan invasion 
in DRC in 1996 to destroy the ex-FAR/Interahamwe bases was indiscriminate in the refugee 
camps in eastern Kivu provinces. About 232,000 refugees (majority of them were non-armed) 
lost their lives and many others were dispersed into Congo’s deep forests wherein life 
conditions were harsh (Kisangani 2000: 163-180). The 1996 war of liberation ended with a 
spectacular victory of AFDL and its regional allies (Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi) 
in May 1997. Joseph Kabila became the new Chef d’Etat of DRC.  
 
(ii) The 1998 DRC war and instability in Great Lakes Region of Africa 
 
Laurent Kabila’s regime showed inability or unwillingness to solve the three problems at the 
initial origin of the 1996-7 war, i.e. the regional security (specifically the security of the 
Eastern neighbours), the status of Congolese Tutsi and the establishment of a broad-based 
government. Indeed these problems became worse than before. Laurent Kabila ignored and 
systematically excluded the former democratic opposition against Mobutu and mistreated 
many AFDL leaders. Furthermore, despite the security arrangements signed by the Kabila 
regime with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi; the DRC (particularly the eastern region) 
remained a source of insecurity and the launching ground of attacks against these countries. 
This became worse as Kabila expelled the Rwandan-Ugandan troops from DRC soil despite 
their instrumental role in securing his victory and launched an anti-Tutsi campaign (Arnold 
2005: 889; Scherrer 2002:251-3; Reyntjens 1999:243; CIFP
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 2002:12). Subsequently as 
chapter four points out, in August 1998 a new “war of liberation” against Kabila’s regime 
broke out from Kivu provinces. Rwandan and Ugandan troops gave a vital military support to 
the new Congolese rebel RCD. The eruption of the violent conflict provoked a chain reaction 
leading to the involvement of several other African countries (Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
Chad, Libya and Sudan) and the emergence of a myriad of new rebel factions. The 1998 war 
was then dubiously titled “Africa’s First World War” and claimed millions of human lives 
(Afoaku in Clark 2003:115-6; CIFP 2002:12).  
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Certainly to maintain objectivity in the face of complex and multidimensional evidences is 
surely difficult. Many of the available literatures on DRC conflicts arguably seem to be 
“thick description” of complex episode to use Clack’s terminology (Clark 2001:262) than 
being ‘scientific’ analysis of the events and factors driving them. I shall confess that without 
minimizing the weight of all other factors in the 1998 war (in DRC), the main focus here is 
the security (internal and regional) problem. As elaborated in Chapters Three and Four under 
Kabila’s regime in 1997 DRC and the eastern DRC in particular was plagued gradually into 
interethnic hatred and violent conflicts. The anti-Tutsi sentiment grew increasingly sharper in 
eastern DRC and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe became indispensable actors on the scene. Kabila 
collaborated so closely with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe to spread the anti-Tutsi campaign and 
they were a vital force on Kabila’s side in the 1998 war. These 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees 
reorganized into FDLR continued to cooperate with many other rebel groups operating from 
DRC territory, particularly the Burundian rebels, Ugandan rebels and mai-mai groups 
consequently threatening the regional security. The regional countries to secure their own 
borders from attacks by insurgents within the DRC resolved in invading DRC the second 
time. Having African countries fighting each other on DRC soil in 1998 war (on Kabila’s side 
there were Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Libya and Sudan; and on anti-Kabila 
rebellion’s side there were Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to less extent) affected certainly the 
interstate relationships between these countries and increased the instability in the Great lakes 
region. This insecurity in DRC and on its eastern borders was also in some aspects an 
extension of instability that prevailed in regional countries. 
 
5.2.2. Insecurity beyond DRC soil and the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees 
 
Certainly this academic exercise intends not to explore the regional countries’ reality 
(politically, economically and socially) in details. Rather to explore briefly and assess the 
nature and extent of the role of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (if any) in the internal 




Despite its intervention in the DRC conflict aiming at securing its borders, Uganda has been 
unable to bring an end to its own internal turmoil. Empirically based studies show that 
Museveni’s regime has had success in many aspects of life in Uganda. However, Museveni’s 
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government has failed to capture the imagination or win the support of population in northern 
sections of Uganda. The absence of the government and the longstanding insecurity in the 
northern-western region of Uganda has led to an increasing frustration among the civilian 
population in that region (Clark 2001: 265-6). Surely the population frustration creates a 
fragile environment (socially, economically) that can be easily infected by conflict as Staub 
(2003) would suggest. The northern and western regions of Uganda has been plagued into 
insecurity for decades due to the rebellion LRA against Museveni’s regime claiming 
thousands of human lives, creating IDPs and contributing to vulnerability and instability in 
the aforementioned regions.  
 
Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide the insecurity in northern and western Ugandan 
regions increasingly worsened. Since 1996 a new rebellion the ADF (Allied Democratic 
Forces) composed largely of ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Zairian soldiers emerged and started 
launching attacks in Uganda (south-western) from DRC’s territory. The ADF aimed at 
destabilizing the Museveni’s regime that had supported the RPF. The ADF perpetrated 
crimes, terror and human right abuses in Ugandan western region (CIFP 2002: 14-5; 
Reyntjens 2005:4). In 1999 eight tourists were hacked to death in the Bwindi Impenetrable 
Forest of Uganda. The killers are said to be Hutu rebels (ex-FAR/Interahamwe) based in 
DRC; and were targeting American, British and others seen as supporting Ugandan military 




As mentioned in previous chapters, following the 1994 Rwandan genocide the new regime in 
Kigali faced many challenges (economically, socially and politically). These included among 
many others the reconstruction of the country’s infrastructure, the unity of Rwandan society, 
the terrible psychological trauma left by the genocide, orphans and widows, and especially 
the insecurity on Rwanda-DRC borders. As soon as they poured in DRC the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe reorganized and infiltrated north-western Rwanda killing mainly Tutsi 
genocide survivors, Hutu seen as RPF collaborators, forcing young Hutus to join them in the 
forest, and destroying infrastructure. The new government in Kigali had made several appeals 
to international community and to Kinshasa government to intervene, but no actions were 
taken (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005:18; McNulty 1999:76; Arnold 2005:855-6). Surely the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe actual and potential attacks on Rwanda have been a threat to Rwandan 
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security. And as pointed out above this has been the main reason Rwanda invaded DRC in 




As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, in the 1994 the Burundian society was 
ethnically polarized and experienced a state of low-intensity internal violent conflicts due to 
its history of Hutu Tutsi’s tension since independence. The Hutu-Tutsi antagonism has led to 
an unstable political climate and periodic outbreaks of violent conflicts that generated 
thousands of refugees and IDPs and claimed thousands of human lives (Uvin 1999: 253-4; 
CIFP 2002:16; Lemarchand 2006:1-10). In the aftermath of 1994 Rwandan genocide, the 
Rwandan Hutu refugees in Burundi (particularly ex-FAR/Interahamwe) opted to join and 
strengthen the Burundian Hutu militiamen as soon as they crossed into Burundi (Scherrer 
2002:153). The ex-FAR/Interahamwe participated in instances of insecurity that prevailed in 
Burundi, targeting their ‘enemy’ the Tutsi. Scherrer (2002:228-31) reports further that late 
1994 the Burundian Hutu rebel group FDD-CNDD collaborated with the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe in murdering and plundering in Burundi’s rural areas close to DRC. 
Scherrer (2002:232) writes further that, 
[In mid-1996] the FDD continued to make free use of both Kivu provinces as a hinterland and 
worked increasingly closely with the perpetrators of genocide from Rwanda. Genocidal Pan-
Hutuism seemed increasingly to be becoming a reality. The massacre in Bugendana (in the 
province of Gitega) on July 20, 1996, in which Hutu extremists, spurred on by an 
inflammatory, RTLM-like radio station in Congo-Zaire and reinforced by Rwandan killers 
from the Interahamwe, attacked a Banyarwanda camp and bestially murdered three hundred 
Tutsi refugees, mostly widows and orphans (…). 
 
Furthermore in August 2004 the Burundian Hutu rebels FNL in collaboration with 
Interahamwe attacked Gatumba refugee camps (in Burundi) killings at least 152 Congolese 
civilians and about another 106 were wounded (HRW 2004:1). Till 2006 Burundi witnessed 
instability in many aspects: security, politically, economically and socially. 
 
Is there a hope for peace and stability in Burundi as well as in great lakes region as a whole? 
This imperatively demands a synergy of many efforts to seek, design and implement 
mechanisms and principles that could lead to the path of peace and stability. The insecurity 
(domestically and regionally) proved to be a crucial issue whose positive solution was a sine 
qua none condition to a sustainable development in the whole region and reconstruction of 
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the regional societies. The chapter’s analysis pointed out the role the 1994 Rwandan Hutu 
refugees (especially ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen) played in destabilizing the region. 
 
Certainly based on Staub’s perspective (Staub 2003) the chapter’s argument maintains that 
the difficult life conditions that characterized the countries of the region created a climate 
conducive to conflicts. Furthermore (psychologically) since the Hutu refugees particularly 
ex-FAR and Hutu militias had played a role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide likely they would 
continue hunting down their ‘enemy’ (the Tutsi) wherever they are (Dutton et al 2005:458; 
Staub 2003: 305). Additionally, the psychological state of these ‘refugees’: severe fear and 
anxiety of their future, depression, anger, aggressiveness (Cohon 1981:257-8) and shame 
provides also to a certain extent a rationale behind such violence-oriented behaviours. Thus 
as scholars (such as Salehyan 2007: 127; Collier in Furley 2006:2 to name few) and this 
humble research have shown refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict and the 
by-product of war, they are also important political actors who can play an active role in 




























The present study attempted to assess rigorously the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide in 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The research focused on the case of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo which felt the most terrible repercussions of this genocide especially the 
eastern DRC region.
73
 The research hypothesis stated thus that “The mass migration of 
Rwandan Hutu population following the genocide of 1994 contributed to the escalation of 
ethnic violence in the eastern DRC between 1996 and 2006.” The present academic exercise 
hoped to make a contribution to the fields of political science, peace and conflict studies by 
providing objective and rigorous analysis on possible linkages between the 1994 Rwandan 
refugee movements and the growth of ethnic intolerance and instability in the eastern DRC. 
This might hopefully shed more light on the understanding of conflicts and mostly on the 
refugees’ potential role in destabilizing the host region or country. 
 
Thus as entitled this last chapter intends to sum up the main points of the research findings 
and draw from the latter a conclusion. The chapter is subsequently divided into two main 
parts. The first section consists of a summary highlighting some of the key findings of this 
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 As suggested by some prominent scholars to study a single case can yield reasonable hypotheses and/or 
theoretical outcome (Moses and Knutsen 2007:132) 
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6.1. THE IMPACT OF THE 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE IN THE AFRICAN 
GREAT LAKES REGION:  THE 1994 RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES AND 
INSECURITY IN THE REGION 
 
The Rwandan genocide has been one of the cataclysms the world and Africa in particular 
have witnessed in the post-cold war era. Indeed as chapter two of this work outlined the post-
colonial Africa has been torn apart by intense and internal conflicts. Since 1990s the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa (particularly DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) has 
been convulsed by civil wars, interstate conflict, genocide and flawed democratic transitions 
(Lunn 2006:1). Studies have argued that the Great Lakes Region’s instability takes its major 
roots in the history of each regional country: the decay of the state and its instruments of the 
rule in the DRC (former Zaire), the “kin-country” syndrome, and the crystallization of ethnic 
tensions that have characterized Rwanda and Burundi generating the displacement en masse 
of population of those countries (Breytenbach et al 1999:1; Mauceri 2004:111; Lemarchand 
1997:11; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002:214).  
 
The ethnic confrontation (between Hutu and Tutsi) that marked the history of Rwanda and 
Burundi has contributed to a large extent to the instability that marked the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa. In 1994 the apex of this Hutu–Tutsi antagonism was the genocide in 
Rwanda that claimed lives of about a million of people (mostly Tutsis and few moderate 
Hutus) and generated a massive outflow of more than two millions refugees in the region. As 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2005: 18) observes all the countries of the Great Lakes Region felt the 
impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda at least in terms of refugee flow. Although, 
geographically the Great Lakes Region of Africa comprises of nine countries: Rwanda, 
Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Mozambique, the most affected states were Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC. 
These 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees have played an active role in conflict dynamics and 
instability in eastern DRC region and in the Great Lakes Region in general. 
 
6.1.1. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and interethnic attitudinal change in eastern 
DRC 
 
Chapter three assessed critically the shift in Congolese interethnic relationships following the 
1994 Rwandan genocide focusing on the change of attitudes towards Congolese Tutsi in the 
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eastern Kivu provinces. In order to measure and examine the nature and extent of the 
attitudinal changes towards the Congolese Tutsis in post-genocide DRC, two variables were 
rigorously analyzed. These were (i) The nature and extent of violent attacks against 
Congolese Tutsis; (ii) The nature and extent of political exclusion and discrimination against 
Congolese Tutsi. The chapter findings showed that before 1994 there was no record of 
antagonism or any form of violent conflict between Hutu and Tutsi living in the eastern DRC. 
The available literatures on pre-genocide eastern DRC articulate unanimously that any form 
of tension or conflict in Kivu provinces was between “native” ethnic groups and 
“Banyarwanda” (Hutu and Tutsi collectively). No anti-Tutsi sentiment or violent attack 
targeting exclusively Tutsi occurred in pre-genocide Kivu region (Mathieu & Tsongo 
1998:397; Mugangu in Guichaoua 2004:647-8; Vlassenroot 2002:499-515; Lemarchand 1997 
on http://web.africa.ufl.edu; Pottier 2002:26). However with the massive arrival of the 1994 
Rwandan Hutu refugees (including ex-FAR and Hutu militiamen responsible for the 
Rwandan genocide) in eastern DRC the interethnic relationships gradually shifted. The 
Congolese Tutsi populations became increasingly and exclusively a target of violent attacks 
and socio-political exclusion. The Kivu provinces were plagued into violent conflicts that 
spread throughout the DRC and affected the Great Lakes Region as whole. 
 
Various analytical studies have attempted to comprehend the complex violent conflicts 
befallen on post-genocide DRC pointing out factors such as economic interests, liberation 
and ethnicity as driving forces behind DRC conflicts (Jackson 2002:520; Chabal and Gentili 
2005:132; Scherrer 2002:256; Autesserre 2006:6-7; Reyntjens 1999:243; McNulty 1999:54-
56; Solomon 1997:3; Rutazibwa 1999:17; Pottier 2002:40-41; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 
2004:397; International Crisis Group 2007:22-28). Without dismissing these scholarly 
observations, the present research suggested that difficult life conditions, the social-cultural 
characteristics together with the psychological dispositions of both refugees (genocidal 
perpetrators and bone fide refugees) and host populations created a milieu conducive to 
violent conflicts (Staub 2003; Dutton et al 2005:458). 
 
Prior to the arrival of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Kivu provinces life conditions 
in DRC (the then Zaire) had deteriorated deplorably. The non-development had become a 
‘signal feature’ of the nation, the political chaos, the dysfunction of the state, economic 
decline, corruption and injustice had created alienation, anger and frustration among the 
Congolese people (McNulty 1996:54). Additionally the Kivu society has been characterized 
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by a history of conflicts between Banyarwanda and ‘natives’ and unsolved issue of 
citizenship rights of Banyarwanda who were consistently regarded as ‘foreigners’ (Autesserre 
2006:9; Jackson 2002:520). The massive arrival of about two million 1994 Rwandan refugees 
in eastern Kivu provinces aggravated disorder in the region and in the country as whole. Life 
conditions became worse to both refugees and local communities. Increase of food shortage, 
poor sanitation, promiscuity, spread of cholera and other infectious diseases, ecological 
damage, insecurity and economic deterioration led to a humanitarian catastrophe (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2005: 18; Royer in Gichaoua 2003:453-457). Furthermore, the Rwandan Hutu 
refugees included the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. And as studies have shown 
these ‘genocidaires’ were most likely to continue hunting down their target perceived as a 
‘virus’, an ‘enemy’ to be killed, the Tutsi (Staub 2003:305; Dutton et al 2005:458). 
 
The failed state in DRC under the Mobutu regime provided a context for the 1994 Rwandan 
Hutu refugees (particularly ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militiamen) to reorganize and start 
launching attacks into Rwanda (as early as end of 1994), aiming at destabilising the new 
government in Kigali (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2005). The ex-FAR and Interahamwe spread hatred 
ideology and mobilized local ethnic groups and Hutus to hunt down the Congolese Tutsi. The 
latter gradually became an ‘enemy’, an ‘out-group’, a target of violent attacks and exclusion. 
From Staub’s perspective (2003: 370) when facing persistent difficult life conditions that 
frustrate psychological needs (identity, connection, etc.) people tend mostly to turn to a 
group. The latter is suddenly defined as an ‘out-group’ and scapegoated for life problems. In 
this process which often leads to violence, hatred ideologies are adopted. Following the fall 
of Mobutu in 1997, life conditions in DRC were not improved they rather become worse. The 
Kabila regime collaborated closely with ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the anti-Tutsi sentiment 
increasingly sharpened in eastern DRC and in whole country in general.  
 
6.1.2. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the rebel movements in eastern DRC 
 
The above consideration illustrates in a way the scholars’ observation that “refugee flows 
facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict” 
(Gleditsch & Salehyan 2006:335). Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide DRC witnessed 
two national ‘wars of liberation’ (in 1996 and 1998) both rooted in the Kivu region’s 
convoluted mixture of political machination, communal violence, borders sensitivity, and the 
exploitation of mineral and agricultural wealth of the region (Jackson 2002:520). The 1996-7 
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struggle that toppled Mobutu’s regime put in motion a complex chain of conflicts that marked 
the DRC since then, involving various actors and different alliances: internal rebel groups and 
regional states. 
 
The DRC conflicts can be divided into three main phases: (i) the October 1996 to May 1997 
(anti-Mobutu rebellion: launched by AFDL); (ii) the August 1998 to late 2001 (anti-Kabila 
rebellion: launched by RCD); and (iii) the 2004 onwards conflicts.  In each phase the main 
actors were descriptively assessed (their constituency and raison d’être). The presence of ex-
FAR/Interahamwe (reorganized under ALiR which became FDLR) on DRC territory has 
been one of the factors that led to the outburst of the two ‘wars of liberation’ (the first two 
phases of the DRC conflicts: 1996 anti-Mobutu and 1998 anti-Kabila). The ex-
FAR/Interahamwe in Kivu provinces had become a security threat on many different 
dimensions: human security of the host population particularly Congolese Tutsi and regional 
security particularly to Kigali government. They contributed significantly in anti-Tutsi 
propaganda that marked the DRC conflicts.  
 
With the arrival of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in DRC the eastern Kivu society became more 
ethnically polarized. The whole region was increasingly submerged into a phase of profound 
dualization characterized by a theme of Bantus vs. Hamites (Reyntjens 1999). In this context 
the rebel movements and alliances were formed following the line of ‘Bantus vs. Hamites’ 
and/or the principle that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. The ALiR/FDLR has been 
one of the main actors in DRC conflicts. It mobilized local population on the basis of its 
ideology, and participated in military training of internal rebel movements (such as mai-mai) 
and arms trafficking. 
 
Certainly the survival (political, social and economical) of either party involved in the violent 
conflicts in DRC and in Kivu provinces in particular  was to a larger extent the main driving 
factors behind these conflicts. When the group’s survival is threatened politically, socially 
and economically the need for connection becomes powerful (Staub 2002:16; Ross 
1995:525). Hence the formation of alliances and rebel movements observed in DRC as 
conflicts unfolded. The complexity and multidimensionality of DRC conflicts is indeed of no 
dispute. This academic exercise emphasized that the frustration of the ‘universal’ 
psychological needs to use Staub’s terminology (2003:293-4) was mostly the rationale behind 
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initial driving forces in the conflicts: threat of one’s identity, fear, survival security, inability 
to control or address life problems (in all aspects) and to satisfy material basic needs. 
 
6.1.3. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees and the instability in the Great Lakes Region 
 
The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees have constituted to a larger extent a security threat in the 
region on many different dimensions: human security of the refugees themselves and hosting 
population, societal security as well as national and regional security. Following the 1994 
Rwandan genocide over 2 millions Rwandan Hutu populations took refuge in neighbouring 
countries particularly Burundi, Tanzania, DRC and Uganda. Among these refugees were the 
officials of the defeated regime, the ex-FAR and the Hutu militiamen but also thousands of 
ordinary people who followed their leaders’ call to flee the RPF (Luyt 2003:101; Shalom 
1996:1:14; Kisangani 2000:165). Studies have shown that refugees generally compel the host 
country to stretch its resources so to accommodate them. The refugees often face traumatic 
experiences that affect their psychological state. Additionally the refugees’ situations are also 
compounded by difficult life conditions in their refugee camps and when no effective control 
is in place in the camps all sorts of crimes develop within and around refugee camps (Cohon 
1981:257-8; Akokpari 1998: 223-5). This certainly illustrates the Staub’s theoretical 
perspective (2003:293).  
 
Thus mechanisms and policies were needed in regional countries to take on the onerous task 
of dealing with the outbreak of refugee crisis. Although the international community stepped 
in for humanitarian assistance the aforementioned regional countries had to shoulder all the 
responsibility of dealing with the massive inflow of these Rwandan Hutu refugees. However 
as descriptively detailed in chapter five the situations were different in each host country 
(Tanzania, Uganda, DRC and Burundi) due to various factors (political, economical and 
social) but also the dynamics of refugees themselves.  
 
It suffices to briefly mention here that the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees (particularly ex-
FAR/Interahamwe, officials in the former Rwandan government that oversaw genocide) 
contributed in one way or the other in the insecurity problem that prevailed in the post-
genocide Great Lakes Region. The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees were actively involved in 
some instances of violence in Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and Burundi. The ex-
FAR/Interahamwe were main actors in DRC conflicts and collaborated closely with 
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Burundian Hutu rebels and Ugandan rebels (ADF and LRA) in perpetrating violence in 
Burundi as well as in Uganda. This observation correlates to some recent scholarly 
consideration that refugee flows are not only the results of conflicts or political turmoil. The 
refugees are an important active mechanism by which conflict can spread across regions. The 
refugees can expand rebel networks increasing subsequently the risk of insecurity outbreak in 
both host and origin countries (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006: 335).  
 
 
6.2. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide not only claimed the lives of about million Rwandans (mostly 
Tutsis) but also it left the country shaken. The Rwandan society was profoundly wounded in 
many ways including experiences of profound traumas, creation of thousands of orphans and 
widows, and the associated destruction of thousands of families. The present research shows 
that the Great Lakes regional countries (mainly Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and DRC) did 
feel the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide at least in terms of refugee flows and 
instability (particularly increase of regional insecurity). As a case study the research findings 
confirm that the mass migration of Rwandan Hutu population following the genocide of 1994 
contributed to the escalation of ethnic violence in the eastern DRC between 1996 and 2006. 
The 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees contributed to the interethnic attitudinal change towards 
Congolese Tutsis in eastern Kivu provinces. The Congolese Tutsi became increasingly an 
out-group and an ‘enemy’. These refugees contributed in expansion of rebel formation and 
networks in a ‘Bantus-Hamites’ created climate in eastern DRC region. 
 
To conclude, I would like to simply note that the difficult life conditions that characterized 
the countries of the Great Lakes Region have created a climate conducive to conflicts. 
Additionally, the psychological state of the 1994 Rwandan Hutu refugees – trauma, severe 
fear and anxiety of their future, depression, anger, aggressiveness, genocidal past (Cohon 
1981:257-8 Dutton et al 2005:458; Staub 2003: 305) and shame – also provides (certainly to 
a certain extent) the rationale behind the violence-oriented behaviours of these refugees: 
particularly the officials of the Abatabazi government, the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu 
militia. Thus as scholars (such as Salehyan 2007: 127; Collier in Furley 2006:2 to name a 
few) and this research have shown refugees are not only the unfortunate victims of conflict 
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and the by-product of war, they are also important political actors who can play an active role 




• Certainly the complexities of the historical, social, economic, and political realities in 
each particular conflict case are to be critically considered as far as the African 
conflict studies are concerned. Thus to achieve lasting peace, conflicts should be 
imperatively mastered. This requires fully comprehending and addressing the root 
causes and complex factors and forces of conflicts (Adedeji 1999:7). The academics 
through research and publication can offer a great contribution in this aspect. 
 
• Undoubtedly the path to peace and sustainable stability and development in the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa demands axiomatically a synergy of many efforts in many 
aspects. Based on the present research’s analysis the persistent difficult life conditions 
(with subsequent frustration of ‘universal’ psychological needs) appear to be initial 
starting points to violent conflicts. Therefore, in order to end and avoid violent 
conflicts (that have ravaged the Great Lakes Region of Africa) policies that promote 
development, national stable economy, respect of human rights, justice and good 
governance are to be implemented in the regional countries. 
 
• Research findings show also that refugees are also important political actors who can 
play an active role in conflict dynamics and instability. Thus mechanisms and policies 
are needed in regional countries to take on the arduous task of dealing with the 
refugee crisis. This implies to ensure the well-being of refugees by providing essential 
services and assistance, promoting and facilitating the voluntary repatriation, and 
ensuring that the set-up refugee camps retained an exclusively civilian and 
humanitarian character. 
 
• Studies and the present research have shown that the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism has been 
one of the key ingredients in violent conflicts in Great Lakes Region. It has become a 
‘virus-like’ in the region. The Hutu-Tutsi confrontations particularly in Rwanda and 
Burundi have led to deep-seated hatred, wounds, trauma, suspicion and insecurity in 
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the regional societies.  Thus governments and leadership that would promote a path to 
reconciliation are needed in the region. In the regional countries (particularly Rwanda, 
Burundi and DRC) there is a need to implement policies and mechanisms that 
promote processes of psychological healing, educational process in values of 
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Appendix 4:  South Kivu region, DRC 
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Appendix 6:  Living conditions in Refugee camps (Goma Camp of 
Rwandan Hutu refugees, DRC 1994) 
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President of Rwanda from 
1973 to 1994 (died in 1994). 
 
Col. Theonest Bagosora: 
Rwandan Ministry of Defence 
Cabinet Director in 1994 
during genocide. He is 
sentenced (life in prison) by 
ICTR. 
 
Mobutu Sese Seko: 
President of DRC from 1965 to 
1997. He had a strong 
friendship with President 
Habyarimana (Rwanda). He 
died in 1997 (in Morocco). 
 
Jean Kambanda: Prime 
Minister and Head of the 
Interim Government in 
Rwanda (in 1994 during 
genocide). He is sentenced (life 
in prison) by ICTR. 
 
Yoweli Museveni: 
President of Uganda from 1986 
till today (2009). 
 
Paul Kagame: President of 
Rwanda from 2000 till today 
(2009). 
 
    
Gen. Laurent Nkunda: 
One of the military 
commanders of RCD till 2003, 
founder and commander in 
Chief of CNDP till 2009. 
 
Gen. Bosco Ntaganda: 
One of the military 
commanders of CNDP, and 
commander in Chief of CNDP 
since 2009 after the Gen. 
Nkunda’s arrest. 
 
Gen. James Kabarebe:  
Currently Chief Staff of 
Rwandan Army. In 1997-1998 
he was appointed military 
commander in Kinshasa and 




Laurent Kabila: Leader of AFDL that 
overthrew Mobutu in 1997. He was the President of 




Joseph Kabila: Son of Laurent Kabila. He is 




Gen. Jean Pierre Ondekane: He was the 
military chief commander of the RCD at the rise of 
the 1998 anti- Kabila (Laurent) rebellion in DRC. 
 
Prof. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba: He was 
the president of RCD rebel movement against 
Laurent Kabila in 1998.  He was one of the four 
vice-presidents in the transitional government of 
DRC from 2003 to 2006. He is currently a senator 
in the DRC.  
 
Jean Pierre Bemba: founder and leader of the 
MLC movement, which was part of the 1998 anti-
Kabila rebellion. He was one of the four vice-
presidents in the transitional government of DRC 
from 2003 to 2006. 
 
Gen. Paul Rwarakabije: One of the founders 
of ALiR (end of 1994) which became FDLR in 
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